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Abstract
This dissertation examines the treatment of venereal disease (VD) in the Canadian
Expeditionary Force (CEF). The Canadians had one of the highest rates of infection
during the war with 15.8 per cent of servicemen being diagnosed with VD. These figures
generated concern among Canadian officials about the negative impact this could have on
both public health and opinion. Overseas officials needed to develop policies and
procedures to control the spread of the disease. When strict disciplinary measures did
little to address the issue, the military experimented with more lenient ones rooted in
science and medicine. Even with these measures in place there were still thousands of
men who needed medical treatment, which required the creation of a VD management
system. The development of this system is the main focus of this study. As the Canadian
Army Medical Corps (CAMC) was part of the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) they
operated under the guidelines and procedures established by the British War Office.
With two theatres of operation, VD required the creation of two systems. In
France, VD cases needed to be treated and returned to the line as quickly as possible,
which was complicated when mobility returned to the battlefield in late 1918. There was
little agreement between the RAMC and CAMC about treating VD at the front. But the
RAMC had authority and was unwilling to discuss changes to procedures at a critical
point of operations. In England, the CAMC had more influence over the development of
the VD management system. Special VD hospitals were established by the CAMC to
treat the large number of cases that developed locally. Staffed primarily by civiliantrained CAMC doctors, these hospitals became important sites for VD research and
development. Treatments utilized new developments such as the use of salvarsan, which
was a highly toxic compound. Drug therapy was complicated by problems in the system
that were uncovered in a 1918 investigation. VD research being conducted by the CAMC
was seen as a crucial component of screening soldiers returning to Canada. Authorities in
Canada insisted that strict measures be put in place to prevent the return of infected
servicemen. Despite their known limitations, the Wassermann and Schwartz tests were
used to detect cases of VD. While these procedures were in place for much of the war,
they had to be abandoned when the war ended and Canada was tasked with demobilizing
its overseas contingent at a rapid pace. Exploring the CAMC through the lens of VD
allows for a long overdue examination of the medical war of the CEF.
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Introduction
On 4 October 1917 Lieutenant-Colonel William Thomas MacKinnon informed
his superiors, “A number of patients in this Hospital have reported 6 girls as below,
employed at ‘The Canadian Palace of Fun,’ as a source of infection. This firm has two
places of amusement, one at Folkstone and the other at Cheriton…Some action might be
taken to protect the troops from the above mentioned girls.”1 MacKinnon was the Officer
Commanding (OC) at Etchinghill Hospital in Folkstone, a special hospital established to
treat Canadian soldiers with Venereal Disease (VD). The VD problem began almost as
soon as Canadian troops arrived on Salisbury Plain in October 1914. Many of them,
despite having been medically inspected in Canada, had contracted VD before going
overseas. The magnitude of this problem increased as men began to interact with the
local population and this relationship between soldiers, prostitutes and local women has
been well documented.2 The Canadians are given the unique distinction of having had the
highest rate of VD in the war. Of the 418,052 soldiers who served overseas 66,083

1

LAC, RG9-III-B-1 Vol. 1826, W.T.M MacKinnon, Source of Infection, 4 October
1917.
2

Margaret H. Darrow, French Women and the First World War: War Stories of the
Home Front (Oxford: Berg, 2000), Craig, K. Gibson, “Sex and Soldiering in France and
Flanders: The British Expeditionary Force along the Western Front, 1914-1919,”
International History Review 23, 3 (2001): 535-79, Karen Hagemann and Stefanie
Schuler-Springorum, Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender in Twentieth Century
Germany, (New York: Berg, 2002), Phillipa Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics:
Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire, (New York: Routledge, 2003) and Clare
Makepeace,“Punters and their Prostitutes: British Soldiers, Masculinity, and Maisons
Tolérées in the First World War,” In John Arnold. What is Masculinity?: Historical
Dynamics from Antiquity to the Contemporary World, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian,
2011).
1

soldiers – or 15.8 per cent - were diagnosed with VD.3 This dissertation argues that
throughout the war, Canadian officials struggled to cope with the high number of
infections. To combat the problem they focused on prevention – first through disciplinary
measures to reduce sexual activity but later adopted a more liberal approach to reduce
infection from sexual activity through the use of prophylaxis and early treatment centres.
This shift at the policy level affected the development of medical services tasked with
treating VD. Above all else, the Canadian medical services took a special interest in VD
research and development that stemmed from their desire to protect public health and the
legacy of the war.
Even with the adoption of these types of measures there were still thousands of
cases that required treatment. Separate medical services were created to treat soldiers in
France and England and medically inspect them before they returned to Canada. This
medical system played a significant role in managing the so-called VD problem but how
it operated and evolved over the course of the war has received little attention from
historians. Most of the current literature focuses on the changes to VD management at the
policy level or the construction of sexual norms. While VD management was affected by
shifts in attitudes surrounding sex and VD

– especially at the policy level – it is

important to examine how this impacted the clinical level. In doing so, we can see how
British policy (after all the Canadian Expeditionary Force was part of the British Army

3

Jay Cassel, The Secret Plague: Venereal Disease in Canada, 1838-1939. (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1987), 126. It is not clear whether the high rate is evidence
of higher incidences of VD or if this number reflects a more thorough screening process
and effective diagnosis.

2

and never autonomous), negative stigmas, and wartime conditions impacted the evolution
of the Canadian medical system and the effect it had on Canadian soldiers.
This does not mean, though, that the topic of wartime VD has been completely
neglected. In their examination of wartime epidemics, medical geographers Matthew
Smallman-Raynor and A.D. Cliff studied the rates of VD amongst armies from 1875 to
1989, arguing that the rates of VD among armies have historically been contingent on
several internal and external factors. As an organization, an army typically has near
complete command over its soldiers, staff and policies. They could exercise a degree of
control over VD through education of its medical staff, accessibility of treatments and
prophylaxis, disciplinary measures initiated by the commanding officer and availability
of alternative forms of entertainment for the troops. However, the effectiveness of these
internal forms of control was largely dependent on external factors such as local control
over prostitution, which was not always consistent. At an individual level, SmallmanRaynor and Cliff found that servicemen were more likely to seek out prostitutes and
thereby increase the chance they develop VD, if they suffered from excessive loneliness
or boredom that was compounded by geographic isolation, accessibility to brothels or
women, lack of military controls, deployment type or demographics. Some men even
used VD as a self-inflicted wound to escape service. 4 These findings reflect pre-war VD
rates in the British Army where incidence levels remained higher in forces stationed

4

Matthew Smallman-Raynor and A.D. Cliff, War Epidemics: An historical Geography of
Infectious Disease in Military Conflict and Civil Strife, 1850-2000 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 349-413 and 527-565.

3

abroad than at home.5 During the Great War, as we will see, high VD rates among
Dominion soldiers was also blamed on the fact that soldiers were far from home and their
higher rate of pay made them more attractive to local women. Smallman-Raynor and
Cliff show some of the unique factors that shaped wartime sexual relationships.
The literature for the First World War focuses on both the construction of pre-war
masculine ideals as well as how these were transferred to (or were challenged in) the
interwar period.6 Historians working on wartime sexuality have focused on the social
problem of venereal diseases among First World War soldiers to analyze how the state

5

William Grant Macpherson, Medical Services Diseases of the War, Volume II, (London:
His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923), 119.
6

Michael C. Adams, The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990); Mark Osborne Humphries, “War’s Long
Shadow Masculinity, Medicine, and the Gendered Politics of Trauma, 1914–1939,” The
Canadian Historical Review 91, 3 (September 2010): 503-531; Jeff Keshen,
Propaganda and Censorship During Canada's Great War (Edmonton: University of
Alberta Press, 1996); Jeff Keshen, “The Great War Soldier as Nation Builder in Canada
and Australia,” in Briton Cooper Busch, ed., Canada and the Great War (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003); Jessica Meyer, Men of War: Masculinity and
the First World War in Britain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Desmond
Morton and Glenn Wright, Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the
Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987);
Desmond Morton, Fight or Pay: Soldier’s Families in the Great War (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2005); Desmond Morton, When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the
First World War (Toronto: Random House, 1993); Mark Moss, Manliness and
Militarism: Educating Young Boys in Ontario for War, (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 2001); George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal
Sexuality in Modern Europe (London: Howard Fertig, 1985); Mike O’Brien, “Manhood
and the Militia Myth: Masculinity, Class and Militarism in Ontario, 1902–1914,” Labour
/ Le Travail 42 (Fall 1998): 115-141; Christopher Pugsely, The ANZAC Experience: New
Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War (Auckland: Reed Publishing,
2004); Jonathan Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the First World War
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997).

4

organized to combat this ‘moral problem.’7 In recent years, researchers have begun to use
sexuality to explore the cultural and social factors that characterized life on the Western
Front. According to British historian Mark Harrison, the “ways in which the Army
responded to the problem of venereal disease in these countries reveals much about the
place of medicine within British warfare. It also illuminates military concepts of
masculine virtue, as well as prevalent attitudes towards women, ‘race’ and class.”8 An
examination of life in the trenches through the lens of prostitution and VD expands our
knowledge of how war challenged contemporary conceptions of gender, class and race
because VD was viewed as both a medical and moral issue.
Military medical services had to evolve to meet the challenges of modern warfare,
one of which was controlling the outbreak of VD among soldiers. Harrison contends that,
much like shell shock, the problems associated with prostitution and VD challenged
traditional assumptions regarding gender, race and class. While other army medical
services may have developed to meet the needs of modern warfare, the British

7

Allan M. Brandt, No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United
States Since 1880 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); S. Buckley, “The Failure
[of the British Government] to Resolve the Problem of Venereal Disease among the
Troops,” in B.Bond and I.Roy, eds. War and Society: A Yearbook of Military History,
Volume II, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishing, 1977); Cassel, The Secret Plague;
H.C. Fischer and Dr. E.X. Dubois, Sexual Life During the World War (London: Francis
Aldor, 1937); Gibson, ‘Sex and Soldiering in France and Flanders,” 535-79; Mark
Harrison, “The British Army and the Problem of Venereal Disease in France and Egypt
During the First World War,” Medical History Journal 39, 2 (1995): 133-158; Antje
Kampf, “Controlling male sexuality: combating venereal disease in the New Zealand
military during two world wars,” Journal of the History of Sexuality 17, 2 (May 2008):
235-258; Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics and Angela Woollacott, “‘Khaki Fever’
and its Control: Gender, Class, Age and Sexual Morality on the British Homefront in the
First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 29, 2 (April 1994): 325-347.
8

Harrison, “The British Army,” 134.

5

Expeditionary Force (BEF) struggled with the problems that arose from prostitution and
VD throughout the war. VD had been a concern before the war as both a public health
and moral issue, but during wartime there were concerns it would affect the ability of the
army to keep men fighting. Combating VD, Harrison suggests, presented a unique
problem for medical officials since it encompassed both a moral and medical issue that
challenged traditional assumptions about sexual and gender norms.9 It did so because
contracting VD meant that men (and women) had engaged in pre-marital or extra marital
sexual relationships that contradicted preferred Victorian morals. Despite clear moral
objections to ‘deviant’ sexual behaviour, military authorities were also conflicted when it
came to regulation and enforcement in ways that civilian social reformers and lawmakers
were not: prostitution and sexual recreation were also perceived as necessary evils which
helped sustain morale. In his examination of American and British responses during the
war, historian Edward Beardsley contends that the British were reluctant to address the
problem of VD and organize effectively until the later stages of the war as they “regarded
prostitution as something between a necessary evil and a vital auxiliary service.”10 This
dilemma is often repeated within the existing literature. A few histories have begun to
examine what these sexual encounters meant to the soldiers themselves and the officers
tasked with maintaining the social and moral integrity of the British Army. 11

9

Harrison, “The British Army,” 134.

10

E. H Beardsley, “Allied against Sin: American and British Responses to Venereal
Disease in World War I,” Medical History, xx (1976): 190.
11

See Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War
(London: Reaktion Books, 1996). Bourke provide insight into male intimacy in the
trenches but focuses on male bonding and does not detail sexual encounters with women.
Makepeace, “Punters and their Prostitutes.”
6

Understanding this moral conflict is important as these social and political factors shaped
the construction of VD policies.
Another important layer in these studies is the dynamic between the British and
Dominion armies. While the British viewed VD “as regrettable but unavoidable” the
Governments of Australia, Canada and New Zealand were less ambivalent about the
problem.12 A few histories have explored the experiences and attitudes regarding VD in
the Dominion armies during wartime.13 Dominion soldiers had the highest VD rates
among the Allied nations. These high rates were attributed to the fact that Dominion
soldiers were far away from home and their higher rates of pay made them more
attractive to local women. A number of historians have argued that Canada, Australia and
New Zealand were the first to take serious action because of the effect that VD was
having on their soldiers and the negative impact it could have at home following the war.
Preserving the legacy of the war was seen as an important cultural component that was
necessary to foster the growing independence of the Dominions.14 In response, Australia
demanded better treatment and facilities to help combat the disease, while Canada’s
Prime Minister Robert Borden vowed that Canada would not send troops if another war
broke out unless this matter was effectively dealt with.15 This exchange is significant, as

12

Cassel, The Secret Plague, 123.

13

Beardsley, “Allied against Sin”; Buckley, “The Failure [of the British Government],”
Gibson, ‘Sex and Soldiering in France”; J. Greenhut, “Race, Sex, and War: The Impact of
Race and Sex on Morale and Health Services for the Indian Corps on the Western Front,
1914,” Military Affairs, xlv (1981): 71-74 and Harrison, “The British Army.”
14

Jeff Keshen, “The Great War Soldier as Nation Builder.” See also Keshen,
Propaganda and Censorship and Vance, Death So Noble.
15

Beardsley, “Allied against Sin,” 192.
7

without the pressure of its Dominions, Britain might not have changed its policies on
prostitution and VD. Historian Edward Beardsley argues, “by March 1918, the British
government was in serious difficulty for it stood to lose a large amount of citizen support
in Britain and the Dominions over prostitution and venereal disease.”16 The dilemma
stemmed from the fear that providing preventive measures would encourage behaviour
that was considered immoral. This predicament, along with pressure from the Dominions,
shaped the construction of wartime VD policies.
Much of the literature has focused on the evolution of the response to the VD
problem at the policy level.17 Initially, the favoured solution to the VD problem focused
on reinforcing sexual continence through lectures and punishment. As the rate of VD
continued to rise, this tactic was supplemented by more permissive attitudes that saw the
development of early treatment centres, the use of prophylaxis and the construction of
special VD hospitals. Harrison explores the three main views that shaped the policies
surrounding the contraction and treatment of VD in the BEF: sexual continence,
medically regulated prostitution and a more liberal approach using technology.18 While
these views all influenced the creation of VD policies to some degree over the course of
the war, Harrison argues that BEF policy regarding VD was largely successful because

16

Beardsley, “Allied against Sin,” 198.

17

Beardsley, “Allied against Sin”; Bourke, Dismembering the Male; Brandt, No Magic
Bullet; Cassel The Secret Plague; Darrow, French Women and the First World War;
Gibson, “Sex and Soldiering in France and Flanders”; Hagemann and SchulerSpringorum, Home/Front: The Military, War and Gender; Levine, Prostitution, Race and
Politics and Makepeace, “Punters and their Prostitutes.”
18

Mark Harrison, The Medical War: British Military Medicine in the First World War,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 155.

8

the efficient work of medical personnel was supported by the individual responsibility the
soldiers bore over their own sexual health. 19 Historian Allan Brandt describes the
evolution of VD policy in the American Expeditionary Force as a battle between moral
order and scientific efficiency, “the two most powerful social currents of
Progressivism.”20 Missing from these works, however, is a study of how VD was actually
managed and treated on the battlefield. While the varying scientific and moralistic views
may have informed methods and procedures, such as the implementation of prophylaxis,
early treatment centres or medically regulated prostitution, little is known about how VD
was treated when a soldier in the trenches or in England was found to be suffering from
VD.
The historiography on wartime VD in the Dominion countries draws a deeper
connection between battlefield and the home front. Historians in Australia explore similar
themes to their British and American counterparts but in the context of a Dominion
located far from the battlefields. In her examination of sexuality in Australia, historian
Lisa Featherstone explores the effects of VD at home and overseas during the war. She
looks at the problem as a class and gender issue since the VD problem incited concern
over the physical and moral health of soldiers who increasingly came to define
masculinity and nationhood.21 She argues officials were not concerned with individual
suffering but the potential negative effect on the image of the Australian Imperial Force

19

Harrison, The Medical War, 170.

20

Brandt, No Magic Bullet, 96.

21

Lisa Featherstone, Let’s Talk About Sex: Histories of Sexuality in Australia from
Federation to the Pill, (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 94.

9

(AIF), which prompted officials to review policies and treatments. 22 Author Raden
Dunbar takes a similar approach, examining the evolution of the campaign to control the
outbreak of VD among Australian soldiers through the lens of army officials, medical
doctors and the soldier.23 He finds that commanders were initially moralistic, ordering
strict punishments or sending home those who contracted VD. However, the medical
community eventually forced them to confront the problem through an alternative
approach. As the AIF arrived in Europe in 1916, they were issued prophylactics and
given sex education. While both of these works show the shifts in treatment and
understanding of VD, Marina Larsson looks at the effect these campaigns had on
Australian soldiers as they returned home. In Shattered Anzacs, Larsson briefly explores
the impact that VD had on marital relationships after the war. Wives often unknowingly
contracted VD, while some servicemen suffered from insanity caused by untreated
syphilis.24 Although her analysis is brief and limited to two Australian couples, Larsson’s
work reveals the human aspect of a topic that is primarily written about from a medical
and moral perspective.
The Canadian historiography has followed a similar trajectory as Australia
although it has yet to explore the connections between VD and medical problems in the
interwar period. Historian Jay Cassel devotes a chapter in his book, The Secret Plague
Venereal Disease in Canada, 1838-1939 to the response of Canadian officials to the
22

Featherstone, Let’s Talk About Sex, 98.

23

Raden Dunbar, The Secrets of the Anzacs: The Untold Story of Venereal Disease in the
Australian Army, 1914–1919, (London: Scribe Publication, 2014).
24

Marina Larsson, Shattered Anzacs: Living with the Scars of War, (Sydney: University
of New South Wales, 2009), 136-38 and 165-66.

10

outbreak of VD amongst the troops of the First World War contingent. Cassel’s work
draws important attention to how Canada’s dominion status affected the response to the
problem of VD in contrast to approaches in the British, French and German armies. He
argues that the biggest problem the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) faced was the
fact that prevention and treatment fell under the purview of the medical arm of the BEF,
which saw VD as regrettable but largely unavoidable. This reality, according to Cassel,
was especially true among Dominion soldiers who had no family to visit on leave and
were targeted by prostitutes since they made more money. He argues these circumstances
resulted in a large number of Canadian soldiers contracting VD while overseas. 25
Desmond Morton deals briefly with the problem of VD from the perspectives of medical
services and discipline. He focuses on the preventive measures employed by the CEF
rather than cures and causes. Sex education and ‘blue light depots’ became more widely
available to the men, but women remained the focus in the formation of policies to
combat VD. Within the BEF, Morton argues, “These luckless women were arrested,
medically examined and, if infected, jailed without treatment. Canada imitated the British
regulations, with much the same cruel consequences for women.”26 When Cassel and
Morton, and most other histories on the topic, examine the issue it is primarily from the
perspective of policy formation – the push and pull of morality, science and necessity.
This is what is missing from the historiography – a detailed examination of how
these competing interests affected medical services tasked with treating VD. Sir Andrew
Macphail wrote the official history of the Canadian medical services seven years after the
25

Cassel, The Secret Plague, 124

26

Morton, When Your Number’s Up, 202.

11

war but what is missing is a contemporary analysis of Canada’s medical war. Books like
Mark Harrison’s The Medical War are a good starting point for Canadian studies but it
only tells half the story. Canada, like Australia and New Zealand, found themselves in a
unique position as they became increasingly responsible for the health of their troops
even though their medical services fell under the direction of Great Britain. Battlefield
medicine played a significant role in soldiers’ lives and we need to write these histories to
provide a framework for their experiences. Transnational comparisons can help us
understand the complexities, similarities and variations of the British and Dominion
systems especially when sources are sometimes scarce.
Historian Mark Humphries takes this approach in his recent examination of the
treatment of shell shock at the front. Humphries situates the experiences of Canadian
soldiers and doctors within the larger structure of the Royal Army Medical Corps
(RAMC). He explores the interplay between British and Canadian policy, where their
respective practices diverged and converged. In doing so, he uncovers the differences
between the procedures that were created to manage shell shock and how it was treated
on the battlefield.27 His use of admission and discharge books along with official reports
and contemporary writings taken from Canadian, British and Australian sources provided
the framework for how I approach VD in the CEF.
VD provides an interesting lens to study the Canadian Army Medical Corps
(CAMC). Shifts at the policy level had a significant impact on the delivery of medical
services and the experiences of soldiers while policy and practice often diverged or were

27

Mark Osborne Humphries, A Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary
Force, 1914-1918, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018).

12

inconsistently applied. The progression from strictly punitive tactics rooted in morality to
more liberal measures shaped by medicine and science fundamentally changed the VD
management system. Over the course of the war, men were increasingly given access to
more prophylaxis measures including calomel tubes, early treatment centres and
sometimes condoms. At the clinical level, the treatment of soldiers also changed over the
war. Men sent to a VD clinic early in the war received few comforts and experienced
little compassion while hospitalized. This harsh view was gradually replaced by the
notion that treating these men as ill rather than social deviants would produce better
results. This close examination also allows us to see how successful the military was at
implementing the newer medical techniques and technologies that were available. From
here we can begin to understand how policy changes and medical services actually
impacted soldier care in the CEF.
To accomplish this task, I have primarily relied on the files of the Canadian
Assistant Director Medical Services (ADMS) in England along with the war diaries of
the British and Canadian medical services (LAC, RG9, Militia and Defence and TNA,
WO95, War Diaries). Admission and discharge books and contemporary writing from
medical journals like the Canadian Association Medical Journal have provided
additional information on many of the reports in these records. Files from the AIF have
been used to supplement these materials (AWM), as the Australian war experience was
remarkably similar to the Canadian one. These sources allow us to see how the military
responded to the problem of venereal disease. We can begin to understand how the
CAMC functioned and the factors that shaped their responses and policies such as the
theatre of operations, cost, curative rates, and manpower. The majority of these records
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were generated from mid-1916 onward as it became clear that the VD problem required a
more systematic response.
These administrative records allow for a comprehensive examination of the issue
but it is important to note that officials higher up the medical chain of command crafted
the letters and reports in these files. While their experiences and concerns no doubt
sometimes deviated from those who worked below them, they played a significant role in
facilitating medical services. The case study of Etchinghill allows us to fully appreciate
how these plans affected outcomes at the clinical level.28 As the largest VD hospital in
the CEF, Etchinghill had a significant role as both a passive recipient and active
participant in the creation of this system. Here we get a better understanding of the
experiences and roles of the hospital’s staff although this narrow focus does not capture
everyone involved in the process. Missing from these sources are the reports of the
battalion medical officers who were the first ones to diagnosis and treat these cases. Even
if these were available, they still only tell us one side of the story – the doctors. Patient
experiences are mediated through medical and military authorities as soldiers’ voices
appear infrequently throughout the available records. Even more difficult to reconstruct
are the stories of the women who were the main targets of many policies and procedures
that were created. Nevertheless, these records can help us understand the structures that
shaped one’s work or medical care even if we do not always know how they felt about
these experiences.
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The first chapter explores the impact VD has had on the military since the first
major outbreak that occurred in Naples in 1495 and how it has evolved over time.
Without comprehensive and cohesive policies, the military response to VD among their
ranks has varied since Charles and his men fled Naples all the way up to the First World
War. It examines some of the dominant themes such as experiments with legalized
prostitution, the use of punitive measures, available treatments and the implementation of
prophylaxis. The solutions employed by military officials have been largely reactive and
shaped by local commanders and concerns. The lack of a formal strategy left the British
unable to effectively deal with the high rates of VD they experienced early in the First
World War.
The second chapter examines the development of a VD management system in
France during the Great War. Given that the majority of VD was acquired while men
were on short leave or stationed in England, the treatment of VD in France has received
less attention. The availability of medically-regulated brothels along the Western Front
may give one the false impression that VD was not as serious an issue in France. While
VD infections contracted in France were generally lower than in the United Kingdom, it
was still a problem as it occurred at a critical point of operations. They needed men in the
trenches, not in a hospital being treated for a sexual infection. Commanders and medical
services in the field had to develop policies and procedures to deal with cases at the front,
as these did not exist prior to the war in the British Army. Both the British and Canadians
established early treatment centres after punitive measures failed to curb rates of
infection. An evacuation system was created to move cases to VD hospitals located in the
rear, increasing tensions between the British authorities and Canadian physicians who
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thought soldiers with VD should be kept closer to the battlefield. The conflict was a moot
point after both armies had to adapt to the renewed mobility of the battlefield in the fall
of 1918. Increased access to large city centres in Belgium and during the occupation of
the Rhine crossings in Germany, coupled with a lack of early treatment centres, led to a
dramatic increase in the number of VD cases reported within Canadian divisions. Even
so, operational effectiveness was never seriously compromised by VD, so in this sense,
the policies accomplished their purpose of keeping most men at the front.
The third chapter looks at the treatment of VD in England by examining the
evolution of Etchinghill, a special Canadian hospital established to deal with local cases.
The hospital played two important roles in the development of VD management: how it
managed cases inside the hospital and how it shaped VD management outside its doors.
Etchinghill operated under the guidelines determined by the War Office but an
examination of its records shows that the doctors had a high degree of autonomy not only
in the day-to-day administration of the hospital but also in regards to research and
experimentation at the hospital. The hospital’s operations were closely scrutinized after
the deaths of eleven Canadian soldiers from suspected arsenic poisonings from 606
injections at several different clinics. The deaths sparked an inquiry into the whole
Canadian VD medical system, which uncovered multiple problems with the management
of syphilis in particular – many of which were found at Etchinghill. The fourth chapter
explores the findings of these investigations. Procedures were ignored, records were
unreliable and there were multiple problems coordinating care among the different
medical structures.
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Examining the VD management system at the hospital level also reveals some of
the limitations of the available treatments and technology, which impacted procedures for
returning these cases to Canada. The final chapter looks at the process of demobilization
– sending soldiers with a history of VD back to Canada – both during and after the war.
Despite the fact that an estimated of 25 per cent of VD cases treated overseas originated
in Canada, domestic officials there were very concerned about the negative effect the
return of these soldiers could have on both public health and ultimately the legacy of the
war itself. As a result strict inspections were put in place to protect the public from the
return of a “plague of diseased soldiers.”29 The Wassermann and Schwartz tests were
used to detect syphilis and gonorrhea but it was well known that these tests were not
reliable. The lab at Etchinghill played an important role in trying to improve techniques
for VD testing to better facilitate existing procedures. However, the preferred policy of
thorough testing and holding cases overseas until they were ‘cured’ had to be abandoned
when the CEF had to coordinate demobilization on a massive scale. Given the realities of
returning tens of thousands of men back to Canada within a relatively short period of
time, overseas officials said the policies that had been in place since the beginning of the
war would have to be significantly altered. Canadian officials would have to assume
responsibility for the care of cases although they were reluctant to do so.
As this dissertation will show, the Canadian response to the VD problem was
complicated by the fact that their medical services were shaped by its place within the
RAMC. The CAMC had a long history with the RAMC and was indeed an imperial
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branch of that parent organization.30 Surgeon General J.T. Fotheringham described the
relationship between the RAMC and CAMC during the war as one of “absolute mutual
co-operation and goodwill.”31 The two services worked intimately with one another and
the result was “the Canadian laboratory man has been given his chance and has made
good in both British and Canadian laboratories in the field, and the friendly rivalry and
hearty good comradeship has gone far to make permanent for all time the good relations
which are and can be based only upon mutual respect.”32 Fotheringham paints a sunny
picture. In reality the relationship between the two was more difficult to navigate. In his
telling of the Canadian war story, Lieutenant-Colonel John Adami stated “there could be
no question of running the medical, or any other section of the First Contingent as a body
independent of British authorities; the terms of Canada’s offer to Britain precluded
that.”33 Managing the organization of the two services was challenging as the CAMC
provided its own supplies and personnel, though technically this fell under the purview of
the divisional authorities under the guise of the ADMS. Herein lay the problem: the
CAMC was technically a separate organization that worked alongside the RAMC and
was headquartered in Ottawa and England with personnel attached to units at the front.
Those frontline infantry, artillery, and cavalry units, though, were part of a separate
command structure that did not include Canadian officials, running instead through
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Canadian Corps headquarters and then to British Armies and the War Office. To make
matters even more complex, Canadian stationary and general hospitals and, until 1916,
Canadian casualty clearing stations operated independent of the Canadian Corps under
the direction of British Directors of Medical Services along the lines of communications
or within each army area. How these various authorities and jurisdictions were to be
navigated was constantly up for debate. The different lines of communication and
authority created no end of administrative complications especially in the different
theatres of operation. Eventually, they reached a compromise that the DMS for the
Canadians would be stationed in London but allowed to cross the Channel when
necessary to deal with matters affecting Canadian personnel. 34 The CAMC gained some
further control over their communications but continued to operate under the structure
and policies of the RAMC. All the while, the frontline medical system, including
evacuations, hospitals and treatment in France and Belgium, followed the orders issued
by the War Office.
In this way, the study of VD also offers an opportunity to examine how the
CAMC actually functioned across the various zones of authority during the war. This
raises important issues about the nature of the Imperial war effort, or rather the ways in
which the various Dominions worked with, alongside, and against Great Britain. In a very
real way, the war provided an opportunity for the Dominions to become better acquainted
with one another and, in some cases, to work together on similar issues, which had lasting

34

Adami, War Story of the Canadian Army Medical Corps, 81 – 83 and Bill Rawling,
Death Their Enemy: Canadian Medical Practitioners and War, (Quebec: AGMV
Marquis, 2001).

19

effects back home. On 27 June 1916, for example, it was decided that separate units
would be established for the treatment of regular soldiers with VD from Australia,
Canada and New Zealand. Officers, both British and Colonial, would continue to be
treated at No. 9 Stationary in Le Havre.35 To treat their rank and file soldiers, Australia
and New Zealand established a VD centre at Étaples in France. They also set up the 1st
Australian Dermatological Hospital in Bulford, England, which had been moved from
Abbassia when the ANZACs were sent to the Western Front.36 At home, the Australians
set up Langwarrin outside Melbourne to treat diseased soldiers. 37 In France, the
Canadians set-up their VD centre outside Le Havre by the Canadian Base Depot. They
also established special hospitals Etchinghill, Witley and Hastings (for officers) in
England. While their treatments followed the schedules set out by the War Officer the
“Canadian laboratory man” touted by Fotheringham experimented with techniques and
therapies to build on the resurgence of VD research just before the war. The creation of
separate spaces offered the Canadians some autonomy in the treatment of VD – at least in
England.
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This dissertation also reveals that there were clear differences between British and
Canadian policy at the front. In France, there was little agreement over where to treat VD
cases. The Canadians established a system that held gonorrhea cases near the front. This
organization was in stark contrast to the British system in which cases were sent to a base
hospital for the duration of their treatments. Under this system, it could take weeks even
months for a man to return to his unit. The Canadians felt their preferred system would
allow men to remain in lines which would simultaneously permit them to be more
thoroughly treated. The discrepancy likely stemmed from the fact that the majority of
CAMC physicians had been born in Canada and came to the front armed only with their
experiences in civilian medicine. In contrast, most doctors in the RAMC had been trained
within the military system. Historian Mark Humphries argues, “Although the surgical and
medical tasks were the same as those in the civilian world, the priorities and mindset of
military doctors was necessarily different.”38 These differences, like those at the policy
level, saw Canadian medical practitioners sometimes favour a different approach than the
British. But this was not always possible as Canadian medical services were ultimately
shaped by their place within the RAMC.
Their position within the RAMC coupled with high rates of VD and contemporary
views on sexuality presented a unique challenge to Canadian medical services. An
examination of the available administrative records allows us to the see how all of these
factors shaped the development of a VD management system within the CEF. Both
Canadian soldiers and the medical facilities that treated them were greatly affected by
major shifts at the policy level – something that has received little attention in the study
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of wartime VD. The adoption of more progressive tactics involving a medical and
scientific approach replaced measures focused solely on concerns over morality that did
little to address the problem. These changes affected the VD management in both France
and England. Commanders in France benefited from more permissive views towards
medically-regulated prostitution but they still had to contend with high rates of infection
among their troops. Although in France they faced the additional problem of controlling
wastage at a critical junction while also having to closely follow British policy. In
England, they had slightly more autonomy and were able to exert more influence over the
VD management system but even here they faced problems. The deaths of eleven
Canadians from arsenic poisoning in early 1918 showed that after four years of war,
Canada still did not have effective procedures in place to deal with the VD problem.
Procedures were not followed or enforced, records were unreliable, medical staffs were
not properly trained and clinics had more cases than they were designed to handle.
Concerns over the VD management extended to procedures over sending Canadian
soldiers home. Officials at home were gravely concerned that the return of these men
would generate negative press and public health problems. They were adamant that
overseas officials employ the latest medical technologies to screen and treat these cases
in England. These measures had to be abandoned when the signing of the armistice
marked the return of Canadian soldiers could return home en masse. The realities of
demobilization trumped the fears of the officials at home. An examination of the VD
management system offers an important look at the medical side of the First World War
in the CEF.
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Chapter 1
Defeated by Venus: A History of VD in the Army
Since the first major outbreak of venereal disease in Europe in the fifteenth
century, its spread has been linked to the social disruptions caused by warfare. This
chapter examines British and American military responses to VD within their ranks.
Wartime conditions created an environment where military and civil populations came in
frequent contact with each other, which created ideal conditions for the spread of sexually
transmitted infections. Camp followers and brothels followed the large concentrations of
soldiers while the migration of these soldiers in the aftermath of a conflict carried the
diseases further throughout Europe. To combat the VD problem, military officials
experimented with a variety of approaches including punitive measures aimed at soldiers,
legislation targeting women or medical intervention. Disciplinary methods such as court
martial, restricted leave or a pay stoppage focused on controlling sexual behaviour among
soldiers. This tactic rested on the idea that sexual diseases were a moral issue that could
be mitigated through punishment. Soldiers were not the only ones who faced punishment.
From the eighteenth century onwards, women were seen as the main carriers of disease,
which led to the implementation of restrictive legislation aimed at local women.
When these methods failed to eliminate VD, military officials would embrace a
more permissive attitude that utilized contemporary medical and scientific knowledge to
stop the spread of infections. At various times armies have experimented with medicallyregulated brothels, prophylaxis kits and early treatment centres to address the issue.
Despite the prevalence of VD, armies failed to implement widespread regulations to
23

effectively manage the problem. This problem was compounded by the dismantling of
military medical structures at the end of every conflict.39 This meant their approach was
always reactive and shaped by local commanders and concerns. Part of this inconsistency
also stemmed from the fact that VD posed two separate issues. In wartime, VD created
short-term problems in manpower and cost but the returning soldier created long-term
public health concerns. These two distinct issues required different solutions, as the field
commanders were generally more concerned with the immediate consequences. With no
clear policy in place on the eve of war, the management of VD in the British
Expeditionary Force, and subsequently the Canadian Expeditionary Force, followed these
same patterns over the course of the First World War.40

Origins of VD at War
The World Health Organization (WHO) recognizes four different types of
sexually

transmitted

infections

(STI):

chlamydia,

gonorrhoea,

syphilis

and

trichomoniasis. 41 During the First World War these infections were categorized as
venereal diseases (VD), of which there were two main sub-classifications: venereal
disease syphilis (VDS) and venereal disease gonorrhea (VDG). VDG was typically the
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most prevalent.42 Gonorrhea, also called gleet, is a bacterial infection that is spread
primarily through sexual contact but can pass from mother to child during birth.
Symptoms generally appear two to six days after the initial infection and include unusual
discharge, swollen testicles, urethritis and pain during urination.43 Almost half of women
do not experience symptoms but when they do they can suffer from abdominal pain and a
swollen cervix. If left untreated it can cause damage to fallopian tubes or testicles and
lead to both male and female infertility.44
Syphilis, also known as the pox, is also a bacterial infection transmitted primarily
through sexual activity. The infection can also be acquired in utero so it can be passed on
to any child that is conceived if one, or both, parents are infected and it was not properly
treated, even if they are not symptomatic at the time of conception. Children born with
syphilis are often born blind or suffer from severe physical deformities. In an infected
person syphilis would appear in four stages with new symptoms appearing and
disappearing at each stage. The first sign of VDS are genital sores that occur during the
primary stage. In the secondary stage, a person develops rashes that generally appear on
their feet and hands. Without medical intervention, the infection usually enters a period
of latency during which time they do not have any symptoms. During the final or tertiary
stage, the bacterial spirochetes can cause severe disfigurement or long-term, and
potentially fatal damage, to the multiple organs including the brain, spine and heart. If
42

Cassel, The Secret Plague, 118.

43

Anne R. Hanely, Medicine, Knowledge and Venereal Diseases in England, 1886 –
1916, (London: Palgrave MacMillian, 2017), 5-6.
44

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Gonorrhea,” (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/std/gonorrhea/stdfact-gonorrhea.htm

25

left untreated in this stage, infected persons can suffer severe and permanent neurological
damage, which often results in institutionalization with syphilitic insanity.45
There are several theories as to the origin of the first wave of VD that spread
across Europe in the fifteenth century. One long standing theory is that VD was a product
of the ‘Columbian Exchange’ which posits that Christopher Columbus and his crew
brought the disease back to Europe with them after their first voyage to the Caribbean in
1492.46 Other scholars contend that VD had always been in Europe as evidenced by
unearthed skeletal remains that have bone markings consistent with tertiary stage
syphilis. Since it shares similar characteristics with other historically common diseases
such as leprosy, earlier cases of VD may have been misdiagnosed. Its ‘appearance’ in the
late fifteenth century could also represent changes in diagnostic cultures. This could
explain why there has been little mention of VD in earlier historical records. The
symptoms and severity of these earlier strains likely evolved over time but had always
existed in Europe in one form or another.47 The impetus for this evolution, according to
the third theory of its origins, returns to the Columbian Exchange. If VD had always
existed in both Europe and North America, the American strain likely merged with the
European strain during contact. Medical historian Roy Porter contends “it is feasible that
some American treponemal infection merged with a similar European one to become
45
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syphilis, with both initial infections disappearing.” 48 Once these organisms came in
contact with each other, they developed into the disease that we would recognize today.
While there is no consensus on the origins of venereal disease, the first major
outbreak in Europe at the end of the fifteenth century is generally attributed to the
military ambitions of Charles the VII of France. In 1495, Charles and his army of 50,000,
as well as a number of camp followers, made their way towards Italy to invade Naples.
The battle was short-lived and Naples fell quickly to French forces.49 While Charles
commemorated his victory by parading through the city dressed as a Byzantine emperor,
his men celebrated by raping, pillaging and engaging in orgies with the camp followers.50
The festive mood, however, did not last long. Just two weeks later Charles and his men
fled Naples after many men experienced an explosion of boils and running sores. Charles
and his men were defeated by the first major outbreak of syphilis recorded in Europe and
in English circles the disease quickly became known as the “French pox.”51 Ever since
the French were driven out of Naples by a syphilitic outbreak, VD has continued to create
numerous operational problems for armies. Outbreaks of VD in Sweden can be traced to
the Seven Years War and the Russo-Sweden wars. The Balkans experienced similar
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outbreaks after the Russo-Turkish War. 52 These incidences point to a relationship
between wartime conditions and high rates of VD that continued into the First World
War.
“Carnal encounters” and subsequent military responses were also shaped by
contemporary sexual culture. VD had significant social ramifications. By the sixteenth
century it had become clear to contemporary doctors that VD was spread through sexual
contact. In response, in England at least, King Henry VIII tried to control the spread of
the disease by shutting down brothels and communal bathhouses.53 But not all historians
agree there was a negative association between VD and prostitution at that time. In her
analysis of venereal disease in the seventeenth century, historian Kathryn Norberg argues
that early on VD was characterized as a medical problem endured by all classes so the
main focus was on finding a cure. By the close of the eighteenth century, however, VD
had become the identifying characteristic of prostitutes.54 This shift in perception can
been linked to both increased concerns over public health and changes in contemporary
understandings of disease. Initially, Humorists – those who ascribed to the belief an
excess or deficiency of one of the four humors was responsible for health and
temperament - believed that ‘pox’ produced an excess of phlegm that could be cured by
52
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provoking drooling through the use of mercury.55 But by the end of the eighteenth
century they began move away from humorism and the miasma theory and more towards
an understanding that diseases were contagious and could be transmitted by multiple
vectors.56
Changing perceptions of disease and health generated fears over depopulation that
grew during the late eighteenth century. These anxieties coupled with growing concerns
over the health of soldiers paved the way for increased regulations against women
suspected of prostitution. Norberg argues this shift can be traced back to concerns that
high rates of VD were having an adverse effect on the French army. She points to a 1790
French publication in which a Dr. Lecointe argued that French nationalism, like other
nations, was tied to the strength of its army. Soldiers contracting VD negatively affected
France’s fighting strength and could also have negative repercussions on its national
health. Lecointe believed prostitution was the root cause of the army’s problem,
referencing a purported case in which a single prostitute infected fifty-eight soldiers with
syphilis. This alleged incident was problematic as soldiers were expected to fulfill their
duty not only on the battlefield but also by producing children so “the male children
could serve in the military thereby strengthening the army and the nation.”57 The British
Army shared this sentiment. In 1792 Army Surgeon Robert Jackson wrote, “The
preservation of the health of the soldier is indispensable to the preservation of the
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conquest which fortune or courage achieves. The health of the Army ought, therefore, to
be a primary consideration of the State.”58 As the scale of wars increased, military and
civilian officials became increasingly worried about the impact VD could have on future
generations when soldiers returned home.
As sex became increasingly regulated in Western cultures during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries the public reaction to any ‘transgressions’ changed as well. As
historian Dagmar Herzog argues, “For a long time, prostitution had been the ‘open secret’
supplement to marriage. It had been quietly tolerated as a necessary evil or a basic
good.”59 But fears over VD prompted a shift in contemporary views. Abolitionists, moral
purity groups and feminists became increasingly concerned that illicit sexual encounters
threatened both public health and families. 60 This association led to a change in
perceptions about sexual practices and the disease itself, most notably the perceived
connections between prostitutes and VD. During the rise of nationalism in nineteenth
century Britain, preferred gender roles and sexuality were redefined to reflect “proper”
and “decent” attitudes.61 Men and women were expected to adhere to gender norms –
men ruled the public sphere while women remained in the private sphere. Both were to
engage in ‘normal’ heterosexual activities showing self-control in the face of excessive
sexual desire although there was some leeway for male transgressions. But due to their
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frequent interaction with prostitutes and high rates of VD, the military and soldier health
became a focus among reformers.62 The image of the soldier increasingly became a
symbol of national health and strength as he exemplified masculine virtues such as
courage and bravery, so preserving their health became paramount.63 As a result, women,
mainly prostitutes, became the focal point of efforts by military officials to combat the
rise of VD. They were cast as the primary risk group and the main source of infection,
which marked a departure from earlier views. The complex relationship between VD,
society and the Army affected the way that contemporaries viewed sexuality and disease.

VD During the Civil War
By the middle of the nineteenth century, VD was understood to be both a social
and medical problem. From a socio-cultural perspective, reformers and moralists argued
that the disease was the product of “bad living” and lack of adherence to acceptable
moral standards and it was therefore stigmatized. From a medical point of view, in the
pre-bacteriological era the disease was understood to be contagious and associated with a
variety of social “evils” including prostitution, poverty and overcrowding. While the
actual mechanism of transmission was not understood, neither was the chronic nature of
syphilis known, that is, that patients could exhibit symptoms and then enter a period of
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latency with the disease progressing through a series of stages over time.64 Instead there
was a general association between VD, long-term health problems and mortality as one
could suffer from debilitating neurological complications.65 But this tended to support the
social stigma associated with the disease and arguments against “immoral living” in
general. Treatments for the disease were diverse and included a combination of
chemotherapy (including mercury) and symptomatic treatments as well as general moral
regimens. The fact that symptoms tended to disappear over time reinforced the view that
treatments were effective.66 ‘Cures’ tended to be achieved through a combination of
medical treatment and moral transformation.
When the United States erupted into civil war in 1861, millions of young men
were mobilized. The Civil War was the first large scale conflict prior to the First World
War that generated a coordinated – and well-documented – response from military
commanders to the problems disease posed to marching armies. Military service thrust
soldiers into a different world that introduced them to new freedoms, alcohol and
opportunities for sexual activity, both consensual and not, in an anonymous environment
free from normal social constraint. Over the course of the war, almost 9 per cent of Union
soldiers would develop some form of venereal disease.67 Rates in the Union forces in the
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West were almost five times as high at their Northern Front counterparts. This
discrepancy is attributed to three factors: armies were situated in areas in the West known
for prostitution; measures implemented were generally less effective because they lacked
strong leadership; and the disease was concentrated and able to spread rapidly.68 These
findings highlight some of the problems Union officials encountered in developing
effective methods to mitigate the impact of VD on operations.
VD in Union armies in the East, while troubling for army commanders, did not
reach epidemic levels. Nonetheless, military officials were aware VD was on the rise and
that policies were needed to curb its spread. The lack of a comprehensive or cohesive
plan to enforce abstinence led to varying approaches that produced variable results.69
They believed the easiest and most effective way to prevent infection was to limit the
contact between soldiers and prostitutes. Prostitution naturally increased in any place that
had a large concentration of soldiers, which generally led to higher rates of VD. As
important logistical centres for the Union Army with large citizen populations, both
Nashville and Memphis encountered high rates of prostitution and disease. To combat the
problem they tried to eliminate prostitution before finally experimenting with legalized
prostitution and establishing special VD hospitals.70
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In Nashville, women would have to apply for a license, report for regular medical
inspections and had to pay taxes to fund a special hospital for prostitutes who contracted
VD. Any woman who violated any of these regulations was arrested and incarcerated in a
workhouse for up to thirty days. Legalization drew more prostitutes to Nashville since
they could be afforded some degree of protection from VD. But even with the increase in
the number of prostitutes, local authorities reported that while VD had not been
eliminated, it had been effectively controlled. The success in Nashville led neighbouring
Memphis to implemented similar measures with similar success. 71
After Memphis was captured from the Confederates, it became a logistical hub for
the Union Army. To deal with the increased problem of prostitution and disease, officials
looked to Nashville’s positive experiences with legalized prostitution. Officials in
Memphis believed as “Offensive as ‘consorting’ might be morally, the army was even
more concerned with the practical problems of having hundreds of soldiers off duty, sick
with gonorrhea or syphilis.”72 While there were a number of officials who abhorred the

American Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) and James Boyd Jones
Jr., “A Tale of Two Cities: The Hidden Battle Against Venereal Disease in Civil War
Nashville and Memphis,” Civil War History, Vol. XXXI, No. 3 (1985): 270-276. This
also created problems as it increased the number of non-consensual relationships: E.
Susan Barber and Charles F. Ritter, “Dangerous Liaisons: Working Women and Sexual
Justice in the American Civil War”, European Journal of American studies[Online], 101 (2015).
71

Lowry, The Story the Soldiers Wouldn’t Tell, 82. See also: Boyd Jones Jr., “A Tale of
Two Cities” and Travis L Bullock and Steven B Brandes,
“The Venereal Disease Epidemic of the Union Army: The Syphilitic Hospitals and
Prostitution Legalization in Civil War Nashville and Memphis,” The Journal of Urology
173, 4 (04/2005): 244
72

Lowry, The Story the Soldiers Wouldn’t Tell, 84. Also see Bullock and Brandes,
“The Venereal Disease Epidemic,” 244.

34

idea of legalized prostitution they could not deny that it ultimately worked.73 Although
the experiment had proven to be effective, the program was disbanded once the city was
returned to civilian control. This was the first and only time the US Army would
experiment with legalized prostitution even though “under the systems at Nashville and
Memphis, public order was improved, disease was reduced, and both prostitutes and their
clients appear to have benefitted, at little cost.”74 Despite the success of this arrangement,
the perceived moral cost was too high. The US military would never again experiment
with legalized prostitution even when faced with high rates of VD during the First World
War.
The experiences of the Americans during the Civil War prompted the Army to
order an investigation into the overall health of soldiers after war’s end. Their findings
were consistent with Smallman-Raynor and Cliff’s. After the war, the Surgeon General
wanted to improve the overall health of the army by compiling a comprehensive list of
disease statistics including VD. The statistics revealed that rates of infection were
affected by soldiers’ age and ethnicity, as well as both their type and length of service. By
1890, the overall rate of VD in the army was 79.63 per thousand. But among new recruits
with less than one year service the rates climbed to 191.93.75 American born soldiers
contracted VD at a higher rate, a rate that peaked if they were between the ages of twenty
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to twenty-four and were in a non-combat role.76 These comprehensive statistics are
important as they show the circumstances that led to high rates of VD such as age and
location. However, identifying the contributing social or geographical factors was only
one part of the problem.
Contemporary medical procedures and knowledge did little to contain the spread
of VD among soldiers. While Civil War doctors understood that sex was the primary
mode of transmission for syphilis and gonorrhea, they lacked the scientific understanding
to effectively control these diseases. Civil war doctors knew VD debilitated men but they
also believed they could be cured.77 Unaware that venereal infection spread through the
blood, doctors relied on mercury, silver nitrate or potassium iodine to treat or cauterize
any visible sores. Some doctors used irrigation techniques to flush out a patient’s urethra
or even their digestive tracks, as they believed it would rid a person of the disease.
Injections of chlorate of potash, chloride of zinc or saline cathartic could sometimes offer
temporary relief from the inflammation and urethral discharge caused by gonorrhea.
Plant-based remedies such as balsam from the copaiba tree, magnesia or powered cubebs
could be used topically or ingested to treat symptoms but did little to the bacteria that was
causing them.78 We know today that many of the treatments used by doctors during this
time were ineffective; and there was little consistency among the types of treatments that
were used in military medicine. While mercury remained the most widely used treatment
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for syphilis, at least one doctor believed the smallpox vaccination to be effective.
Surgeon E.A. Tomkins described one stubborn case of syphilis that was treated with
every known cure available such as “Potassium iodine, sarsaparilla, corrosive sublimate,
lunar caustic, calomel, black draught, emetics, blistering, iron, quinine, and external
chloroform but over the course of four months it did little to help the soldier who was
barely able to walk after undergoing treatment.”79 Historian Thomas Lowry argues, “It
is a medical truism that when there are many remedies for the same disease, it is likely
none of the remedies are much good. Such seems to have been the case in the thenprevailing treatment of venereal disease.”80
The treatments used by Confederate doctors were equally ineffective. Natural
remedies such as pokeroots, elder, sarsaparilla, Jessamine, prickly ash, silkweed root,
whiskey, resin and blue vitriol could provide some temporary relief from certain
symptoms but they did little to combat the source of the sores and symptoms reappeared.81 If left untreated, VD acquired during the war could have long-term health
consequences once soldiers returned home. At the end of hostilities in 1865, most of the
men who had been treated for VD were likely still contagious and took these diseases
home with them. Researchers have estimated that as many as one-third of former Civil
War soldiers who died in veterans homes passed away from complications related to late
stages of VD, so it is likely the wives and children of these soldiers were also directly
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affected by these diseases. 82 While officials were seemingly aware of the potential
problems, it appears there was little done to mitigate the spread of VD amongst returned
soldiers.
The Civil War was one of the first large scale conflicts that required a coordinated
response to the spread of VD. Lowry argues that VD did not impact the fighting strength
of the Union Army though it certainly caused discomfort among soldiers.83 While VD
was a concern for military officials during the Civil War, it still did not generate the same
level of alarm that it would during the First World War. These same concerns would
generate a flurry of policies and discussions surrounding the health and eventual return of
soldiers with VD.

VD and the British Army before the Great War
The Americans were not the only army dealing with VD in the late nineteenth
century. These diseases plagued the British Army regardless of attempts to control
soldiers’ sexuality through awareness and temperance campaigns. Florence Nightingale
was reportedly appalled by the rate of VD in the Crimea as it was the fourth major cause
– after malnutrition, tuberculosis and dysentery – of illness and hospitalization.84 The
initial responses to high incidence rates, military historian Harold Raugh argues, reflected
the commonly-held view of VD as a social problem, albeit one that was largely ignored
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by most of society. However, the ever-increasing frequency of VD in the military
eventually forced officials to make some effort to control VD. Raugh states that in 1859
“there were 422 admissions for every 1,000 soldiers and the following year there were
369 cases per 1,000 men. There was a very bad outbreak of venereal disease in 1862 in
Great Britain among troops recently returned from India, where the disease was rife.”85
The outbreak put pressure on the government to implement reforms that would address
the issue. In response, the government passed the Contagious Diseases Act in 1864 to
limit the outbreak of VD amongst servicemen. Although soldiers were to remain celibate
– in fact they required permission to marry, which was rarely granted – the rate of VD
was alarming. Historian David Pivar argues, “Since one in every three Army sick cases
involved venereal disease, the 1864 and 1866 acts passed with virtually no opposition.
The Acts established districts, dock and garrison towns, in which military and local
authorities cooperated to regulate prostitution for military forces.”86
The Contagious Diseases Act unfairly targeted women who were characterized as
the purveyors of disease, which meant they were subjected to legal and medical
surveillance. Women who were arrested under the Act could be held in Lock Hospitals
for up to a year, while being forced to undergo invasive and painful treatments.87 The
passing of the Act generated enough public backlash that several changes were made in
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1866 and 1869 before it was formally repealed in 1888. Middle-class feminists were the
most vocal opponents of the Act. They strongly opposed the double standard that placed
the sole burden of the transmission of infections on women. Some members of the
medical profession disagreed with the bill on the basis that it “represented an already
dated concept of public health as cleaning up nuisances, rather than the more nuanced
model of prevention which was emerging, and demonstrated a lag between popular ideas
and medical developments.”88
Contemporary critics also argued that there was little evidence to suggest that the
Act had positive results. Statistics compiled for VD rates by Colonel H.A.L. Howell in
1901 show that between 1860 and 1898 there was a brief spike when the Act was
suspended – up to 75 per 1,000 in 1885 – but rates actually fell after the Act was
abolished down to 20 per 1,000 in 1888.89 Based on these statistics, Howell argued, “It is
obvious that the results of enforcement of the CD acts were not very marked and it is not
very evident that they had much effect at all in diminishing the prevalence of venereal
disease in the army.”90 He suggested that the Act was largely ineffective because it did
not apply to all military districts, so troop movements could still spread VD when
soldiers went on furlough to unprotected areas. Initially established to deal with the
problem of VD in Britain’s armed forces, the passing of the Acts opened up wider
discussions on public health and gender as well as discussions over the state’s role in
regulating sexuality and morality. Although the Act was bitterly contested and ultimately
88

Hall, “Venereal Diseases and Society,” 121.

89

Howell, An Essay on Venereal Diseases, 28.

90

Ibid, 28.

40

repealed in 1886, it served as the framework for the creation the medical portions of the
Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), which was passed in an effort to curb prostitution
and VD during the First World War.
While the British government sought to control VD through legislation and social
reformers argued about its efficacy, army doctors continued to quietly explore the
multiple facets of the problem within the army. During wartime, VD clearly had an
immediate and negative impact as it “jeopardized defense strategies, undermined army
discipline, and reduced troop strength.”91 But VD was still problematic during times of
relative peace because of its potentially long-term impact on public health and its
connection to nationalistic concerns. With the rise of militarism in the late eighteenth
century, maintaining a healthy army was deemed essential. Howell wrote, “We therefore
feel justified in saying that one of the most practical ways to increase the fighting
strength of our forces would be to take steps to protect our soldiers from the ranges of
venereal disease and the necessity for enquiry into and consideration of the subject.”92
In his essay, Howell explored the factors that he believed led to an increase in VD
around 1860, which was followed by an overall decline in the home army by the close of
the century. Howell believed one of the main factors that influenced the initial rise in VD
was the introduction of the Short Service System in 1870. New volunteers now only had
to serve in the colours for a period of seven years with an additional five years in reserve.
This change, Howell asserted, increased the number of young recruits who joined the
Army, which had the double effect of increasing VD rates. According to Howell’s
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statistics, men between the ages of twenty and thirty were far more likely to get syphilis
or gonorrhea than the next age group (49.14 per 1,000 compared to 27.17 per 1,000). To
combat the increase in VD, the military initially tried to introduce measures that heavily
penalized soldiers who became ill. Beginning in 1873, soldiers who caught VD were
subjected to docked pay or fines. This punitive approach was short-lived because, as
Raugh explains, “In 1873, the army decided to dock the wages of soldiers found to have
venereal diseases, and this resulted in a large decrease in reported cases in 1873-1874. In
1875, however, it was discovered that soldiers were failing to report their disease and
trying to treat it themselves.”93 By 1879, the army cancelled the order as they found these
punitive measures did little to deter soldiers from risking disease by consorting with
prostitutes.
As VD rates in the home army decreased, rates in the British Army in India
remained high. Similar to his findings for the Home Army, Howell attributed the increase
to a major shift in demographics among troops stationed in India. He argued the Indian
Rebellion in 1857 changed the composition of the Army in several ways as the
Rebellions prompted the British to bring in more troops, which generated an influx of
younger, unmarried soldiers. The need for more troops also led the British to reduce the
length of service required for troops stationed in India, which again created an increase in
younger servicemen who were more likely to consort with prostitutes. Instances of VD
among British forces stationed in India remained high even with the presence of
medically-regulated brothels. But when moralists at home forced the temporary closure
of military brothels, VD rates spiked. While the rest of the British Army reported rates of
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203.1 per 1,000, in just one year British military officials in India saw hospital
admissions climb to 438.1 per 1,000 up from 361 per 1,000 in the previous year with
these numbers peaking at 536 per 1,000 in 1895. When military-run brothels were
reopened in 1899 with stricter control, rates would eventually fall to 67 per 1,000 by
1909. British experience in India shows the effects of a more permissive approach
towards sex and prostitution. 94 But as the image of the soldier became increasingly
important to nationalistic images, these permissive attitudes were placed by a more
punitive and moralistic approach that characterized the British response in the early
stages of the First World War.95
Growing nationalistic and militaristic sentiments in Europe increasingly linked
the image of the soldier to national identity. In her analysis of prostitution in the British
Empire, historian Philippa Levine argues, “The image of the wholesome and brave
defender as a recruiting tool was valuable in encouraging nationalism and as a recruiting
tool...It was only privately that officials acknowledged a less sunny reality.” 96 VD
challenged the idealized image of the soldier and generated fears that it would create
public health concerns once these soldiers returned home. This was especially
problematic for officials from Canada and Australia who wanted to use their wartime
experiences to foster a growing sense of nationalism and independence from Britain.97
Levine argues, “Since soldiers were an imperial necessity, and since the assumption was
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they would return to heterosexual family life in Britain, propagating the race, their
freedom from constitutional disease became a deeply gendered metaphor for the health
and race of the nation.”98 The soldier would continue to play an important role in ideas
surrounding family and nation building during the First World War especially given the
existing pre-war anxieties over public health. 99 These concerns prompted military
officials to implement policies to curb the high incidents of VD amongst its soldiers
while also promoting proper behavior and attitudes towards sexual matters.
Concerns about the negative effects that sex and VD had on morality and public
health remained a major issue in the years leading up to the war in both Europe and North
America. A 1902 conference of the International Congress for Prophylaxis of Syphilis
and Venereal Disease in Brussels determined these diseases were a medical problem, and
that they should be subjected to the same regulations as other contagious diseases. In the
interest of public health they argued treatment should be free, confidential, performed by
licensed practitioners and anyone knowingly spreading VD be subjected to strict
penalties. This attitude stemmed from the belief that VD should be treated as a medical
disease rather than a moral one. Many in the medical community promoted this approach
as “doctors were not willing to rely simply in individual responsibility to control the
spread of disease – they were too well aware that individuals of every social station were
inclined to be ‘wayward,’ and if nothing were done VD would plague the whole of
society.”100
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Doctors in North America were in agreement with their European counterparts.
They too believed VD required medical action but were reluctant to enact any meaningful
measures. Prevention through self-discipline and abstinence was cheaper and adhered to
preferred notions of respectability especially given the limitations of medical
technologies at the time. The major discoveries of the period, such as salvarsan and the
Wassermann, were still a few years away. Condoms and douching were available but
many doctors were reluctant to discuss the use of any prophylaxis or contraceptive
devices because of their association with immoral sexual practices. So morality remained
the key component of VD campaign in Canada and the US.101

VD and Pre-war Public Health
Fears over moral degeneration created an increase in public concerns regarding
prostitution in pre-war Canada. Reformers in Canada turned their attentions to the ‘white
slave traffic’ in the hope of saving the young, white women they believed were being
forced into prostitution by the “evil elements of society.”102 Prostitution’s greatest threat
was not the role it played in the spread of VD but rather the negative effect it had on the
idealized concept of domesticity and the family.103 The same was true in Canada where
reformers increasingly wanted to implement measures to deal with the “urban associated
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ills such as disease and morality.” 104 Captain Gordon Bates, a doctor who championed
sexual health before the war and would eventually head up the VD section at the Base
Hospital in No. 2 District in Toronto during the war, fought to make the issue of
prostitution a public one. “The Tragedy of the women of the street,” he argued, “is
fraught not only with pathos but with danger, potential or actually, to every home in the
country.”105 The perceived double threat posed by prostitutes made them vulnerable to
legislation and military policies designed to curb VD among soldiers during war. But
even with a renewed focus on prostitution, venereal disease remained another matter.
The federal government had largely been unwilling to undertake any meaningful
legislation towards VD, as this was believed to fall under provincial jurisdiction. But a
wave of immigration in the early twentieth century in the West sparked new concerns.
The first campaigns against VD centered on concerns about ‘racial purity’ and ‘race
suicide.’106 Contemporaries were concerned about sexually transmitted infections, as they
knew it threatened fertility and offspring. Even more concerning was that VD affected
everyone including the “better sort,” which generated fears that the “the race’ would lose
many of its ‘best specimens.’”107 In an effort to curb infections, public sex education
became a cornerstone of the reformers’ agenda. While they had open discussions about
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sex and sexual conduct they promoted a moral agenda that emphasized self-restraint and
control as sex was only for reproduction. Ultimately, this approach stigmatized VD,
which made it more difficult for people to get information about it.108 The conversation
changed when the war gave reformers the chance to “remove the shroud” of sexually
transmitted infections.109 Rising rate of VD among servicemen in the First World War
renewed discussions about the disease and forced officials to take action. The
centralization of power that occurred during the war also provided the federal
government with an increased opportunity to tackle the problem.110
In Britain, these same concerns, along with increased pressure from medical
practitioners and the social hygiene movement, led to the creation of a Royal
Commission on Venereal Disease in 1913. 111 Released on 2 March 1916, the
Commission concluded, “that better results are likely to be obtained through the diffusion
of knowledge and the provision for effective treatment for both sexes under conditions to
which no stigma is attached.”112 However, just two years later when under pressure from
the Dominions to do something about the high rates of VD among their soldiers, the
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British enacted DORA Regulation 40D.113 The decree created a double standard for
sexual infections and practices as it unfairly targeted women as the main source of
disease. Regulation 40D gave the justice system the power to control women’s bodies
and sexual behaviours. This legislation reflected a view that the civilian population,
especially women, was responsible for infections rather than the soldiers. The
Commission had reported that VD had risen in the civilian population, which carried a
high economic cost. Fixing the problem required the creation of public treatment centres,
education and increased attention from the medical and scientific communities to find
effective methods of diagnosis.114 While rates had increased among civilians, the report
found that rates in the Army had fallen from 224.5 per 1000 in 1888 to 56.5 in 1912
largely due to screening and the availability of medical care. According to the report, this
downward trend was consistent across all European armies but the scale of the First
World War would create new challenges for these armies.115

Pre-War Medical Knowledge
Many of these discussions about VD had been re-invigorated by the development
of several new medical technologies in the first decade of the twentieth century.116 New
mercury ointments, the discovery of Treponema pallidum, the development of the

113

Laura Lammasniemi, “Regulation 40D: punishing promiscuity on the home front
during the First World War,” Women’s History Review 26, 4 (2017): 584-585.
114

“Royal Commission,” 353 and Evans, “Tackling the ‘Hideous Scourge’,” 418-420.

115

“Royal Commission,” 351.

116

Cassel, The Secret Plague, 112 and Evans, “Tackling the ‘Hideous Scourge’,” 451.

48

Wassermann test and breakthroughs with salvarsan generated enthusiasm among those in
the medical community who now believed VD could be effectively controlled through
science and medicine.117 Even if doctors in Canada remained cautiously optimistic over
the discoveries, these new techniques offered another potential solution to the military’s
VD problem. Instead of approaching the matter with only moralistic and punitive
measures, the military was increasingly willing to pursue scientific and medical options.
This shift was important as it was understood that punitive approaches by themselves
would not solve the problem. An Army report in 1906 concluded “the isolation of a
particular section of infected persons, namely, of diseased prostitutes, cannot be
considered to be an ideal method of arresting the disease while large numbers of infected
persons of both sexes remain free to spread the contagion.”118 Decreasing the rate of VD
among soldiers would require increased medical intervention.
Incorporating civilian medicine into the military was no easy task. The recent
advances in modern medicine were not necessarily compatible with the needs and
capabilities of an army. The report outlined the types of treatments that were available
and the ones that were best suited to military medicine where time and cost were
significant factors. VD in the military constituted an economic problem since soldiers
who contracted VD required medical intervention that often meant lengthy and costly
hospital stays. It also meant that these men were unable to fight. With the discovery of
salvarsan still several years away, mercury was still the “only known drug which has a
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distinct effecting curing the disease.”119 There were two schools of thought surrounding
the use of mercury, intermittent or continuous. With the intermittent approach, which was
heavily favoured by the French and Germans, doctors gave patients doses of mercury at
regular intervals and only when symptoms appeared. The continuous method, preferred
by American and British physicians, involved giving the patient doses of mercury for a
definite period with short interruptions. Doctors could either give a patient as much
mercury as they could handle for a period of time or they could reduce the dosage as
symptoms improved. The most common method of administering mercury in both
civilian and military medicine was orally over the course of eighteen to twenty-four
months. Mercury could also be given by injection or inunction in which a mercury-based
ointment was rubbed into the skin. The report stated that inunction or injection was the
best way to administer mercury to soldiers mainly because this method required
supervision, which ensured men would finish their treatment. Regular ulcers were to be
treated with silver nitrate or salt, while fungating ulcers were cauterized after being
treated with cocaine. Non-mercurial options were also available and included iodine,
Zittman’s treatment or surgical intervention, although mercury remained the most widely
used option because it was believed to be the most effective.120
Irrigation or injections into the urethra were seen as the most effective way to
treat gonorrhea. Both methods reduced inflammation and cleared away the pus and
discharge that accompanied the infection. The report outlined the available treatment
options with the caveat that “the procedure about to be detailed fulfills the requirement
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our present knowledge of the treatment of gonorrhea. The appliances and staff provided
in the venereal division of our military hospitals at present are not sufficient to carry
treatment on the lines indicated, but arrangements should be made to permit of this
being.”121 Neisser’s method involved injecting silver nitrate into the urethra. Patients
would have to hold the solution in their urethra by plugging the meatus for two minutes
on the first day and increasing it by increments of one minute each day until they reached
fifteen minutes. If the subsequent urine examination was free of any signs of gonococci
‘threads,’ the patient could be considered cured.122
The alternative treatment was to irrigate the urinary tract with potassium
permanganate. This method was designed to fill the ureteral quickly but instead of
holding it in, the solution was quickly dispelled. However, these techniques were not
ideal for military use as “experience is necessary to use this method correctly, for if
insufficiently filled the urethra is not distended and the result is disappointing, while if
used too frequently or over-distended the solution may be forced into the bladder.”123
Special equipment and training were needed to ensure treatments were being
administered correctly.
The creation of special hospitals, like those built during the Civil War, could
ensure VD patients received proper medical attention. Instead of establishing special VD
hospitals, the committee believed, “Much importance attaches to the strongly-expressed
opinion that special hospitals for venereal disease are not desirable. It is stated that a
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certain amount of disgrace would attach to those sent to these hospitals, and that soldiers
would frequently conceal their disease rather than seek treatment in order to avoid being
immured in a venereal hospital.”124 Rather than build a separate hospital, the committee
proposed altering existing structures to accommodate a venereal ward when it was
structurally, economically and geographically feasible. This tactic might have worked
during times of relative peace but would not be effective during a large-scale conflict.
The medical advances in the treatment of syphilis just before the start of the war would
also require the creation of a more organized and thorough management system for VDS.
In an infected person, syphilis would appear in stages with new symptoms
appearing and disappearing at each stage. Without the visible, physical symptoms,
syphilis was difficult to detect until the identification of the bacterial spirochete that
caused syphilis, Treponema pallidum was discovered by Fritz Schaudinn and Erich
Hoffmann in 1905.125 This breakthrough led to the development of early diagnosing and
screening tests. In 1906, three German bacteriologists August Paul Wassermann, Julius
Citron, and Albert Neisser, developed a serological exam that could detect the specific
antigens associated with syphilis in the blood even if the patient was asymptomatic.126
While this test could sometimes accurately identify the presence of the bacterial
spirochetes, its results were not always conclusive. Sometimes the exam failed to detect
the syphilitic spirochetes. In other cases the presence of other illnesses and diseases could
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generate a false positive.127 Despite its limitations the Wassermann test would remain a
vital part of diagnosing syphilis in soldiers for the duration of the First World War.
The treatment of syphilis was revolutionized by the development of a potentially
new treatment. In 1910, German Paul Erlich developed arsphenamine – an arsenic based
compound more commonly called salvarsan or 606. 128 Upon its initial discovery,
salvarsan was hailed the ‘magic bullet’ that would replace mercury in the treatment of
syphilis. Compared to mercury-based cures, salvarsan was a fast and effective treatment
as patients were seemingly cured of symptoms and deemed non-infectious after just one
dose. Salvarsan was considered a better treatment because early tests showed the
compound would only attach itself to the bacterial spirochete, Treponema pallidum,
which caused syphilis. If caught early, doctors believed salvarsan could alleviate
symptoms in the primary and secondary stages and keep the disease from entering the
tertiary stage.129 The initial enthusiasm over the new miracle drug was fleeting as it soon
became clear that patients could not be cured with one dose. Although it did target the
specific bacterial spirochetes, the effect salvarsan had on them was short-lived, so
patients required multiple injections. This change increased the possibility patients would
suffer from the potentially debilitating side effects of arsenic poisoning from salvarsan,
which included nausea and vomiting to problems with their blood and skin, and liver
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disorders. Some patients would succumb to arsenic poisoning if doctors failed to see the
early warning signs that a patient was having an adverse reaction to the treatment.130
Despite these problems, salvarsan became the preferred anti-syphilitic cure over mercury
because physicians believed salvarsan was more effective and shortened the treatment
schedule. These two factors would make it ideal for military use. But the potential issues
from exposure to arsenic coupled with the lack of a well-developed VD management
system would create problems when salvarsan became the favoured treatment during the
First World War. Treatments were complicated by the fact the Allies had to develop
arsenic substitutes once they could no longer access German produced salvarsan.131

Conclusion
Ever since Charles and his men were driven out of Naples, VD has remained a
problem within the military. Over the course of the First World War, the British and their
allies would encounter many of the same problems that British and American armies
faced in the late nineteenth century. Wartime conditions led to an influx of young men
who frequently came in contact with local populations, which often resulted in high rates
of infection. These increases created two distinct problems. In the short term, VD caused
logistical issues from manpower and economic costs to the delivery of an effective
medical response. Armies also had to contend with the long-term problems. Sexual
diseases caused by illicit sexual encounters challenged the idealized image of the soldier
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and created public health concerns once these soldiers returned home to their families.
The problems created by VD were often met with reactive and provisional policies
shaped by local factors. To curb the spread of VD, military officials experimented with
ways to limit or discourage sexual relationships between soldiers and civilians. This
approach generally included strict measures that unfairly targeted women but did little to
stop the spread of VD. When disciplinary measures such as harsh punishments or docked
pay were not effective, officials experimented with more permissive attitudes towards
sex, prostitution and the use of prophylaxis and medical intervention. Even though the
British had embraced some of the new techniques and treatments they were not prepared
to use them in a large-scale conflict. The British Army went to war without a coordinated
military medical system to effectively manage VD.
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Chapter 2
A Trip to Blighty with Venus: Treating VD at the Front
In his history of the Canadian medical services, Sir Andrew Macphail wrote, “in
the Canadian Corps in France the troops came into little contact with the civilian
population, and any man infected was obliged to disclose the source… as a result the
Canadian Corps was practically free from venereal disease contracted in the field.”1 The
low rates of infection in France were attributed to the fact that the French permitted
brothels that were medically inspected on a regular basis.2 It is true that the majority of
the cases reported in France occurred while men were on leave in the UK or brought up
from base as reinforcements, however, there were still a number of cases that developed
locally or while men were on leave in Paris even with the presence of medically regulated
brothels.3 Prevention at the front developed along the same lines that it did in the United
Kingdom On one side there was the moral issue, which involved the use of punitive
measures to discourage sexual activity. On the other side, there was the medical issue that
led officials to adopt more liberal measures to reduce rates of infection from sexual
activity. But even with these measures in place, there were still a number of cases
1
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requiring treatment in France. This chapter explores the multiple factors that influenced
the creation of a VD management system in the CEF on the Western Front.
There was also a different military dimension to the problem at the front: the army
was anxious to keep men at the front and to prevent VD from providing an escape from
combat. Early on in the war, men who contracted VD while at the front were evacuated to
England.4 Macphail argued that this practice was stopped after men “deliberately infected
themselves with the milder forms from a favoured comrade.”5 In many ways, the VD
management system at the front mirrored the system that was established in England
although conditions at the front created unique problems. The British created a system in
which cases were sent back to a base hospital for treatment. These hospitals functioned
differently than the special VD hospitals that had been established in England. Across the
Channel the length of hospitalization was not as great a concern because a soldier’s
absence from his unit did not require an immediate replacement, as he was not on active
service. Whereas in France removing a man from his unit kept him out of the trenches for
weeks if not months. To address this issue the Canadians wanted to treat cases at field
ambulances (FA) or casualty clearing stations (CCS) to reduce wastage by keeping men
near the front. The VD situation on the front became even more complicated when the
Allies pushed into Belgium and Germany in 1918.
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The new mobility of the battlefield coupled with increased opportunities for
infection created new challenges for the VD management system at the front. The
problems that sexual disease created for commanders and medical services have been
overlooked in studies of VD, as the general consensus is that it did not pose as big of a
concern as in England. Cassel argues that the problem was not as acute as in England
while Macphail argued that the Canadian Corps was virtually free from disease at the
front.6 An examination of the Canadian records shows that incidences of VD at the front
required the development of separate medical services and remained a concern
throughout the war.
The creation of this system was complicated by the fact that the CAMC operated
under the rules and regulations created by the RAMC. Stationary hospitals, general
hospitals and CCSs, until 1916, operated under the British chain of command. Field
ambulances were one of the few spaces over which the CAMC had complete authority in
the system. In the treatment of VD, the CAMC used these spaces to hold cases nearer the
front as physicians argued this system allowed men to return to their units faster. Under
this system, many specialists believed men could be treated more thoroughly, which
would limit the potential public health consequences once these men returned home. The
British were concerned that this arrangement could create problems: from the lack of
consistency in care to the fear the Germans could overrun these frontline medical centres.
The tensions between the CAMC and RAMC likely stemmed from the different
composition of the two organizations. The RAMC was staffed by military trained
personnel whose experiences and positions within the military gave them a different set
6
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of priorities than their CAMC counterparts who had little, if any, military training.
Instead, CAMC personnel, seeing the situation through the lens of a civilian practitioner,
saw an opportunity to improve efficiency and efficacy with the VD system. The tensions
between the RAMC and CAMC along with the unique challenges of providing medical
care on the Western Front shaped the development of the frontline VD management
system in the CEF.

Preventive Measures
For the first few years of the war, the majority of the cases reported in the
Canadian Corps in France occurred while men were on leave or brought up from base as
reinforcements. Officials blamed the conditions on cities in Great Britain being “so
different from those in Canada, that Canadian soldiers fall an easy prey to the disease.”7
Compounding this problem was a belief that most Canadians had few friends or relatives
in the “Old Country” while on leave and were thus more inclined to develop
“promiscuous friendships” than British soldiers.8 Although the bulk of the cases were
being contracted in England, there were still a number of cases that developed locally or
while men were on leave in Paris, which increased over the course of the war. To combat
the problem, a number of preventive measures were put in place to reduce infection rates.
As in England, local women, both professional prostitutes and the so-called amateurs,
were seen as the main problem. Troops received lectures about the dangers of VD among
local women on arrival, every six weeks in the line and every week in convalescent
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depots by an MO. If a soldier failed to heed these warnings and contracted VD, he was
subjected to punishment. Before a man was transferred to the rear for treatment, he was
taken to identify the woman with who he had had relations.
British policy on the Western Front during most of the war, like DORA
Regulation 40D in the United Kingdom, targeted women as the carriers of disease.9 In
January 1916 in the Flanders area, Dr. Rulot was called in from the Service de Santé et
Hygiene, a local civilian organization, to help control VD. Rulot made arrangements “for
inspection of women suffering from the disease to be made by lady doctors, he also
arranged for the reception and treatment of any women found to be infected into a special
hospital set apart at La Panne.”10 Infected soldiers were asked where they had caught the
disease. If he was able to identify the woman, he was escorted by a policeman and
gendarme in an ambulance car to her house. If the encounter took place in the area of
another army, the soldier was transferred to a hospital or medical unit in the area in order
to obtain identification. After locating the woman and signing a statement, the man was
evacuated while the accused was taken to a French military doctor for an examination. If
she was infected, she was sent to the hospital or evacuated by the gendarmerie.11 But this
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protocol was not popular as it often delayed treatment and was thought to have little
effect on controlling VD in the area. In March 1917 there were complaints that
“compliance with this order entails consumption of petrol, wear and tear of Ambulance
cars, the time of Military police, and Interpreters, which the results obtained hardly seem
to justify.”12 Despite opposition to the practice, it continued for the duration of the war.
While operating on foreign soil, British officials were determined to respect local
laws, customs and civilians. While the Dominions complained about the existence of
French brothels, the British were not willing to risk offending the French by asking them
to close them down.13 Division personnel were told they were to issue instructions to the
prevote – the local police – attached to them to collect a list of local prostitutes from the
local mayor. The mayor would then be asked to arrange medical examinations with
civilian doctors for these women. If a woman had VD, a proces verbaux – verbal order –
from the gendarmerie was dispatched and sent to the French Mission and Canadian Corps
along with a request for evacuation. Any women who were found practicing prostitution
but who were not registered could “be obliged to register.”14 But there were reports that
women who worked as prostitutes had re-located outside town boundaries so that they
could circumvent compulsory examinations and regulations.15 Plus this process was time-
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consuming. It required a report from the Assistant Prevost Marshall (APM) proving
prostitution that had to be forwarded to the French Mission for further instructions. The
divisions were explicitly told “No steps must be taken with a view to the medical
examination of any woman other than a registered prostitute until reference has been
made to the French Mission and Canadian Corps.”16 In the meantime, any house believed
to be involved in prostitution could be placed out of bounds. These procedures were
carefully designed to “prevent any misunderstandings which could give rise to illfeeling” among the local population.17
Even though women received the majority of the blame, infected men were still
punished for contracting VD. To root out unreported cases, companies and battalions
were subjected to frequent unannounced inspections.18 When VD cases were admitted,
the hospital or admitting station was to notify the paymaster regarding temporarily
stopping a soldier’s pay, what the army referred to as a hospital stoppage.19 NCOs and
rank and file soldiers undergoing treatment lost 50 cents of their pay plus their field
allowance while officers were docked a dollar plus their field allowance.20 In an effort to
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further discourage sexual encounters a new order was issued on 27 January 1917, which
stated that any officer or soldier who contracted the disease was denied leave for a period
of twelve months.21 This practice was designed to deter sexual encounters while also
preventing the spread of the disease to their family back in England. But this policy was
not widely implemented, as a soldier was likely to be evacuated to England for other
illnesses or injuries before the 12-month period had expired.22
Likewise, as the war dragged on the policy regarding hospital stoppages was also
somewhat relaxed as resources near the front became strained. To economize manpower
and improve patient health, the British began moving chronic VD cases from venereal
hospitals to a CCS sometime in late 1917. While at the CCS, these men were given
employment as stretcher-bearers and trained to unload the sick and wounded from
ambulances when they arrived. Adjutant General G.H. Fowkes, who was in charge of
discipline, reported this experiment had successfully promoted recovery among VD
cases. Under this system hospital stoppages were remitted as men were considered on
active service even if they were not in line but they would not be eligible for proficiency
pay, Corps pay or the minimum rate of pay.23
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In January 1917, William Macpherson, then Deputy Director General Medical
Services (DDGMS) at General Headquarters, wrote to the Canadian Corps to report that
the experiment had been a great success as the men employed as stretcher bearers at
CCSs recovered more quickly than those without employment treated at base hospitals.
He asked the Canadians to reconsider the restrictions on the transfer of venereal
convalescents from base hospitals to CCSs. He argued, “Owing to the congestion of the
venereal hospitals at the Base, it is very desirable that authority should be given for the
Canadian convalescents to be used in the same way as convalescents of the Imperial
forces, and steps will be taken as far as possible to allot them to Canadian Casualty
Clearing Stations only, if you consider it desirable to place this restriction upon their
employment.”24 Although the British championed this system the Canadians seemed
somewhat reluctant to embrace it.25
Part of the problem was that while working as stretcher-bearers these men would
have to be re-assigned to British units. Major J.F. Lash asked for feedback stating, “The
question would seem to be one of the kind of treatment to be given for this particular
disease rather than one of employment of Canadian Soldiers away from Canadians as a
patient would still be under medical supervision and not discharged from the hospital.”26
Colonel A.E. Ross, Deputy Director Medical Services (DDMS) of the Canadian Corps
replied, “The Canadian Cas. Clg. Stations do not wish to have Venereals. If ours can be
24
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employed under proper treatment, I see no objection.”27 Even if men still remained near
the front working as stretcher-bearers took them out of harm’s way, which was one of the
‘benefits’ of contracting the disease they had wanted to eliminate. This practice also
allowed men to circumvent some of the disciplinary measures designed to deter illicit
sexual encounters.
The BEF consistently found that punitive measures were only partially effective
and found that it had to manage VD as an unavoidable problem requiring medical
intervention. Early in 1916, the British implemented a system for soldiers to disinfect
themselves by irrigating their urethra with potassium permanganate and applying calomel
ointment. Calomel ointment was routinely issued to men with instructions to apply it both
before and after sexual intercourse. The belief was that applying the mercury-based
ointment prior to exposure would create a barrier that would prevent direct contact with
the diseases thus minimizing the risk of transmission.28 The case sheets and medical
information collected at Etchinghill hospital kept track of the success of early treatments
and prophylaxis. Based on the information collected, the medical staff concluded that the
use of antiseptics prior to exposure was largely ineffective. In 2728 cases 2132 men had
used this method and still contracted venereal disease. The more effective treatments
were those that were used after exposure. Men were instructed that after intercourse they
should urinate, thoroughly wash their penis with soap or potassium permanganate,
reapply the calomel ointment and then report to an early treatment centre. Here, they
27
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would have their penis swabbed with a mercury-based solution followed by irrigation of
the urethra with an argyrol solution. The man would then be instructed not to urinate for
several hours and be given more calomel ointment to apply to his genitals. 29 The
prevailing belief was the earlier the better as the chances of contracting VD increased
every hour after exposure. The early British system, as a whole, was not very successful
as it was not widely promoted by many commanders and the stations were generally
located in urinals so men were reluctant to use them. Without clear instructions and
incentives, many soldiers did not understand the need to irrigate as soon as possible so
too much time elapsed between exposure and early treatment, which was thought to
render the procedure ineffective.30
The Dominions were quicker to adopt a more comprehensive approach to
prevention while the British would not implement new measures until late 1918.31 This
development is not surprising given that the VD problem was a more pressing concern
among the Dominions than their British counterparts. The Dominions viewed the war as
an important nation building experience.32 Officials were concerned high rates of VD
among their soldiers would have a negative impact on the war effort and national
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health.33 When the British did not respond to repeated requests to solve the issue, the
Dominions came together to form a committee tasked with addressing their shared
interests. The Canadians and Australians used lectures in conjunction with a prophylaxis
kit containing calomel tubes, potassium permanganate tablets and directions. Soldiers
were also told that they could access more supplies at ‘blue light depots.’ 34 The
Australian Army also made condoms – known as French Letters – available to their
troops at the cost of three pence each.35 Despite their availability, it does not appear
condoms were widely promoted among Canadian medical services. The only mention of
this appears in an appendix in the Assistant Director Medical Services (ADMS) War
Diary for 1st Canadian Division in February 1918, which warned men to “ALWAYS
wear a French Letter.”36 Cassel argues Canadians were reluctant to issue condoms as
most MOs considered the ointment to be more effective. Furthermore, since condoms
were a contraceptive, issuing them might look as though the army condoned illicit sex
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whereas the ointment could be considered disease control. Some officers also hoped
preventive kits would remind men of the risk and help curb desire.37
The Canadians reported these measures had had a positive impact on rates of
infection. In the summer of 1916, the number of VD cases at the Canadian Base Depot
had prompted a visit from a sanitary specialist with the RAMC Since the majority of the
cases developed in Le Havre, the specialist there suggested instituting preventive
measures at the base. Beginning on 1 November 1916, the NCO on duty would talk to
each man returning from leave and direct him towards the medical hut for preventative
treatment if he had “exposed” himself. He would wash with a solution of hydrarg
perchlor, irrigate his urethra using a solution of permanganate of potassium and finally
apply ungt hydrarg sub-chlor to his genitals. Over the next six months, 5153 preventive
treatments were used and they claimed not one man who used them had developed VD.
They reported that from November 1916 to April 1917 only 49 cases came from Le
Havre and those cases only developed when the man had not sought preventive treatment
at least 3 to 5 hours after exposure. The other 70 per cent of the cases were reported as
having developed among new drafts from England. 38
The Canadians also opened a main early treatment centre at the La Pepiniere
Barracks in Paris. The facility opened in November 1917 and they reported that 22,000
men had been given leave in Paris over the next five months. During this period
anywhere from 100 to 150 men reported for early treatment daily with some 28,000
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treatments performed.39 Canadian troops arriving in Paris were met and taken to La
Pepiniere where they were lectured on the preventative measures they should take in the
event they exposed themselves to VD. They were supplied with prophylaxis and told how
to use them as well as being advised to report for examination and early treatment.40
Major-General Gilbert L. Foster, then Director General Medical Services (DGMS) of the
Canadian Contingent, argued the implementation of this centre had drastically reduced
the amount of men contracting VD while on leave there.41

Medical Treatment at the Front
Even with preventive measures in place, there were still a number of cases at the
front requiring treatment. In the early part of the war, VD cases that developed in France
were evacuated to England as soon as possible. But it was soon found that this policy
created two military problems: it overcrowded hospitals and could be used as a means to
escape service. There were reports that men were intentionally exposing themselves to
the disease while on leave so they could remain in England or at least avoid returning to
the trenches.42 In the latter half of the war, this created considerable debate over whether
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to admit cases to hospital in England or return them to France for treatment. Given the
length of a course of treatment – which last about forty-two to fifty-five days – if these
cases were retained in England they would have to be struck off strength overseas so
most were returned to France.43 This practice returned men to their units sooner and also
eliminated some of the ‘benefits’ of contracting the disease, but it required the
development of separate medical services for VD treatment in France. Four large VD
hospitals with a 9,000-bed capacity were opened by the BEF in order to keep these cases
in France.44 Medical treatments followed those that had been established in England but
sometimes had to be adapted to meet the unique needs of medical services on the
Western Front. Weather, supplies and location all impacted the delivery of medical care.
Men at the front were also on active service so any medical evacuations reduced
manpower at a critical point. Throughout the war, Canadian medical personnel argued
that establishing treatment locations closer to the front would reduce wastage and actually
improve curative rates. Although they developed a system that held the majority of cases
in field ambulances at the front, they eventually had to return to the British system of
transferring cases to the rear. Even with the development of special hospitals in France,
the VD management system was continually shaped by the realties of conditions at the
front.
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The first VD centre created in France was at No. 9 Stationary Hospital in Le
Havre in 1915.45 This hospital eventually became the model of all other VD hospitals in
the BEF although early on arrangements were chaotic. Patients were housed in a special
camp, away from the other patients and the staff was explicitly told “things were not to
be made too pleasant for them.”46 Circumstances at the hospital were not ideal given the
majority of doctors and staff had little experience with treating sexual diseases. The
hospital site itself was surrounded by mud, which created less than ideal conditions as
many treatments required intravenous injections. To improve care, the hospital instituted
a number of changes by the end of 1915. A laboratory was setup and two wards created,
one for the treatment of gonorrhea and the other for syphilis and soft chancre.47 The
gonorrhea ward generally housed about 1,600 to 1,900 patients across several special
sub-wards each comprised of 200 - 250 patients under the care of two MOs. As in
England, potassium permanganate was the primary treatment and used for routine
irrigations. Unless there were extenuating circumstances, no uncomplicated cases were to
be given bed rest. Physical activity was supposed to be the main component of treatment
with patients made available for physical training and fatigues. 48 While most treatments
followed established medical practices, the development of a hospital lab also allowed
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staff to experiment with new procedures and techniques. In 1916, the hospital reported
that the average stay had fallen to thirty-six days with the introduction of injections of
succinimide of mercury and phthalamine. Vaccines they manufactured for gonorrhea
from virulent strains of cocci reportedly had a positive impact on curative rates.49 In
reality, the success rates of these measures were mixed and the treatment of gonorrhea
continued along well-established lines.50
Time was a crucial component of treatment, as doctors believed that in most cases
gonorrhea could be completely cured if it were caught in the early stages. When a case of
VDG was admitted to a field ambulance, the patient was instructed to pass water and
thoroughly clean the glans and meatus with soap and water. The next step was
Ballenger’s method in which 1 cc of a solution of 10 per cent argyrol was injected into
the urethra and while the solution was still inside, the meatus was sealed using collodium
flexile and cotton for three to four hours. With the fluid still in the urethra, the patient
was to be transferred to a CCS. Once at the CCS, doctors there would typically continue
to use the Ballenger method for three days in a row, twice a day. It was followed up with
a daily irrigation using potassium permanganate for five days. Medical staff could also
use the massage pack method for treatment. This process used a strip of cotton gauze
soaked in a solution of 5 per cent argyrol that was then packed into the anterior urethra.
Once the gauze was in place, the penis was massaged for 5 minutes after which the pack
was taken out. A second pack was inserted and left in place for at least four hours. This
action was repeated three times a day for three days followed by several days of irrigation
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using a potassium permanganate solution. The third technique sometimes used was the
Hoffman’s (Bonn) Method, which involved an injection of 2 per cent algargin held in the
glans for two and a half minutes. After a brief interval, the procedure was repeated. On
the third day the patient was given daily irrigation using potassium permanganate. With
no clear consensus on which method was most effective, medical officers were
encouraged to choose one of the treatments for trial and keep detailed records of their
cases. After one month their opinions and records were to be collected in an effort to
determine which showed the most effective results.51
Syphilis cases, unlike those of VDG, were immediately transferred to the base via
a CCS for treatment with salvarsan. However, the transfer from a field ambulance to a
CCS to base often took seven to ten days, during which time a patient did not receive any
treatment. To address the problem arrangements were made for treatments to be carried
out at selected CCSs and in conjunction with a mobile laboratory. Only definitive cases
were to be treated while cases that did not have a clear diagnosis would continue to be
evacuated the ordinary way.52 Diagnosing syphilis cases could be complicated as its
symptoms could be mistaken for other illnesses. Mistakes could mean unnecessary
arsenic and mercury injections that could jeopardize the wellbeing of an otherwise
healthy soldier. In the syphilis ward at No. 9 Stationary Hospital, a system was
established to ensure safe and proper treatment of all cases. As many of the medical
officers had little to no prior experience with VD and were constantly rotated in and out

51

TNA, WO95-286, Abortive Treatment of Gonorrhea, Instructions for Medical Officer
I/C Units Os.C. Field Ambulances, 1918
52

TNA, WO95-285, War Diary 2nd Army, 20 December 1916.

73

of the hospital, one of two officers in charge of the ward would review any case
recommended for anti-syphilitic treatment. This way every diagnosis was double-checked
before a patient was given any mercury or arsenic. If the doctor in charge did not agree
with the diagnosis then the patient was held for further observation. Confirmed cases
were given a case card outlining the treatment schedule and were placed in the care of
their MO. In November 1915, the anti-syphilis treatments in France were extended to 42
days. Treatment consisted of four 0.3 gram injections in the first two weeks, followed by
two weeks rest and then four more injections in the final two weeks.53 After the war,
Macpherson argued that supervision at No. 9 Stationary had granted the hospital
“comparative immunity from trouble resulting from arsenobenzol treatment which was
enjoyed by the hospital throughout the war.”54 While there were a number of deaths
attributed to the use of arsenic in anti-syphilitic treatments, there were apparently no such
problems reported at No. 9 Stationary as they reported “only” twelve deaths after 119,727
arsenobenzol injections.55
Although the hospital was not immune to the same problems that developed in
anti-syphilitic treatments in England, this statistic is significant given the extra challenges
of providing these treatments near the front. At a medical conference in 1917, Captain
Grantham Anderson, a doctor at No. 51 General Hospital in France, explained that
wartime necessity shaped the delivery of treatments. He told his colleagues,
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Let it be clearly understood that the object of the treatment is to
get an infected patient cured of his disease in the shortest period
possible, and for this reason the drugs employed are pushed to
the utmost tolerance of their toxicity, whereas in the treatment of
a private case, where time is not such an important factor, each
individual case could be treated on its merits, and the doses of
drugs regulated accordingly. Thus although the treatment cannot
be called ideal, it is essentially practical for dealing with large
numbers of patients, and should be regarded as the minimum
which should be given to the average man.56
The treatment schedule in England was approximately 2.8 grams of salvarsan over the
course fifty days (changed to 2.6 grams over fifty-seven days in 1918) while closer to the
front Anderson reported that for cases in the early stages he administered 4.8 grams in
forty-three days.57 The course of treatment at these hospitals varied depending on the type
of salvarsan or substitute each hospital used which was affected by availability, doctor
preference and conditions. As salvarsan became more difficult to obtain, doctors could
choose from a wide variety of substitutes and there was little consensus on which was the
most effective. At Camiers, Anderson stated the medical staff was “under some
difficulties as the treatment had to be carried out in store tents and marquees, so that it
was found more convenient to use Neo-salvarsan and its equivalents, as the preparation
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and administration were much simpler.”58 Compared to established hospitals in England,
on the front had they had to contend with ever changing circumstances from weather and
location to staffing and supplies, which could negatively impact VDS treatments.
While No. 9 Stationary may have served as the model for VD hospitals, many
Canadian authorities began to question whether cases in France needed to be sent to
hospitals in the rear for treatment at all. The British maintained a system of sending cases
to a CCS or base hospital. Suspected cases of syphilis were to be sent as soon as possible
to a stationary hospital to have the nearest mobile laboratory carry out an examination. If
the test came back positive, the APM was notified and the hospital was to commence
treatment while the APM conducted their investigation. Once the soldier was no longer
needed, he was evacuated to base via a CCS to continue his treatment.59 Under this
practice men would not be available to their units for at least eight weeks, sometimes
even longer, as they passed through the system. To help eliminate wastage at the front,
Canadian medical officials proposed the development of a system that would provide
treatment at FAs located closer to the front. This system, the Canadians argued, would
help maintain manpower while also allowing for a more thorough treatment.
Captain Colin Russel, a neurologist with the CAMC, reported the U.S. Army was
treating their VD cases at Regimental Rest Depots to keep men out of hospital and close
to the front. Russel was interested in VDS cases from a neurological standpoint given the
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neurological complications that would develop in cases that were left untreated. He was
particularly concerned with the fact the treatment time in the Canadian Army was only
eight weeks. “In others words,” he argued, “the disease is ‘whitewashed’; and under
ordinary conditions one could look forward to probably 90 per cent recurrences – many
of which will be the type of Tabes Doralis, General Paresis, Cerebro Spinal Lues and
there will also be the danger of the widespread infection of the people of Canada.”60 He
suggested Canada adopt measures similar to the US which treated men in line using the
salvarsan substitute novarsenobillon. Since the drug could be given “safely intravenously
in as little as 2 cc’s water” it appears Russel thought this method would allow VDS cases
to be more thoroughly treated while also keeping them at the front.61 Russel favoured a
similar approach to the treatment of shell shock as he also advocated treating them at rest
stations at the front. 62 Lieutenant-Colonel John Amyot questioned whether Russel’s
recommendation would have much of an impact on VDS treatment at the front. He asked,
“Will the American system also not be white washed? The product they will use has also
been used by us.”63 It would appear that the type of drug used was of little consequence
as the goal of treatment was to reduce wastage in the short-term rather than address
potential long-term problems Russel was concerned about. Cost, supplies and manpower
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were the most pressing concerns. In an effort to address these concerns, the Canadians
implemented a system in which few cases were evacuated to base hospitals.
In September 1917, the ADMS in each of the four Canadian divisions received
updated guidelines for processing patients. New gonorrhea cases were to be held in the
Corps area and treated at Les Quatre Vents, or Four Winds, by the field ambulance unit
there. “After a sufficient rest period,” they were told, “such cases should be available for
graded work, the decision resting with the M.O. in charge during the remainder of this
treatment.”64 Men experiencing recurrent gonorrhea symptoms were to be held for a few
days worth of treatment and returned to duty. Men with chronic gleet would remain on
duty unless they developed complications. These cases were sent to a field ambulance for
longer treatments then returned to duty. Syphilitic cases were evacuated to the ambulance
unit at Four Winds for salvarsan treatment although in December 1917 it was later
reported that syphilis cases – and VDG cases among officers – were evacuated in the
usual way to a CCS.65
The OC at No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, then in charge of Four Winds,
suggested that all cases should pass through the ambulance in their division to arrange
interviews with the APM for cases contracted locally. Although this system kept more
cases at the front, it was not without its problems. At the time, there were 108 patients
under their care and they reported having problems keeping men on the grounds. To help
maintain order, they requested a detail of military police for guards. As well, the OC
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asked for clarification on how hospital stoppages were arranged for men receiving
treatment at Four Winds. As cases were to be sent to the rear, there were no procedures or
policies regarding cases that were not evacuated to the rear.66 The British later told the
Canadian field ambulances that they did not have the proper forms since these cases were
supposed to be sent to base hospitals for treatment.67 Although holding cases at the front
went against many procedures established by the British, the Canadians continued to
develop a system to keep VDG cases in field ambulances.
To accommodate VDG cases at the front, the CAMC requisitioned a former
brewery near Aix Noulette in late 1917. Field ambulances took turns running the facility,
which explains why patients were frequently transferred between field ambulances in
their admission and discharge books.68 These were administrative transfers, as men likely
never left this established station unless they were moved to the rear for treatment.69 The
venereal station was a two-story cellar situated outside the village that could
accommodate up to 180 patients. Admitting rooms, irrigation rooms, dining rooms, a
bath-house and medical and pack stories were located within the brewery. A nearby shellscarred chateau was used for the orderly room, quarters and canteen. To protect against
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splinters from aerials bombs, fatigue parties consisting of personnel and light duty
patients constructed a three-foot mud wall around the perimeter. These parties also
cleaned up the grounds and sanitized the wards and buildings. Daily admissions
numbered around twenty-seven and they reported an average of 190 patients under their
care at any one time. Overflow patients were evacuated to a CCS but they were making
arrangements to expand operations in order to accommodate more cases.70
The irrigation room at the brewery was moved after it was discovered that it was
too small and delayed treatments. It could only accommodate six cases at a time and
orderlies reported they had trouble maintaining sanitary conditions. To amend the
situation, a proper irrigation plant was constructed in a separate area from the wards.
They utilized an unused ten by eighteen foot three-sided roofless building located on the
grounds. It was retrofitted with corrugated metal on the outside, a canvas lining inside, a
brick floor and a fireplace to heat a forty-gallon water tank. Two rows of troughs ran the
length of the building that emptied to drain below the floor and ran to a soakage pit
outside. With fourteen douche cans and tubes arranged above the trough, the new space
could serve more than twice as many patients as before. After the opening of a new ward
and the re-arrangement of the old ones, the capacity at the Aix Noulette facility increased
to 200.71
With these improvements, by all accounts the Corps Venereal Station was able to
fulfill the treatment needs for gonorrhea cases. On 26 March 1918, the medical personnel
at No. 13 Field Ambulance, who were then in charge of the space, reported on the
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advanced work being carried out at the station. Three irrigation chambers were in
operation and many other improvements had been completed.72 But the next day they
received orders that the 265 VDG patients under their care were to be evacuated or
returned to duty. They were likely ordered to dismantle this front line station after the
British had discovered the practice a few months earlier. In early January 1918,
Macpherson wrote “It has been brought to notice that it is the practice in some instances
to treat venereal patients in Field Ambulances, instead of sending them to the base
hospitals appointed for the purpose.”73 After notifying the patients a “big proportion
volunteered to return to duty” and they were cleared to their units by 7pm.74 These men
were sent with dressings, drugs, twenty-four hour rations, cigarettes and a discharge
slip.75
While they may have returned these cases to duty, the order appears to have had
little impact on the Canadians VDG management system. Instead of returning acute cases
of gonorrhea to base hospitals, the Canadians continued to send these cases to rest camps
for treatment. They argued treating cases immediately behind the line saved “many days,
if not weeks, of active service” which significantly reduced wastage.76 In June 1918, it
was reported that since this system had proven successful the British moved to adopt it
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although there is no evidence that actually supports this assertion.77 In fact, just a few
months earlier in April 1918, the 3rd Canadian Division issued orders that all venereal
cases in both officers and men were to be evacuated to the CCS. This marked a reversal
of a policy that had been in place from at least February 1918 but likely started much
earlier.78 Suspected venereal cases in the First and Second Armies were to be sent to No.
4 Stationary Hospital in Arques.79
Despite British opposition, the Canadians continued to push for changes to the
existing VD management system. After forty-three cases developed over the course of six
weeks and were evacuated to Rouen, the Canadians argued, “the question again comes
up, of the best method of treating Venereal Cases, and it is again emphasized that these
cases, in the opinion of the Senior Medical Officer, should be treated locally.”80 In No. 2
District they suggested that instead of sending cases to the rear for treatment, three to four
hutted hospitals could be constructed at Conches with one hut devoted to VD cases. They
reported that while the usual duration of treatment was six weeks, when treated locally
this number fell to three to four weeks. To support their cause, the Canadians referenced
two cases that had developed in the Bordeaux group in June. One case spent almost three
months in hospital as the soldier was admitted on 28 March 1918 and discharged 17 June
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1918. The other case was discharged on 22 June 1918 after being admitted on 22
November 1917.81 With little other information it is difficult to know why these cases
were hospitalized for so long and if they represented the norm. But for the Canadians,
these cases supported the argument that treating cases in the rear kept men out of lines for
far too long; the British remained unconvinced.
By the end of the month, the RAMC issued a reply stating that venereal cases
were not to be retained in any hospital that was not designated for venereal disease
without permission from the DGMS in France.82 The British even asked if the practice of
holding men to identify the alleged source of their disease unduly delayed transfer to
hospital for treatment.83 The Canadians replied that this procedure did not delay treatment
as treatment commenced as soon as the patient was admitted.84 The CAMC continued to
press for changes to the existing system enforced by the British. In contrast to the British
system of sending cases to the rear, the Canadians continued to believe these cases should
be treated at the front.
Although the Canadian system for treating VD in FAs near the front had been
shut down, the Canadians continued to look at ways to expand VD management at the
front by focusing on VDS cases. Major William Turner Lockhart compiled a report in
August 1917 “demonstrating that a centre for treatment for syphilis could be readily
established for troops in the zone of active operation, which would obviate the necessity
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of sending to hospital at least three-fourths of the officers and men who become infected
with this disease.”85 Lockhart was a forty-four-year-old physician from Saskatchewan
who had enlisted with the CEF on 25 September 1914. He spent eighteen months as MO
for 1st Canadian Artillery Brigade in France before doing a rotation at Etchinghill and
eventually ending up at the VD hospital in Witley. 86 At Witley, he reported they
administered the neo-organic preparations of arsenic in a concentrated solution. The
arsenic was dissolved in 2 ccs of water, based on the findings of Professor Thibirge of the
French Army. Lockhart stated that after 1745 intravenous injections they had not
experienced the early reactions common when larger quantities of water were used nor
had they had any cases of venous thrombosis. Only five out of sixty-three Wassermann
tests had come back positive after undergoing this treatment.87
This method required fewer supplies and personnel as three orderlies and an
officer could give one injection per minute, which would make it viable for use at the
front. As well, Lockhart argued that holding cases for treatment in hospital was
unnecessary as it had been shown that “infective organisms disappeared from lesions
within twenty-four hours after the exhibition of the first intravenous injection of arsenic,
thereafter the lesions are merely ordinary ulcers which heal in the ordinary way except
for neoplastic and circulatory disturbance which may cause delay in certain cases.”88 The
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physical demands of duty would also not pose an issue as patients underwent physical
training while in hospital and they resumed regular duties when being treated as
outpatients during the second half of their treatments in England.
Even with the exigencies that may arise at the front, Lockhart felt syphilis could
easily be treated there. Complicated cases would need to be sent to the base hospital but
simpler cases, which Lockhart argued was the majority of the cases, could be held at the
front. Except on the day of an injection, men could carry on with normal duties while
undergoing treatment. He argued troops could be treated while their units were in the
support and reserves trenches. It was even easier to coordinate treatments for troops in
Field and Heavy Artillery units. This system, Lockhart asserted, would also allow men to
begin treatments as soon as their symptoms appeared thereby making these cases “more
amenable to curative measures.”89 He informed his superiors that,
From my experience as an M.O. to a unit in France and
subsequently in Special Hospitals in Great Britain, I am sure that
very excellent work could be carried out along the lines I have
suggested, which would result in a decrease in the loss of
effectives at the point where they are required and would
diminish the load of disability which the Army and the Nation
will have to bear as the result of late or inadequate treatment of
syphilis. It would give me great satisfaction to be permitted to
organize such a service.90
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Canadian officials made plans to visit Lockhart at Witley to consider his
proposal.91 By the end of the month, the senior medical officer in No. 12 District received
notification that they should be treating syphilis cases in their hospital provided they had
an officer capable of administering salvarsan. They were told, “the patients will receive
their injections in your little operating room, they can sleep in Bell Tents, and when they
have received their second or third injection they can return to work in their different
companies.”92 After their initial treatments, these men were issued syphilitic cards that
noted the days they received their injections and when they were to return for their next
one. “By this method,” they were told, “your syphilitic cases are much more easily and
conveniently treated in your hospital than your gonorrhea patients.”93 It is not clear how
successful or widespread this system actually was. By 6 November 1918 Major R.M.
Gorssaline informed Canadian divisions that all venereal cases were to be evacuated to a
CCS and they were not to be held at a Canadian Corps Rest Station.94
There is no clear answer to explain why the British insisted on treating patients in
the rear. It is possible that without a centralized site for care it was difficult to maintain
uniform standards of treatment among cases. Untrained MOs routinely treated all
suspected venereal sores with calomel ointment. This approach was problematic as it
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often disguised the true nature of the sore and made it difficult to obtain a correct
diagnosis later on. Lieutenant Colonel F. Howell asked that all the MOs be made aware
of “the harmful results to the patient that may follow injudicious use of calomel or other
preparation containing mercury, prior to a definite diagnosis being established.”95 Any
MO who did not comply with this order could be investigated and subject to disciplinary
measures. At Etchinghill, MacKinnon reported that he had spoken with Captain Scarlett
who had been recently assigned to the hospital after serving in France. During his time in
France, Scarlett told MacKinnon he had treated cases of VD but had been unaware that
VD treatment required any special knowledge. While in France, he had kept no records of
treatments meaning that if a soldier saw another MO there was no record of any previous
treatment “and for that reason, it would be possible to overdose the case and cause acute
atrophy.” Scarlett had also been giving only six treatments instead of seven and was
unfamiliar with proper dosages or how much time should elapse between treatments.
MacKinnon supplied Scarlett with a table, instructions and other literature to bring him
up to speed on VD treatment. He reported that Scarlett was anxious to become proficient
in VD management. Despite his earlier mistakes, MacKinnon stated he would have “no
hesitation in exchanging him for one of the Officers at the hospital at any time.”96
Scarlett was not the only MO MacKinnon found not using proper treatment
methods. MacKinnon had also filed a report about an MO in the Ottawa area who had
apparently been treating patients for primary syphilis in Canada by exposing the vein,
95

LAC, RG9-III-B-1 Vol. 1830, Correspondence from Lieutenant Colonel F. Howell, 22
January 1919.
96

LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3617, 25-11-1 Vol. 9, Letter from W.T.M. MacKinnon, 13
September 1918.

87

severing it and tying the lower end in order to administer salvarsan through a cannula in
the upper end. When these patients arrived at Etchinghill with latent symptoms,
MacKinnon found it impossible to use their arms as the site of treatment. They told
MacKinnon they had only received three doses of salvarsan as the MO felt this was
sufficient. Although he did not provide the name of the MO in question, MacKinnon
argued, “The fallacies of this method of treatment should in my opinion be brought to the
attention of the authorities in Canada and steps taken to have the treatment of primary or
any other stage of syphilis carried out in an intelligent and rational manner.”97 With VD
knowledge among MOs lacking, as was also the case in England and Canada, it is
possible that the British wanted a central system that would ensure proper treatments. It is
equally possible that the British were concerned about holding too many medical cases at
the front in the event the Germans went on the offensive and captured these field
ambulances and the men within them.98 Whatever the reason behind the British system,
the debates between the two sides became a moot point once the VD management system
had to contend with the new mobility of the battlefield. As the Canadians pushed east as
part of the British force, semi-permanent spaces like that of the venereal station at Aix
Noulette would no longer fulfill the medical needs on the battlefield.
VD posed a big enough problem that it required the creation of a separate
evacuation and treatment schedule. Keeping these cases in France limited the amount of
time men spent away from their units. They could also provide manpower in non-combat
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roles while they underwent treatment. It is unlikely that VD ever had the potential to
render the army ineffective for combat. Instead the creation of its own medical system
was initially prompted by the belief that these cases needed to be dealt with severely to
discourage men from contracting VD either by accident or intentionally. Officials also
wanted to segregate these cases over the misguided belief that the disease could be
potentially be transmitted via non-sexual encounters. As the army increasingly embraced
a medical approach to the VD problem, this shift also supported the existence of a
separate medical system. Treating VD required medical training that many doctors did
not have. In a clinical examination VDG and VDS could be difficult to diagnose by a
non-specialist as symptoms could be easily mistaken for other diseases such as scabies.
Administering arsenic and mercury treatments also needed special training to limit the
potential for adverse side effects from their use. The establishment of a VD management
system at the front was the most effective way for the army to deal with the VD problem.

New Battlegrounds
As hostilities wound down, venereal disease became a bigger problem for
commanders in the field. Once Canadian troops pushed east into areas formerly held by
the German Army, they faced new challenges in combating VD along the front. Officials
reported that their troops were at higher risk of contracting VD while in lines in newly
acquired divisional areas. Early on in the war the majority of the cases had been
contracted when men were on leave but with more large towns located within the forward
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zone there were more opportunities to interact with local women.99 Allied armies also
blamed rising rates on the Germans as they had supposedly released large numbers of
infected women and prostitutes from their hospitals as they retreated. It was reported that
the Germans freed 60,000 cases just after the signing of the armistice.100 With hostilities
winding down, troops had more opportunities to interact with locals and travel on day
passes into city centres. To deal with rising rates of infection, early treatment centres
were established in newly occupied areas and men were increasingly reminded that
contracting VD would result in the loss of pay and could delay their return home. Despite
efforts to control the disease, infection rates for locally contracted cases remained high.
Venereal disease had not been an immediate concern for officials as troops moved
into areas formerly held by the Germans. Officials initially stated “According to the
information given by the French Authorities venereal disease is at present not very
prevalent among the civilians. The precautionary measures and compulsory inspections
of suspected women appear to have been rigorously carried out by the Germans.”101
However, officials soon found this was not the case in many areas. Shortly after arrival
several Allied divisions informed HQ that “In reconquered territory evidence proves that
a number of infected women in the larger towns in some cases amounts to several
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thousands; that these women on the arrival of relieving troops left the hospitals in which
they were being treated and in many cases returned to their homes. They are thus
scattered throughout the district.”102 It is not clear whether women left on their own
accord once they were no longer under German occupation or if they were intentionally
sent home as the Germans retreated. But Allied soldiers were warned that the Germans
had deliberately released infected women and were “still trying to cripple you even if the
fighting is over.”103 Regardless of the reasons for the apparent high rates of VD among
local women, with more opportunities for infection the number of cases contracted
locally increased dramatically. To combat the problem, divisions had to develop policies
and procedures to effectively deal with the VD situation in Belgium and Germany.
The new mobility of the battlefield initially made it difficult to provide
prophylaxis and early treatment to soldiers. While ‘blue light depots’ had been
strategically placed along the Western Front and city centres in France, these were no
longer in range of divisional areas. Colonel C.P. Templeton from the 3rd Canadian
Division reported that in place of early treatment centres, all field ambulances and
regimental MOs had been supplied with calomel ointment and other antiseptics.
Treatment rooms were established within medical dressing rooms and MOs were told to
urge soldiers to use early treatment methods.104 However, Templeton was still concerned
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at the rising rates of VD in his division. In the month of October 1918, there were twentyfive reported cases of VD with four contracted locally. The remaining cases had been
contracted while on leave in Paris or Great Britain.105 By November, eighty-one cases of
VD had been admitted to field ambulances. Thirty-eight of these developed after a man
returned from short leave, another thirty-eight cases had local origins and the source of
the remaining five cases was unknown.106 Templeton instructed his medical officers to
lecture troops in four main areas: the seriousness of the disease to the individual; their
family and society; the negative effects of alcohol; the types of prophylaxis measures that
were available as well as the potential fallibility of such measures to encourage
continence. In addition to lectures, MOs were to maintain calomel supplies, establish
early treatment facilities and provide proper instructions. When infected women were
identified and brought in they were to be admitted to the hospital and presumably treated.
To improve the effectiveness of these measures, Templeton issued several suggestions.
Unit OCs were asked to assist medical officers in carrying out these instructions. Units
were also told to issue an order requiring men to seek treatment within twenty-four hours
of exposure and to take disciplinary action against men who disobeyed and had to be
evacuated due to VD. Unit commanders were also encouraged to promote healthier forms
of entertainment such as sports to their troops.107
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When returns during the first week of December showed higher rates than what
had been reported in the previous month, Templeton became increasingly concerned that
rates were climbing despite intervention. To address the issue, daily parades would
include pertinent information about the prevention of VD. Troops were cautioned against
intercourse with infected prostitutes. Prostitutes in the area were examined twice weekly
and so should be able to produce a card showing they were free from infection. If a
woman could not produce a card then soldiers were warned not to have relations with her.
Men could also readily obtain calomel tubes from their MOs. If a man was potentially
exposed, he was to report to a treatment centre within twenty-four hours. In the event a
man did not follow these produces and contracted VD, he was to be evacuated to a
hospital for treatment. If this happened, men were warned they would be hospitalized for
two to six months during which time their pay would be docked fifty cents per day plus
field allowance. Leave would also be pushed back six months from when a soldier was
scheduled to take it. And finally, since hostilities were winding down, he said troops
should be made aware that VD would delay a man’s discharge from the Army and return
home.108
Similar problems plagued 2nd Canadian Division. Colonel R.W. Simpson, ADMS
for 2nd Canadian Division, Simpson stated that they were doing their best to maintain
treatment centres “so far as the present condition of extreme mobility permits.”109 He did
report that the doctrine of early treatment had been a feature of the division for several
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months and had helped keep the disease at a low level.110 But early treatment rooms had
not yet been established although FAs kept a large stock of calomel tubes.111 Simpson
reported eighty-one cases of VD in the month of December. Twenty cases were
contracted in Great Britain while another five developed after men returned from short
leave in Paris. Most troubling was that the remaining cases occurred locally with eleven
in Germany and thirty-nine in Belgium. Even more problematic was the fact that these
figures only included the first fifteen days of the month. Given the incubation period for
venereal disease Simpson concluded that roughly one-third of the cases contracted had
not yet developed. At the time of the report, only one case of syphilis had been reported
among the eleven cases in Germany. However, since the total figures were split
approximately 50/50 between gonorrhea and syphilis, Simpson expected more cases
would develop. Based on these parameters, he estimated that at least fifteen more cases of
both VDG and VDS had been contracted during the first two weeks of occupation in
Germany. These calculations were an indication that Canadian forces needed to adopt
more stringent measures to keep rates of infection low. “It is only to be expected,”
Simpson contended, “that as time passes soldiers will become better acquainted with the
inhabitants and the natural result will be a gradual increase in venereal disease.”112 To
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this end, Simpson argued that the best method for reducing the number of cases was to
remove any woman suspected of transmitting VD to a soldier from the divisional area.113
This request was not possible as the practice of evacuating women infected with
VD from areas occupied by British forces ended in late 1918. Under the new policy,
known prostitutes were placed on a nominal roll and examined at regular intervals under
the presence of a Canadian medical officer.114 Local physician Dr. Haberman performed
examinations and sent the samples he collected to No. 8 Mobile Laboratory for
examination and report.115 Any woman who tested positive was incarcerated and kept
under medical supervision until they were deemed cured. Women who tested negative
were given a certificate to show that they were free from infection.116 However, No. 8
Mobile Laboratory reported that only one prostitute in Bonn went to Dr. Haberman for
her bi-weekly inspection.117 This number was unacceptable to the CEF and Gorssaline
suggested that civilian authorities also set aside hospital space to hold and treat any
woman found to be infected.118 The situation appeared to improve by early January when
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a sudden rise in the number of examinations forced Dr. Habermann to extend his first
time slot to 8 am. The clinic had also set aside twenty beds for these cases and at the time
fourteen were filled. However, as the police reportedly escorted a number of women to
the clinic it is difficult to determine if the number of women submitting to these
examinations voluntarily had increased.119
Even with measures in place to medically inspect known prostitutes, commanders
reported there were problems with this system. Captain Petri in 2nd Canadian Division
stated that multiple women had passed clinical inspection but dozens of men reported that
they had contracted VD from them. 120 When he passed this communication along,
Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald of 2nd Canadian Division told his superiors that this
situation could be improved by making arrangements to ensure laboratory testing in all
cases. He said that it was impossible to guarantee a correct diagnosis without a lab test.
Although there was a military laboratory in Namur, many smaller villages did not have
access to any resources to test samples.121 The lack of proper testing meant many cases
that did not show external symptoms may have been mistakenly been released and told
they were healthy.
In addition to the medical inspection of women, each field ambulance in 2nd
Canadian Division was ordered to establish an early report centre marked by a blue light
and a sign that read “Early Report Centre. No questions asked.” Similar signs giving its
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location were to be put up around town. Battalion MOs would also be required to create
early treatment centres drawing supplies from the nearest field ambulance.122 Given the
significant problem VD posed, MOs were to be given “no trouble” in pursuing the issue.
MOs were to speak to officers about the methods of infection, the progression of the
disease and the potential medical consequences of VDG or VDS. Educating officers was
an important part of combating the problem since “it has been noted that there exists the
most pitiful ignorance amongst the majority of officers and men concerning even the
most elementary facts of venereal disease and medical men have an opportunity to
educate the public which should no be lost.”123
Major Arthur Yates reported that he had spoken with several Canadian soldiers
arriving on leave in Brussels who informed him that their risk of contracting VD was low
as they incorrectly believed that all infected women had been removed from the area. The
men he spoke to also had an “exaggerated idea of the efficiency of the early
treatment.”124 They would often wait nine or ten hours to seek treatment even when they
suspected the woman had had VD, as they apparently were unaware that prevailing belief
was the curative rate diminished continually after the first hour. A few men had
apparently also been allowed to travel to Brussels with VD, and although it could be hard
to detect these cases, it nonetheless created more difficulties for authorities in Brussels
and needed to be stopped. To resolve these problems, Yates suggested that the Canadians
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start giving addresses at leave clubs. Within the British Army, these lectures had
apparently helped reduce rates of VD to one man for every thousand on leave in Brussels.
The Canadian Report Centre stated that they had not received the authority to give these
lectures to the men.125 Without the necessary information as to their existence or purpose,
the early treatment centres did little to address the VD problem. Many men claimed they
had little understanding of the potential dangers or the proper procedure following
exposure. Even those that were aware of the centres did not know that the curative rate of
early treatment decreased each hour so that it was important they access intervention
within the first sixty minutes.126
This issue was problematic as it meant more men could become infected and HQ
had already reported that 40 per cent of total evacuations while the 2nd Division was in
Germany were for venereal disease.127 Men were to be informed about the existence and
locations of early treatment sites and explicitly told they could visit with no questions
asked.128 Reports forwarded to Divisional HQ only needed to contain the place where the
disease was contracted and whether the man had undergone early treatment. 129 No
records were kept except the certificate that was issued to the soldier. This system
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maintained confidentiality but also ensured that men could prove they had used early
treatment and would not be punished if they still developed an infection.130 With several
blue light centres established throughout the town, men were free to visit any one they
chose as it was believed soldiers would be more comfortable visiting a centre not
attached to their particular unit. Senior medical officers were informed that they should
limit their visits to these centres. Once the personnel responsible for running them were
trained, he would only need to appear periodically to ensure standards were being
maintained. The measures put in place appear to have had a positive impact on infection
rates. It was reported that twice as many cases had developed in Cologne compared to all
the other towns in the area combined. These low rates in areas outside Cologne were
attributed to the presence of early treatment centres in these areas.131
For 1st Canadian Division, who was stationed in Cologne, VD continued to pose
problems for commanders in the area. They received a note from HQ telling them that
they had reported far too many cases during a five-day period in January as they had
already recorded twenty-eight cases of VDG.132 By the end of the month, more than half
of the number of cases of VD came from 1st Division. Of the 309 cases reported by 1st
Canadian Division, 2nd Canadian Division and Canadian Corps Troops, 168 belonged to
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1st Canadian Division.133 Colonel Arthur Snell, DDMS for the Canadian Corps, stated “It
is hoped that every possible precaution is being taken in your area to limit the disease to a
minimum and that the men of your division are aware that nobody be allowed to return to
Canada unless thoroughly cured.”134 Lieutenant-Colonel George J.Boyce, ADMS of 1st
Division, responded that the men in his division had been given numerous lectures
warning them about the dangers of VD. Blue light centres had also been established in
Huy, Liege and at a Divisional Rest Station nearby. He blamed the “practically one
hundred percent” increase in VD on the fact that the division had been assigned to the
Cologne area. He argued that conditions would be different had 1st Division been posted
to a different area in Germany.135 When the division moved in to the Cologne area in
mid-December 1918 the number of cases nearly doubled from fifty-four in November to
102. They reported that of the 291 cases that had appeared since the Canadian division
took over, 184 of these had been contracted in Cologne.136 Boyce stated “the Prevalence
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of venereal disease is causing the medical services much anxiety and all possible steps
are being taken to combat the disease.”137
Canadian divisions were increasingly concerned about the short-term wastage
problem as well as the long-term danger of returning these men to Canada. Colonel
Wright hoped that local authorities would be willing to take the necessary precautionary
steps as the local authorities in France had been. He strongly believed “In dealing with
this question our national health should first be considered rather than the endeavor to
avoid hurting the feelings of local inhabitants.”138 Arrangements were made in early
February to have women suspected of being infected sent to a hospital in Liege. At the
same time, the divisional ADMS stepped up the amount of lectures to the troops. Captain
W. W. McKay delivered several lectures and even had a showing of Whatsoever a man
soweth “an excellent picture setting forth from a medical standpoint the results of
venereal disease.”139 Even after leaving the Cologne area in February, 1st Canadian
Division still had a number of VD cases that they believed were contracted while troops
were still in Cologne. This raised the question as to whether men had been concealing
their disease, so Boyce suggested “short arm” inspections be performed once a week.
Men would continue to be held back from sailing to Canada and be docked pay while
undergoing treatment. In addition, Boyce stated there was a new law in Canada that men
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would not be permitted to marry without a medical certificate proving he was free from
infection.140
To contend with the number of cases that had developed as the Canadians entered
Belgium and Germany, the Second Army altered arrangements to treat these cases. Every
field ambulance and casualty clearing station would establish means for treating
gonorrhea cases while patients were involved in the identification process. Once a
woman was located, the case was evacuated to a CCS or ambulance train. No cases were
to be treated at the Corps or Divisional level beyond the time it took to complete this
process. Any soldier with venereal sores was sent to No. 44 CCS in Cologne for the
purpose of identification. Suspected cases of VDS would receive salvarsan and mercury
injections at No. 44 before they could be evacuated by ambulance train pending
identification. While at No. 44 CCS, the No. 1 Bacteriological Laboratory would test
these cases for the presence of Treponema pallidum. If a man had any open syphilitic
sores, MOs were told not to apply mercury or salt to open sores as doing so made it more
difficult to obtain a conclusive result from the lab. The sore was to be cleaned only with a
saline solution and covered with clean lint or gauze.141 They were, however, to be
provided preliminary treatment prior to evacuation. Major General Thomson, the DDMS
for British Armies in France, reported that a number of cases had arrived at base hospitals
having received no treatment when they were initially admitted at a FA or CCS. This
situation was problematic as doctors believed curative rates diminished significantly over
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a short period of time. So he requested that VD cases be given initial treatment though it
should be limited to washing out the anterior urethra with a weak antiseptic solution for
VDG cases. VDS cases should only be given mercury except when special arrangements
were made for the administration of salvarsan.142
Even with preventative measures in place, 4th Division reported exceedingly high
numbers for VD. Colonel Snell reported that the rates jumped in the Canadian Corps
when 4th Canadian Division rejoined them. In February 1919, he stated “this division has
more venereal disease than any other division due to their proximity to Brussels and the
fact that many men are allowed daily into the city on a pass.”143 4th Canadian Division
had established several blue light centres in Brussels each staffed by an officer assisted
by five other ranks. When men arrived in Brussels on leave, they had to have their passes
stamped within two hours of arriving in the city. At this point, an MO spoke to these men
and lectured them about the dangers of VD. They were also supplied with prophylaxis
and received instructions on how to use them.144 Men were told to wash thoroughly with
soap and water, followed by a wash with percloric of mercury solution. A solution of 2
per cent protargol or 10 per cent argyol was injected into the urethra and retained for 10
minutes. Afterwards, an inunction of 30 per cent calomel ointment was applied to the
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external genitalia.145 Additionally, in lectures men were told to avoid any woman with
rash or a sore on her mouth or privates. They were also advised to avoid kissing as much
as possible or exposing injuries such as a cut finger or cracked lips to infection.146
Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Dell stated that every field ambulance and regimental aid post
had established an early treatment centre open twenty-four hours.147 Snell argued that all
possible provisions had been made to offer early treatment in the area. Between 1st, 2nd
and 3rd Canadian Division as well as the Canadian Corps division, there were 103 early
treatment centres in the area. 148 The success of these measures relied on the selfdiscipline of the men. They needed to report for early treatment as soon as possible to
increase the success rate of preventative treatment. If the number of cases continued to
rise over the next week, Snell said they would have to seriously consider putting Brussels
out of bounds to Canadian troops.149
After visiting a few of the early treatment centres, Snell found that a number of
men were still not being told about them. He was concerned “this shows a certain lack of
thoroughness in the work of Regimental Medical Officers instructing and lecturing these
men. It also bears proof that the Regimental Officers are not taking the interest in this
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matter which is required of them.”150 To address the problem, each divisional ADMS was
required to periodically visit these centres and question the men there about their
knowledge of venereal disease.151 Yates proposed that men proceeding on leave be
questioned by an officer to see if they understood the main points of VD prevention.152
Snell questioned several men from both the 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions who had
reported to an early treatment centre in Brussels and found, despite efforts to improve VD
education among troops, men were not conversant about the centre nor had they received
a lecture by their MO.153 The lack of information surrounding the existence and purpose
of early treatment centres no doubt contributed to higher rates of infection. In March
1919, 4th Canadian Division attributed the high rate of disease among their troops to the
fact that only 22 per cent of infected men had used early treatment.154
The high rates of VD caught the attention of General Arthur Currie who issued a
report to all ranks of the Canadian Corps to draw their attention to the problem. In the
period from 23 February 1919 to 15 March 1919, there were 842 cases among the
Canadian divisions in the Fourth Army. He stated, “These statements disclose a condition
of affairs regarding this most obnoxious disease which, besides being discreditable to the
Corps, is sufficiently alarming for us all to take it very much to heart, and to work to-
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gether to see if something cannot be done to lessen the danger so apparent.”155 He warned
soldiers that they were placing their own health in danger and that contracting the disease
would delay their return to Canada. Men were also putting the health of their spouses and
future children at risk by potentially exposing them to this “cursed” disease. “I use the
word cursed advisedly,” he related, “because medical science knows of no other disease
that has brought so much unhappiness and misery into the world.” 156 Currie also
reminded troops that premarital or extramarital sexual encounters were a sin before God.
In order to “stamp out this evil” Currie highlighted the measures that were already in
place. First, soldiers would continue to receive lectures on the moral and physical dangers
of VD. Second, he reiterated that men who exposed themselves to disease needed to seek
out preventative treatment as soon as possible. 157 Those who did not would be
disciplined, although it was not made clear what these measures would entail. By the end
of February 1919, rates were still high among these divisions. Divisions located near
larger centres like Brussels and Liege were typically worse especially as men were often
allowed on pass to these cities daily so it was suggested that these cities be put out of
bounds to Canadian troops.158 Currie was reluctant to enact such measures as he felt
many soldiers benefitted from these breaks and innocent men would be punished. Instead,
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he stated that he was doing everything possible to get the Belgian authorities to remove
infected women and make soliciting a crime. But ultimately, Currie told them, the
solution rested with the soldiers themselves.159
As officials struggled to curb high rates of infection, medical services also had to
grapple with the increasing number of men who required treatment. With operations
winding down by December 1918, Colonel Ross suggested a policy reversal regarding
where to treat VD cases for economic reasons. Since these cases were not likely to return
to duty anyway, he said they should be evacuated to England for treatment as they had
over 1000 cases hospitalized in France. If England could not accommodate all cases, then
he proposed sending ones with syphilitic sores to England and holding gonorrhea cases in
France.160 Since syphilis cases required longer treatment, it was felt they should be the
first ones evacuated. At No. 7 Stationary Hospital, Brigadier-General F.J.L. Embury
reported that they had 1000 venereal cases under treatment. At a reported $1000 per day
to hold them in France, he argued these men should be sent to England to continue
treatment. He proposed establishing a small staging hospital to facilitate the transfer of
these cases once they were able to travel.161
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Officials in France also argued the practice of sending VD cases acquired in
England back to their units in France for treatment should be reconsidered. 162The ADMS
of the 3rd Calvary Division reported that while on leave, three of his men had reported
sick with VD in London. They were sent back to France where they were then admitted
to hospital. He believed this procedure posed a danger to the man and the general public
as “the man is travelling untreated and under adverse conditions for many days.
Generally he is a source of great danger in latrines, washhouses, baths and general rooms
of feeding and sleeping.” 163 The response from Argyll House, however, was that
hospitals in England could not accommodate these cases. They argued that “since a
Canadian hospital has been set apart in France for this work it is thought advisable to
continue that work in France for the time being.”164 As space became available they
would start taking the more severe syphilis cases. When bed space at No. 7 Stationary
could no longer accommodate the number of cases being admitted, they asked if
Etchinghill was able to take over 300 cases but it is unclear what happened to these
cases.165
What is clear is that the new mobility of the battlefield created a number of new
challenges for medical services in France. Established systems of both treatment and
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prevention, even if the British and Canadians did not always agree on how they should
function, had been built around a largely static battlefield. As men initially had fewer
opportunities for sexual relations while on active service, most cases of VD occurred
while men were on leave in the United Kingdom However, this changed as Canadian
divisions moved into areas formerly occupied by the Germans. In these new areas there
was increased contact between soldiers and local inhabitants. And after the armistice,
soldiers had more time to visit larger city centres while on daily passes. When combined
with the fact that there were initially no early treatment centres in these forward areas,
infection rates among Canadian troops increased dramatically. In response, new early
treatment facilities were established and troops were constantly lectured as to the dangers
of VD. While these measures had helped control VD when stationed along the Western
Front since men were being demobilized and returned home it is difficult to know if these
measures had any real effect on VD rates.

Conclusion
Although Macphail stated that the Canadian Corps was practically disease free
while in France, VD acquired both locally and in the UK was a concern in the field. Like
in England, prevention developed along two lines – a punitive approach followed by a
medical one. Even with these measures in place, VD in France required the development
of a separate medical system for treating these cases. VD at the front never represented a
serious threat to fighting capabilities at the front but its presence still prompted action.
The creation of medical services at the front to deal with the issue eliminated some of the
‘benefits’ of contracting VD. Men could escape the trenches but they could still perform
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vital non-combat roles while undergoing treatment. At the same time, they could be
returned to their units faster than if they were sent across the Channel for medical care.
The medical treatments used at the front were built on established treatments and
techniques although conditions at the front sometimes required accommodations. The
British established a system in which VD cases were evacuated to a base hospital to
undergo treatment. The creation of a VD management system at the front was
complicated by the tensions generated by the competing interests and ideas of RAMC
and CAMC personnel. In contrast to the British system, the Canadians developed a
system to hold more cases in rest stations and field ambulances near the front. This
system, they argued, would reduce wastage while also allowing them to provide a more
thorough treatment, although the British ultimately did not support this approach. The
British were concerned with preserving manpower by ensuring men were treated in the
rear where they could be returned to their units quickly but were not in danger of getting
captured during a German offensive. Despite the differences between the British and
Canadian approaches, the situation in France had been somewhat manageable given that
men had fewer opportunities for interaction with local women while in the trenches –
although soldiers would take advantage when the opportunity presented itself. As Allied
armies moved east, the system once again had to adapt to the new challenges. As
hostilities wound down men had more opportunities to form new ‘friendships’ in newly
acquired territories, which ultimately created more problems for commanders in the field.
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Chapter 3
Venus, the Invisible Bullet: The Evolution of VD Treatment at Etchinghill Hospital,
1916-1919
While the implementation of prophylaxis and early treatment centres helped to
reduce the overall rates of VD among troops, there were still thousands of cases that
required medical care and bed space. The need for more treatment space was felt
especially in England, as men there had more opportunities for sexual contact and the
United Kingdom did not allow for the creation of medically regulated brothels like those
found along the Western Front. With regular hospitals unable to accommodate VD
patients in their wards, special hospitals needed to be constructed to treat cases. By
Armistice Day, 20 special VD hospitals with 11,000 beds were operating under the
RAMC medical services of the BEF with another 1,500 beds scattered across various
non-specialized hospitals.1 At their peak, the two main Canadian special VD hospitals,
Etchinghill and Witley, had 1,060 and 650 beds respectively.2 These hospitals played a
significant role in managing the Canadian VD problem but how they operated and
evolved over the course of the war has received little attention from historians. To begin
to address this dearth in the literature, this chapter focuses on the creation and
development of Etchinghill special hospital in Folkstone.
As at the front and before the war, VD hospitals were tasked with implementing a
medical solution to a disease that was also seen as a moral problem, which affected their
development and day-to-day operations. As military leaders struggled to develop an
1
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effective policy to combat the rising rate of VD infection among soldiers, an examination
of Etchinghill’s administrative records allow us to see how VD was dealt with at the
medical level. An in-depth look at Etchinghill reveals how VD was treated, its role in
developing the VD management system and the problems the hospital, OCs, staff and
patients encountered over its three-year history. Like the CAMC at the front, the hospital
followed the guidelines and procedures set by the War Office. However, unlike Canadian
medical facilities in France, staff and administrators at Etchinghill had more autonomy to
modify these practices. The existence of their laboratory and the fact that their patients
were generally not in active combat roles gave the hospital staff more independence from
the RAMC.

Overcoming the VD Stigma
In the winter of 1914-1915, a 500-bed Canadian tent hospital was established in
Bulford, England to house VD cases. The hospital’s crude equipment and unsympathetic
staff reflected the prevailing belief that men who contracted VD were ‘moral lepers’ and
the army should “let them go to France and get killed.”3 Both Canadian and British
officials were reluctant to assume care of these men but they soon came to the conclusion
that they only way they could limit the spread of VD was by treating these men as sick
rather than social outcasts. It was becoming increasingly apparent that the problem would
also require special treatment centres to accommodate the large number of cases. 4

3

LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3740, History of the Canadian Special Hospital Etchinghill,
Lyminge, Kent, ND.
4

Cassel, The Secret Plague, 126.

112

Existing VD wards in Canadian hospitals were unable to cope with the number of cases,
which created problems with record keeping and maintaining proper treatment
schedules.5 The situation was made worse after a major windstorm in November 1915
destroyed seventy-three of eighty tents shortly after the hospital had been moved to St.
Martin’s Plain, England. In the resulting confusion records were destroyed, patients
disappeared and the CEF was left without suitable accommodations for VD cases. In the
interim, the Shorncliffe Hospital could accommodate forty to sixty cases but frequently
operated overcapacity with as many as 125 cases at one time.6 In his 1916 report, Colonel
Herbert Bruce argued the existing medical structure for VD treatment was inadequate and
as a result many cases had not received proper medical attention. With the CAMC unable
to handle the large number of cases, Bruce discovered that seventy-five VD cases per
week were being transferred to British hospitals at an enormous cost to the CEF.7
However, the problems highlighted in Bruce’s report were not new and the CEF had
already selected Elham Union Workhouse near Folkstone as the site for a special VD
hospital prior to its publication.8 In August 1916, Etchinghill opened its doors with a 200bed capacity. The hospital staff consisted of seventy-five NCOs, most of whom had little
prior VD experience although a few had done rotations at the venereal ward at
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Shorncliffe.9 After several expansions the hospital’s capacity grew to 1060 beds by
March 1918. The hospital processed over 12,000 admissions during its three-years in
operation before its last patients were evacuated on 10 June 1919.
The first officer in command of Etchinghill was forty-year-old Captain Henry
Ernest Paul, who had been a VD specialist in civilian life in Fort Williams, Ontario (now
Thunder Bay).10 After enlisting in March 1915, Paul did rotations at hospitals in Bulford,
Shorncliffe and had even served briefly as OC of the VD tent hospital in St. Martin’s
Plain. Paul was a prime candidate for the position given his experience in civilian
practice and the CAMC Although he had little administrative experience prior to his
appointment, his superiors later noted, “he rose to the occasion admirably and it was
largely due to his ability that the hospital whose foundations he laid so successfully,
attained the degree of excellence it did.” 11 Despite his extensive knowledge and
experience treating VD, his lack of administrative training made opening Etchinghill a
difficult task. On top of this, he also had to contend with the prevailing negative attitudes
concerning VD, which affected every aspect of day-to-day operations and patient care.
Paul spent a year at Etchinghill, during which time he was promoted to the rank of Major,
before relinquishing command and going back to France to work at the No. 1 General
Hospital in Étaples.
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During Etchinghill’s first year in operation, staff and medical officers led by Paul
had to contend with the negative stigmas surrounding VD. The nature of VD, a sexual
disease that as reformers believed could be avoided by adhering to the moral standards of
the day, negatively impacted the experiences of its patients. Historian Mark Harrison
argues special VD hospitals were initially “regarded, if not intended as deterrents.”12 An
earlier report outlined that any OC of a special VD hospital “should not be a medical man
but a Military man of demonstrated executive ability, who shall be given such staff
assistance as to provide for the physical training and military discipline of the men.”13
This statement reflects the early ideas surrounding the treatment of venereal patients who
were seen as moral deviants who needed discipline more than medical intervention. At
the clinical level, the staff and medical officers at Etchinghill had to work to overcome
this negative view and ultimately improve conditions at the hospital.
As one might expect, Paul’s views on VD management were influenced by the
fact he was a medical man and not a military one. Since 1916, the official policy had
been to dock half the pay of men undergoing VD treatment.14 Cassel argues this policy
was “intended to discourage men from running the risk of infection and to recover some
of the financial loss.”15 In contrast to official policy, Paul argued the best method for
reducing VD rates would be increasing compliance from soldiers through less punitive
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measures. After discussing the matter with a number of soldiers over several months,
Paul determined preventative measures were only being used by 50 per cent of men who
later developed VD. A combination of ignorance, lack of instruction and the absence of
any real incentives kept usage low.16 Men who reported to hospital with VD were docked
pay regardless of whether they used preventive measures, which actually encouraged men
to delay treatment by concealing their disease.17 Paul suggested that any soldier who
developed VD but could prove he had received preventative treatment within twelve
hours of exposure should not be subjected to a hospital stoppage. This system had been
implemented by the US Army for soldiers on active service in Mexico with remarkable
success.18 Men would only be docked pay – both their own and any money they had
assigned to dependents – in the event they could not produce a record of preventative
treatment. While this plan was criticized on the basis that any dependents would suffer,
Paul argued it would be more effective since soldiers would then be encouraged to seek
preventative treatment.19 However, Paul’s suggestions were not implemented and men
continued to be docked pay when they were hospitalized for VD, although their
dependents would continue to receive their full allotment. Officers were docked at a rate
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of $1 per day and their field allowance while all other ranks were docked $0.50 per day in
addition to losing their field allowance.20
While it proved difficult to implement change at the policy level, Paul and his
staff could affect change at the clinical level. The stigmas surrounding VD treatment had
had an adverse effect on patient experiences, especially in the hospital’s first year of
operation. Shortly after the war, Adami contended that from the beginning of the conflict
VD patients were treated as human beings instead of “depraved characters.” “I have it
from one of our chaplains,” he told a group at the Royal Institute of Public Health in
1919, “that as a body he found them the best and brightest and most attractive lot of
fellows he had come across in the army, and that he treated them as such.”21 Adami,
however, overstated the acceptance initially extended to these men, although their
experiences did gradually improve over the course of the war. This change was premised
on the belief that improving the conditions of the hospitals would promote recovery,
which would see men returned to their units sooner.
A similar pattern characterized the development of Langwarrin, the VD hospital
in Australia. When it first opened, the hospital functioned as a detention barracks for
soldiers with VD but men frequently ran away before completing their treatments, which
generated no shortage of negative press in the local papers. Historian Raden Dunbar
argues that it soon became obvious to Brigadier General Williams, the commander at
Langwarrin, “that treating men with VD as criminals while trying to force cures upon
them was self-defeating…Something had to be done to make inmates want to stay
20
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voluntarily until they were cured, and then to willingly return to their military duties.”22
To this end, Williams sought to change the attitudes surrounding VD treatment at
Langwarrin by converting it into a hospital rather than a detention centre. Beginning in
late 1915, the staff and patients worked to improve the existing facilities through
improvements to the grounds, buildings, entertainment and overall comfort of the staff
and patients. These measures appeared to have had the desired effect as the staff reported
that by the end of 1916 absences and escapes had all but stopped. 23 While both hospitals
experienced a similar evolution in improved attitudes and conditions, Langwarrin
benefited from being situated in a fairly remote area in Australia, away from the
constraints of wartime conditions and British policy.
Even finding an area to dedicate to the treatment of VD had been no small task
given that “there is no part of the British Isles that want to have these men in their
neighbourhood.”24 No community wanted to run the risk of an outbreak of VD especially
since soldiers who contracted VD were seen as deviants who did not deserve sympathy
nor even the simplest of accommodations. For example, out of a sense of moral outrage
the Red Cross would not provide comforts such as cigarettes or books to soldiers
undergoing treatment at Etchinghill. They supposedly went as far as to refuse to supply
the hospital with crutches. During a visit to the hospital in December 1917, DGMS
Major-General G. C. Jones argued these supplies were necessary and “no matter what the
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origin of the man’s illness may be, when he is sick, he should receive the same
consideration as if the sickness has been acquired through other sources.”25 The Red
Cross did not begin supplying comforts to Etchinghill patients until early 1918. This
reversal only happened after Colonel William MacKinnon, who had taken over as OC in
1917, informed the Red Cross of the necessity of such items and the fact that the patients
were actually entitled to them.26
Men being treated at Etchinghill initially had little in the way of entertainment or
exercise. They were not allowed outside for marches and had no sports field or other
organized activities until staff members at Etchinghill intervened. 27 Captain Arthur
Skerry, an Anglican clergyman from Nova Scotia who was chaplain at Etchinghill from
August 1916 to June 1919, was the driving force behind these changes. After discussing
the matter with Paul, he wrote to the Director of Medical Services, Colonel A.T.
Shillington to request sporting goods for the patients at Etchinghill.28 “The Societies
organized for this purpose,” he wrote, “seem to think the men here do not deserve
anything in this line. I think it is a great shame not to give any men any opportunities for
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amusement and if you could intercede for us we would appreciate it very much indeed.”29
Skerry’s role was later described as “most important” given his personal contact with
patients and his keen interest in the connection between sports, entertainment and
recovery.30 He worked hard to improve the conditions for patients by advocating for them
in appeals to senior ranks but he also contributed his own time and energy to establishing
programs, entertainment and support. Religion became an important component of
hospital life. Skerry held a church service and bible study group on Sundays, conducted a
mid-week song service and established a library and reading room for patients. Over 200
patients enrolled in education classes provided by the YMCA with topics including
agriculture, history, French, bookkeeping, shorthand and arithmetic. In one instance, a
group of twelve illiterate soldiers was taught to read and write while undergoing
treatment. Sexual education was also an important component, and although already
intimately acquainted with the dangers of VD, patients were lectured on the risks VD
posed to both individuals and the nation.31
Physical activity would increasingly become an integral part of hospital life since
staff found it kept men fit for service and aided in the recovery process. Shortly after
Etchinghill opened in the fall of 1916, the majority of the grounds were cultivated for
agricultural use, which quickly became an important activity and resource at the
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hospital.32 At an inspection on December 1916 the hospital’s dry canteen was criticized
for not providing any room for recreational activities for staff or patients but the CO in
charge of the inspection stated he was impressed with the hospital’s garden and said he
would do anything in his power to provide fertilizer and seeds to continue the project and
also approved of expanding the farm to include pigs and other livestock.33 Almost two
acres of land were seeded with potatoes, parsnip and greens that could be used in the
mess hall with the majority being sold in the surrounding areas. Patients looked after the
bulk of the gardening work because medical staff felt “there is double advantage in this
as patients in doing heavy work such as digging and rolling provide the medical officer in
whose charge they are with a test as to the permanency of their cure it having been
discovered in cases of gonorrhea that a great many relapse occur in men who are placed
in heavy fatigues in their lines immediately after recovering from an attack of
gonorrhea.”34 Due to the physical nature of the work, it could irritate already sensitive
urethras and some men would develop increased discharge and had to be returned to the
ward for further treatments. This physical test allowed doctors to determine which cases
required further treatment and became an important part of gauging the recovery process.
At both Witley and Etchinghill, a growing emphasis on physical activity became
an important part of improving hospital conditions and the effectiveness of treatment. To
promote physical activity Etchinghill developed a training schedule that included four
32
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daily parades. The hospital staff modified the three training branches: drill, physical
training and bayonet fighting as they were thought to be too strenuous for VD patients.
Physical training would only be given three to five days after a patient’s last treatment to
test their condition. If no relapse occurred then patients were returned to their units with
orders to continue light duty for several weeks. Since the level of physical activity
required under normal training procedures was deemed too intense for recovering
patients they were offered classes in map reading, anti-gas and target practice with
muskets, Lewis guns and bombing.35 There were three levels of exercise corresponding to
each class of treatment: acute, sub-acute and chronic to ensure that the level of physical
activity would not trigger a relapse or place any undue strain on one’s genitalia.36 This
schedule would help keep men battle-ready through regular drilling. Its graduated levels
promoted a soldiers’ return to the line by slowly increasing his level of physical activity
without triggering a relapse.
By the fall of 1917, in addition to regular, modified drilling, team sports such as
football and baseball became an important part of recovery.37 An inter-ward softball
league was created and its success led to the establishment of an inter-ward football
league. The prevailing wisdom was that VDG patients should avoid all physical activity
as it might exacerbate their condition and slow recovery. Contrary to this belief the staff
35

LAC, RG9-III-B-1 Vol. 1826, Colonel W.T.M MacKinnon, Reporting the Work
Carried Out at Canadian Hospital Etchinghill During Year Ending 1 November 1918.
36

LAC, RG9-III-B-1 Vol. 3617, Colonel W.T.M. MacKinnon, Instruction in Military
Subjects, 3 February 1918.
37

LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3740, History of the Canadian Special Hospital Etchinghill,
Lyminge, Kent, ND, RG9-III-D-3 Vol. 5041, War Diary, Canadian Special Hospital,
Etchinghill, ND and Adami, “The Policy of the Ostrich,” 386.

122

at Etchinghill determined that “physical training, by keeping the men busy and diverted,
very materially shortens the period of hospitalization.”38 Patient participation in sports
and games was strongly encouraged and Etchinghill reported the 30-50 per cent of
patients generally took part. Physical activity was successfully used as mental stimulus,
to maintain discipline and the graduated increase in physical training created a smooth
transition once a man was returned to duty.
Despite the stigma surrounding VD, patient experiences at Etchinghill gradually
became more humane over the course of the war. These changes can be attributed to the
individual efforts of its hospital staff, like Captain Skerry, who advocated for change on
behalf of their patients. Conditions at the hospital also benefited from a shift in attitude at
the policy level that saw a more liberal approach to the VD problem. Men being treated
for VD were initially regarded as moral deviants but this harsh view was gradually
replaced by the belief that treating these men as sick instead of criminals would produce
better results. This change paved the way for the implementation of entertainment,
physical and personal support at the hospital, which improved patient experiences and
helped to promote recovery.

Improving the VD Management System
VD hospitals became the central sites for managing VD but they did not operate
in isolation. Canadian hospitals functioned in a similar fashion to British hospitals. The
War Office outlined practices and procedures for VD care but the CAMC was
responsible for the delivery of the system established by the British. The success of the
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VD management system depended on the cooperation and efforts of battalion MOs who,
in the wisdom of the day, played an important role in determining the sexual health of the
men under their command. During the course of the war, Etchinghill became something
of a research and teaching hospital tasked with generating and disseminating knowledge
among battalion doctors in England. The responsibility of battalion doctors as educators
of sexual health at the front has been well documented, while their role as medical
practitioners in VD treatments, tasked with diagnosing the disease, has received less
attention. The role of the MO was important as they were the first to diagnose suspected
cases and time was a crucial element in ensuring a successful treatment. Early diagnosis
improved the effectiveness of a treatment thereby reducing the amount of hospitalization
that was required. During his tenure as OC, W.T.M MacKinnon took an active role in
trying to improve the VD management system through by increasing VD education and
awareness among battalion MOs.
Major William Thomas Morris MacKinnon took over command of Etchinghill on
27 August 1917 and remained in charge of the hospital until it closed in early June
1919.39 The forty-four-year-old ophthalmologist from Amherst, New Brunswick, had
been with the CAMC since he had enlisted on 13 September 1914.40 MacKinnon did
rotations at hospitals in both France and England before succeeding Paul as OC of
Etchinghill.41 Although not formally trained as a VD specialist, during his tenure at
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Etchinghill MacKinnon took an active role in trying to shape the management of VD in
the CEF. Under MacKinnon, the hospital’s focus expanded to include increased
education and awareness about VD prevention and treatments. His efforts did not go
unnoticed by those in the senior ranks and he was promoted to the rank of Colonel in the
CAMC.
VD education among battalion MOs became a central aspect of MacKinnon’s
agenda. He continually stressed the importance of early diagnosis and completing
treatments as he argued this significantly reduced the severity of cases and thus the
amount of treatment time. Any delay could allow the disease to generalize, making it far
more difficult to treat. Proper diagnosis, however, could be difficult as VD symptoms
could be masked by other illnesses or mistaken for symptoms of another disease. Too
often this meant that it was several weeks before men with VD were sent to Etchinghill
for treatment, which prolonged treatment times and reduced their effectiveness.
To improve the situation, MacKinnon worked to cultivate awareness and
cooperation with MOs about the importance of early diagnosis. He asserted, “It has been
found by experience at this hospital that medical officers as a rule through distaste of
‘V.D.’ neglect this important subject and are consequently both unable to diagnose and to
treat these diseases.”42In a report to his superiors in Folkstone, he described the cases of
two men who developed primary lesions but were retained in brigade lines for two weeks
before being sent to Etchinghill. In both cases, he noted that the men had enlarged glands
with marked indurations –inflamed and hardened masses - and multiple erosions on the
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penis, all a clear indication that these cases should have been sent to the hospital sooner.
MacKinnon requested that this issue “might be brought to the attention of the M.O.’s in
the Shoreham Area that early treatment is necessary in order to ensure a cure in primary
syphilis; that delays cause the disease to become generalized, and it is almost impossible
to obtain a negative Wassermann, even at the end of a double course of 606.”43 Although
at times Etchinghill reached capacity and was forced to refuse admission to large groups
from outside areas, MacKinnon stressed that there was always enough room to provide
immediate treatment to three or four patients if they had primary lesions.44
Two weeks later he identified three more cases, two with syphilis and one with
chancre that were not sent to hospital until weeks after their symptoms had first appeared.
The chancre case was admitted forty-five days after the man first reported his condition.
Despite the presence of multiple physical symptoms including enlarged glands,
inflammation and induration he was only admitted after a blood test.45 Another case
involved a soldier who had contracted VD in April 1917 with his first symptoms
appearing in May that same year. Over the next few months he underwent several
medical inspections at several different hospitals. In September he paraded before a MO
at Seaford, complaining of a sore throat and had neucus patches and erosions in his
mouth and throat. MacKinnon noted “This was undoubtedly the secondary symptoms of
syphilis and no error in diagnosis should have be made as was the case with this MO who
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told him it was ‘Just a little sore throat’ and that a gargle was all the treatment he
required.46 The man was sent back to his unit until he reported sick again on 31 October
at which point another MO recognized the symptoms and immediately sent him to
Etchinghill. Despite several examinations, it took 158 days before he received a correct
diagnosis.47 The man spent twenty-seven days in hospital before being discharged as an
outpatient for the remainder of his treatment. He received six doses of neo-salvarsan and
seven doses of mercury, but his Wassermann still came back positive on 31 December
1917. However, he embarked for Canada in January 1918 and there is no further
information in his file, so it is not clear whether there were any further treatments or tests
as a positive Wassermann should have excluded him from being sent back to Canada, a
policy that will be discussed in the last chapter. 48
Over the next several weeks, MacKinnon continued to report more cases of
delayed treatment to his superiors.49 After Private Higgins went to his MO after noticing
a small sore on his penis, he was placed in quarantine and treated for scabies for three
weeks. When his condition did not improve, he was sent to Etchinghill and on admission
he was also found to have large rashes and multiple sores over his body, inflammation,
and indurations. Although the symptoms of VD and scabies were similar MacKinnon
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asked “Might the attention of the MO responsible be drawn to the similarity which is
sometimes shown between scabies of the penus [sic] and syphilitic sores. Careful
examination will reveal the distinction. Induration is very noticeable in syphilitic sores
while absent in sores caused by scabies.”50 Private Cook was also mistakenly treated for
scabies when he reported to his MO after he noticed a sore on his penis. After undergoing
a month of treatment for scabies he was admitted to Etchinghill in September 1918 with
syphilis. The delay had allowed the disease to generalize and he had developed several
lesions, chancres, enlarged glands and a large rash on his torso. Again, MacKinnon
insisted the MO should have caught these symptoms and the ADMS agreed that not
enough had been done to get them to hospital as early as possible.51
To rectify the situation, the hospital started holding clinical meetings in order to
educate MOs of the methods of diagnosing VD, which were generally well attended
according to MacKinnon.52 In the absence of available cases, the hospital relied on
lanternslides showing early conditions in natural colours in order to assist the clinical
demonstrations.53 At a meeting at the clinical society at Etchinghill Captain George
Orville Scott, a pre-war VD specialist who worked at the hospital from 19 February 1917
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to 30 January 1919, informed his audience that “if every medical officer here regard any
sore on the genitals as specific until proven otherwise, then we have expended our time to
the greatest advantage and actually saved this afternoon thousands of dollars to the
government, increased the efficiency of every unit in this area, and greatly helped to keep
our overseas division up to fighting strength.” 54 While early diagnosis was key to
reducing treatment times and improving effectiveness, men frequently reported genital
sores to their MOs only to be told that it was too early to have developed an infection.
Instead the sores were attributed to chaffing or unhygienic practices. In some cases,
battalion MOs serving units in England were also found to cauterize open venereal sores
which made it difficult to obtain an early diagnosis through examination or microscopic
smear when they were sent to hospital a week or two later. Scott argued, “it would be
much better if cases in which the Medical Officers above referred to are doubtful of their
diagnosis, were sent to this Hospital at once without being interfered with.” 55 He
explained that a delay in treatment by three to six weeks allowed the disease to generalize
making it more difficult to treat.
The statistics compiled at Etchinghill show that men admitted with primary stage
syphilis spent an average of twenty-one days in hospital whereas the average stay of a
man with secondary stage syphilis spent an average of twenty-two days in hospital.
Although there was little difference in hospitalization times, early diagnosis significantly
reduced the length of time required for outpatient treatment. Once released from the
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hospital, men were required to return at regular intervals as outpatients. Outpatient care in
cases of primary syphilis was thirty-six days compared to the one hundred and sixty-five
day treatment required once the disease had generalized, which significantly delayed their
ability to perform full fatigue and subsequently their availability for a draft. Scott stated
“The balance sheet stands as follows in the majority of cases: Primary syphilis, available
for France in fifty-seven days; generalized syphilis, available for France in one hundred
and eighty-seven days.” 56 Scott informed the MOs their role was of the utmost
importance given that treatment time tripled when diagnosis was delayed.57 These clinical
meetings provided valuable statistical and medical information in an effort to improve
coordination with medical officers in the area. MacKinnon felt the meetings were a
success and stated “a large number of Officers have passed through this hospital and it is
hoped, are now proficient to carry out intelligent diagnosis and treatment upon their
return to Canada, where it is feared owing to the conditions which obtain as the result of
the war, that venereal disease will have spread to a considerable extent as it has done in
this country.”58 MOs played an important role in early diagnosis but their role did not end
there as they coordinated follow-up care once soldiers were discharged from hospital.
Limited hospital space meant many men undergoing anti-syphilis injections had to be
treated as outpatients for the later half of their treatments.
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Since the day it opened, the hospital frequently operated at capacity and had to
implement procedures to meet demand. Unable to retain all men in hospital over the
course of their treatment, which typically lasted two months, men who had no open sores
were sent back to their lines to continue the second half of their treatment as outpatients.
From August 1916 to November 1918, the hospital treated 12,281 outpatients.59 Medical
staff at Etchinghill knew sending patients back to their units while they were still
undergoing treatments could create a number of logistical issues, but the lack of space
made it necessary do so. The success of this system required the assistance of medical
and commanding officers at the battalion level. This cooperation could be difficult to get
as it was often hindered by inexperience and ignorance among MOs.
Shortly after the hospital opened, the staff began to report problems about the lack
of medical experience in treating VD among battalion MOs. Captain Herbert Bates, while
working as an MO at Etchinghill stated he quickly found inexperienced MOs giving
preliminary treatments had been problematic. He noted “patients have frequently been
admitted to this Hospital with badly mutilated arms caused by repeated attempts to
puncture veins, which, to an experienced MO, would present no difficulty.”60 Etchinghill
had been investigating the use of several different 606 solutions so that men could be
treated in lines. But given the fact that it was already difficult to obtain and maintain a
steady supply of the drug and the relative inexperience of some MOs, it was difficult to
ensure uniform treatment outside of the hospital. Instead, the hospital discharged men to
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their units and had them return for treatments and testing. The outpatient system had been
created owing to lack of space and Bates reasoned the “system is not satisfactory, as
some men never return for the completion of their course of treatment and a great many
never return for a ‘Wassermann’ reaction.”61 He reasoned that once the hospital added
another 100 beds it would not be necessary to discharge men until they were cured, which
would solve most of the current problems. But this increase did not solve the bed
shortage and syphilis cases were treated as outpatients throughout the war.
Even with the development of a VD management system to track outpatient
treatments, compliance from battalion MOs in England remained an issue. The men and
their MOs were given written notifications indicating when men were to proceed to
Etchinghill for blood tests and treatments. To ensure that there were no negative side
effects from 606 treatments, men were also to be placed on light duty for twenty-four
hours after their injections. If a man was not recalled seven days after his last blood test
then his Wassermann could be marked negative and he could be considered ‘cured.’62
While this system saw men returned to their units sooner, it required the cooperation of
the soldier’s CO and MO to be successful, which did not always happen. Scott
complained to his superiors, “the necessity for these men to get regularly treated is too
obvious to require any comment. In spite of these notifications, and the obvious
necessity, I find that men fail to report on the proper days, for reasons too varied to
enumerate. In most cases I am convinced the responsibility does not lie with the men
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themselves.”63 He felt this was unnecessarily unfair to the men who were at the mercy of
their MOs. Scott recounted the story of a sergeant who had been discharged as an
outpatient with a slip outlining the days he needed to report back to Etchinghill. The
sergeant’s MO and CO had both received separate notifications but when the man asked
permission to report to Etchinghill, his request was denied. Not satisfied with the
response, the man went to see his Senior MO who told him that he did not need to report
on time as “a few days one way or the other made no difference.”64 When the man was
still not given permission to report for treatment several days later, he felt he had no
choice but to go absent without leave, which left him open to punishment.65
MacKinnon took over shortly after Scott’s initial complaint and he immediately
set about solving the problem. The end result was the creation of a circular letter to be
forwarded to all units outlining the necessity and procedures surrounding outpatients to
counter the false impression treatment schedules could be altered. All units were
informed “this impression is entirely erroneous, resulting often in delays which
necessitates carefully calculated changes in dosage and treatment of the soldier, and in
every instance nullifies the Medical records maintained at the Hospital, of the particular
soldier concerned.”66 In an effort to ensure compliance with outpatient procedure, units
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were told that they were to make arrangements to allow a soldier to proceed to the
hospital, under the escort of an NCO if the soldiers rank or grade was private. Etchinghill
would send notifications to the man’s unit MO and OC, who were responsible for
forwarding these notifications to the soldiers new unit in the event he was transferred.67
When the hospital experienced a marked increase in the number of gonorrhea
cases being re-admitted to Etchinghill in early 1918, MacKinnon realized MOs needed a
reminder about the proper aftercare of VD patients. In order to minimize the potential for
relapse after completing treatments, Etchinghill recommended men be placed on
restricted leave and given light duty for three weeks following their discharge from
hospital. While investigating these cases, MacKinnon interviewed a number of men who
claimed they were immediately returned to full duty or granted a leave of absence. When
men were discharged from the hospital, their units were given specific instructions to put
the man on light duty for several weeks. Men who returned to full duty right away often
relapsed as the strain of heavy work irritated the already sensitive urethral mucosa.
Private Moore was discharged to his unit after spending thirty days in hospital with
instructions to be placed on light duty. However, two days after returning to duty Moore
was placed on heavy fatigues, which involved carrying stacks of potatoes and bundles of
rhubarb and relapsed shortly after.68 Four days after Private Osborne was returned to his
unit, he was marched ten miles and put to work cutting brush for several hours, heavy
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work which MacKinnon blamed for his relapse.69 Although it was not always possible to
prevent a relapse MacKinnon was “quite sure that many relapses would be prevented if
the Officers Commanding Infantry Units would co-operate intelligently with the medical
officers in securing for men on their return to duty, the three weeks construction battalion
and light duty asked for, in order to gradually harden these patients and minimise the
danger of relapse.”70 Relapses were also common among men who were given leave
shortly after release. MacKinnon argued men on leave frequently consumed large
amounts of alcohol, which irritated the urethra often resulting in a purulent discharge that
prompted a return trip to the hospital. The Shorncliffe area had already introduced an
order outlining the proper procedure for dealing with cases of VD and MacKinnon
suggested other areas should adopt a similar order. The order stipulated that all VDG
patients be placed on three weeks of light duty following their return to the unit. During
this time they would also be confined to lines and prohibited from visiting the canteen
with any consumption of alcohol resulting in swift punishment as MacKinnon warned
them of the negative effect alcohol could have on a man’s recovery.71
Etchinghill was the central part of the VD management system but MacKinnon
and other hospital staff like Scott, relied on the cooperation of battalion MOs and
commanders to ensure the eradication of VD. Success started with an early diagnosis but
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also included follow-up care for recovering patients or those still undergoing treatments.
The creation of a better system became a central focus when Mackinnon took over
command. To improve the system, MacKinnon and the staff at Etchinghill increased
awareness and education by improving communication with MOs and implementing
clinical meetings at the hospital. Advancing the knowledge of battalion MOs and
building better working relationships with them was vital to the VD management system.

Patients and Admission Process
Clerks at Etchinghill admitted 12,158 patients over the course of its almost three
years in operation. The names, diagnosis, and length of hospitalization for each patient
were recorded in the hospital’s admission and discharge books. To understand more
about the men who were sent to hospital, a random and representative sample of 382
patients was constructed, choosing every 27th name from the admission and discharge
books sequentially. This number was chosen because it would typically yield results with
a confidence interval of 95 per cent, 19 times in 20, using the standardized data points
collected and outlined below. The sample was constructed sequentially to ensure that it
was both random and representative of the hospital’s entire history, given that patients
were admitted in batches and the population varied over time. The patient’s name, age,
disease, length of stay and outcome were recorded and analyzed in an effort to compare
the demographics to available hospital reports and fill in missing information about the
patient profile. The averages compiled in these categories generally reflect those recorded
in hospitals reports allowing for a construction of the typical patient and experience.
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My sample of Etchinghill’s admission and discharge books reveals that the
average age of a soldier admitted to hospital was 26.3 years old, slightly younger than the
average age of a soldier in the CEF at twenty-seven. Not all patients, however, fit this
demographic and there were several outliers in the sample at both ends of the scale.
Private John Harrington claimed that he was nineteen years old when he enlisted with the
CEF on 30 December 1915. Harrington was, in fact, only fifteen when he enlisted and
was only sixteen years old when he was admitted to Etchinghill with gonorrhea on 4
January 1917. He spent 106 days in hospital before eventually being discharged to duty.72
Sixteen-year-old Henry Howe left his home in North Dakota to enlist in Crystal City,
Manitoba. As Howe was underage, he was not to be sent overseas until he was nineteen
but he arrived in England on 11 November 1916 and was assigned to the 11th Reserve
Battalion. While in Brighton he developed chancroids and spent twenty-three days at
Etchinghill before being discharged to duty on 25 April 1917.73 The oldest man admitted
to the hospital in this sample was Private Archibald Baxter who arrived at Etchinghill on
20 January 1918 with gonorrhea at age fifty-one and spent sixty-seven days in hospital.74
Baxter, an unmarried meat cutter from Regina, told hospital officials that he had
contracted gonorrhea in Regina prior to his enlistment in May 1916.
Gonorrhea was the most common disease among soldiers admitted to Etchinghill.
Based on the sample, 193 cases (51 per cent) admitted to hospital were for gonorrhea.
One hundred and twenty eight cases (34 per cent) were admitted with syphilis and 13
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(0.03 per cent) cases were admitted with both gonorrhea and syphilis. Only 5 of the 382
cases (0.01 per cent) in the sample were classified as chancroids, or sores. The remaining
43 cases (1 per cent) were admitted under several different labels – such as non-specific
urethritis, venereal sores, balanitis – and it is impossible to determine which, if any,
venereal disease they had contracted. In civilian life too, cases of VDG were generally
more common than VDS cases. In pre-war Canada, doctors believed syphilis affected
about 5 to 15 per cent of the population while Macphail’s numbers indicate 28 per cent of
cases were for VDS.75 Contemporary estimates believed anywhere between 25 to a
remarkable 80 per cent of young men had gonorrhea. 76 In comparison, the No. 2
Australian Hospital in Egypt reported in 1917 that gonorrhea represented only 43 per cent
of their cases and 11 percent of the cases were for syphilis.77 Curiously, they diagnosed
45 per cent of VD cases with chancroids even though after the war Macpherson argued
they represented only a small number of cases.78 This difference could be attributed to
the theatre of war since Canadian doctors had more opportunities to interact with their
British counterparts in England than Australian doctors so they would have similar views
and training. Clearly though, while the distribution of these diseases in the CEF reflects
civilian estimates, total numbers were clearly much lower than many doctors feared. This
probably reflects the fact that it was difficult to get an accurate measurement given the
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absence of centralized public health institutions, so civilian estimates were more likely
derived from moralistic fears and socially constructed extrapolations than reliable data
whereas the soldiers of the CEF were subjected to a high degree of surveillance and
medical inspection.
Based on the sample, most men were treated at Etchinghill for an average of fiftyseven days. This average is similar to a 1917 report that stated the average stay of men
who had not used any preventative treatment was 55.5 days. Men who had used some
form of preventative measures were released after 45.8 days, not far off the median of
forty-two days.79 Syphilis patients generally spent twenty-six days in hospital whereas the
average stay for men being treated for gonorrhea was sixty-eight days. Although the
treatment schedule for syphilis was fifty days until March 1918 when it was extended to
fifty-seven days, owing to limited space in the syphilis ward the majority of cases would
have been discharged and finished their treatments as outpatients. The longest stay was
John Arthur Kealy, a twenty-one-year-old private who was admitted to Etchinghill on 25
October 1917.80 After contracting Gonorrhea in London, he spent 373 days in hospital. It
is not clear from the available records why he had to remain so long in hospital but it is
likely his condition had become chronic, which significantly increased a man’s average
hospital stay. A 1918 hospital report based on the first six months of the year reported
that chronic cases were hospitalized for ninety-eight days compared to the 42.6 days
needed to treat cases admitted in the acute stage of infection. While his stay exceeded the
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average stay for a typical case of chronic gonorrhea, it is possible his case was
complicated by syphilis as he was later re-admitted to Etchinghill on 6 May 1919
supposedly suffering from generalized syphilis. He was treated with 606 over twentyseven days, which is consistent with the same report that showed generalized syphilis
cases spent about 28.5 days in hospital at Etchinghill before being treated as
outpatients.81
From a military point of view, then, these figures would suggest that gonorrhea
was a far more serious problem for operational efficiency than syphilis, which, in
contrast, was a more serious long-term health issue for soldiers. With a typical course of
treatment lasting more than two months, a case of gonorrhea might require as long a
hospital stay as a gunshot wound or other traumatic injury. Syphilis patients, in contrast,
typically spent as long in hospital as soldiers suffering from a variety of other contagious
diseases such as mumps, measles, or skin infections. In either case, though, both had the
capacity to incapacitate soldiers for lengthy periods of time.
While syphilis could cause more long-term problems, more hospital space was
devoted to the treatment of gonorrhea since it was the more common disease and required
inpatient care. To accommodate the number of cases being admitted, Etchinghill had
eight wards with 100 beds each dedicated to gonorrhea cases by early 1918. Etchinghill’s
goal was to maintain a high standard of care to prevent the spread of VDG after the war.
The hospital boasted that only 7.2 per cent of cases were considered symptomatic when
discharged and that this only occurred when the men were needed as reinforcements.
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These cases were men who had been hospitalized for longer than six months and could be
considered non-infective despite lingering symptoms. In order to be considered cured for
discharge from the hospital VDG cases had to meet these six criteria: no urethral
discharge; clear urine; urethra smears clear of pus or gonocci; had received their last
treatment more than three days prior; clear urethscopic exam of follicles and have under
gone heavy physical training to ensure they were not likely to relapse once returned to
duty.
Syphilis patients at Etchinghill were frequently told that their time in hospital did
not mean that they were cured. Even after they received treatment and were released,
former patients would have to continually watch for signs of the disease. In the likely
event they developed any symptoms – sores, pains in the head, neck or groin – medical
staff advised patients to seek medical care immediately. Even if they did not develop any
symptoms they were told they should still have their blood tested every four to six
months. MacKinnon informed patients “when the above advice is faithfully followed for
a period of three years, you may in all probability expect to be spared the later and
severer symptoms of the disease, such as bone decay, nerve and spinal cord afflictions,
premature strokes of paralysis etc.”82 Patients were warned of the potential impact the
disease could have on their spouses or future offspring. He suggested to the men that they
“not consider marrying until you have followed this course for three years, and then only
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with the approval of your medical officers or your physician. If you do not follow this
suggestion, you will be liable to transmit the disease to your wife and children.”83

Treatments
Treatment at Etchinghill was based on the prevailing civilian approaches to the
disease, modified by the requirements of the army. The War Office established the
guidelines and practices for VD treatments. In England, like in France, doctors in the
CAMC worked within these rules. But the addition of a laboratory at Etchinghill allowed
CAMC doctors, who largely came from civilian practices prior to enlisting, the chance to
experiment with new techniques. The laboratory provided them with more resources than
they would have access to as civilian doctors and the Canadian government was
responsible for the costs. Wartime medicine gave them unfettered access to supplies,
samples and patients as well as the chance to work alongside VD specialists and other
doctors who found themselves working in the field after being assigned to the hospital.
The creation of a laboratory was thanks to Etchinghill’s first OC Captain Henry Ernest
Paul.
Shortly before taking over command of the hospital, Paul visited No. 9 Stationary
Hospital in Le Havre, which was used as the model for VD hospitals, to observe their
treatment of gonorrhea and came away very impressed by hospital’s capacity, capabilities
and treatments. 84 He reported that the average stay in the hospital in 1915 was 49.88
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days but had fallen to 36 days by March 1916. This improvement was attributed to
extensive implementation of a VDG vaccine and intramuscular injections and an overall
improvement in hospital conditions. Succinimide of mercury and pthalamine were
heavily used in treatments but given the difficulty in obtaining reliable compounds that
were free from impurities, the hospital had begun to develop its own compound, which
they reported had proven successful. Based on his observations at Le Havre Paul
concluded a “well equipped laboratory forms a necessary and most important branch of
this hospital” and worked to develop a similar laboratory at Etchinghill.85 While the War
Office set the general treatment schedules Etchinghill followed, the development of the
laboratory created a level of autonomy for medical staff, as they were able to experiment
with new treatment and techniques.
From February 1917 to June 1919, Captain Alan Bart Jackson, a twenty-two-yearold from Simcoe, Ontario who had just completed medical school, ran the laboratory at
Etchinghill.86 Under Jackson, as we will see later, the lab at Etchinghill played an
important role in the development of techniques for VD detection, a cornerstone of
Canada’s demobilization policies. At the time of Jackson’s arrival, the lab was still not
fully functioning since the gas supply did not allow for anything other than illumination,
nor did the lab have the capabilities to develop its own vaccines for VDG. Vaccines were
available through the medical store but were expensive and hard to obtain.87 Paul tried to
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acquire a new lamp called ‘Clarke’s Sub-Stage Microscopic Lamp,’ which was not yet on
the market but was used for dark ground examinations and would save on the petrol
consumption for lighting. He requested permission to travel to London to enquire about
the lamp and to visit different syphilis clinics to exchange information on current
techniques. The dark field method would become the preferred method at Etchinghill to
check for Treponema pallidum in syphilis cases. In 1918 they reported that under this
method “we have many times been able to diagnose as specific, small ulcers of a day or
so’s duration, there by making it possible to inaugurate treatment before the infection has
made vital progress.”88 This early detection method was employed 464 times over a tenmonth period but the Wassermann reaction, recommend by the Medical Research
Committee, was still the most widely used method. Despite the known limitations of the
test, it remained the primary method for diagnosing the disease.
Although not all the medical staff at the hospital had been VD specialists prior to
their appointments, they quickly learned the important signs to look for to ensure an
accurate gonorrhea diagnosis. The doctors at Etchinghill stated that one of the most
important aspects of care was to first determine the actual cause of discharge or infection,
as gonocci was not always the culprit. From there it was important to determine how far
the disease had progressed. If the disease was still in the anterior urethra, doctors believed
it could be cured in three weeks or less. However, the majority of the cases were not
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admitted to hospital until the disease had reached their posterior urethra, which generally
required two to three months of treatment.89
The main method outlined by the War Office in the treatment of gonorrhea was
the irrigation of the urethra with potassium permanganate twice a day if the disease was
in its acute stages. Chronic cases were to be treated by the well-established methods of
dilation and prostatic massage.90 However, there was no one method or drug for VDG
favored by the medical community, and the war provided doctors with the resources to
continually try new techniques and treatments. In the treatment of acute cases, two main
methods were employed by MOs at Etchinghill. With the first method the whole urethra
and bladder was irrigated. Only the anterior urethra was irrigated in the second method,
leaving the posterior urethra to take care of itself. Of the two, the latter was the preferred
method as MOs felt it was successful when performed ten to twenty times a day with
mild antiseptic and astringent.91
The treatment of chronic cases followed the guidelines set out by the War Office
but staff at Etchinghill worked to improve established techniques. Prostatic massage was
found to be most effective when used in cases where the prostatic or vesicular secretion
showed pus or gonocci. During his time at Etchinghill, Captain W.T. Lockhart wrote
about the benefits of prostatic massage for chronic or relapsing patients. Lockhart had
trained as a cystoscopist before the war and quickly became a valuable asset at
Etchinghill. It was later noted his dedication and keen interest in his work had led him to
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spend twenty-three pounds of his own money procuring equipment for the lab. Lockhart,
a rare specialist in the field, was later moved from the hospital to do the work of an
ordinary MO (although he later ended up at Witley) and no other specialists were sent to
replace him.92 In chronic or relapsing cases when there was no discharge, tenderness or
cloudy urine, Lockhart advocated prostate massage. He argued “The effects of massage
consists in emptying the pus pockets into the urethra, reliving the engorged blood-vessels
and lymphatics of the stoma, and stimulating the reparative processes by inducing a more
liberal supply of fresh blood and lymph to the entire organ.”93 In cases where the disease
had entered the Lacunae Morgagni or Littre’s glands, patients were put on a course of
gradual dilation using sound and Kohlman dilators. Medical officers believed this
resulted in the emptying of the follicles and the absorption of inflammatory products.94
The staff at Etchinghill felt that many of the available drugs and devices on the
market did not produce any real results. They utilized the hospital’s laboratory to
experiment with new compounds and devices. At No. 39 General Hospital, Captain
J.E.R. McDonagh had experimented with the use of colloidal manganese, later combined
with colloidal palladium, which he argued reduced treatment time from 52.6 days to 15.5
days.95 The staff at Etchinghill argued the use of colloidal manganese did not cause any
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significant improvements when tested but it did cause severe reactions in a number of
cases. While suction devices had been developed to help treat chronic cases, Etchinghill
doctors felt that the use of dilatators produced better results. Various solutions such as
Dakin’s solution, zinc permanganate and different tincture solutions of iodine and flavine
were tested but the results were disappointing. Only a solution containing sodium
carbonate had showed any promise but had not yet been tested enough to confirm its
effectiveness. Etchinghill’s staff argued their methods were more effective as only one
out of ten cases would present with severe complications that required special training.
This situation could be problematic given “this training is absolutely neglected in our
medical schools and it has been found necessary to detail inexperienced medical officers
to act as assistants to qualified men for one or two months before giving them charge of a
ward.”96 Even with the development of newer, possibly more effective methods, it was
not always possible to use them given the limitations of wartime conditions. Older, wellestablished methods were generally better suited to the needs and resources of these
military hospitals.
Anti-syphilitic treatment at Etchinghill followed the schedule set by the War
Office of seven intravenous injections of salvarsan, or one of its substitutes, given over
the course of fifty-seven days.97 Treatments started with a half dosage and were slowly
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increased until the last two injections were given at full dose. Doctors also gave patients
concurrent intramuscular injections of mercury at weekly intervals. If a patient’s
Wassermann came back positive after the first round of treatment then they were given
four more injections of both mercury and salvarsan, provided they had not received any
other arsenic treatment within the last twelve months. If their blood tests still came back
positive after the additional round, or they had already received treatment within the last
year, the patient was placed on a three-month course of potassium iodine and mercury.
During the first week they would receive 15 grams of potassium iodine three times a day,
this was doubled to 30 grams three times a day (TID) the next week and in the third and
final week the amount was increased to 40 grams TID. Mercury injections were given
intramuscularly for the first eight weeks and after that they were given orally in pill form.
Based on previous experience, doctors at Etchinghill knew the that any more than twentyfour injections in the buttocks caused great discomfort in patients. If blood testing still
came back positive after these treatments, patients were placed on rest with tonic
treatments for three months before returning to a course of potassium iodine and mercury
treatments. Under no condition was a patient to be put back on a course involving the use
of arsenic until after twelve months had passed.98
The arsenic solution most commonly used in the hospital was the salvarsan
substitute novarsenobillon dissolved with saline and distilled water then boiled for thirty
minutes. To ensure the purity of the solution, stemming from concerns over water quality,
it was frequently examined for chloride, lead and other potential impurities that could
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cause unwanted side effects. In a typical month, doctors at Etchinghill performed around
1,000 injections of 606 and slightly more mercurial injections. In the first ten months of
1918 the attendant physician’s gave 10,456 salvarsan injections and 11,311 mercury
injections. During this time, they had admitted 2408 syphilis cases. Over the same period,
1473 cases were moved to outpatient care while 738 cases were discharged after
obtaining a negative Wassermann. Six hundred and sixty three cases were admitted with
primary stage syphilis, 552 with secondary or generalized syphilis and 225 cases arrived
at Etchinghill with the disease already having progressed to the latent stage. Four hundred
and four cases needed to be treated for both gonorrhea and syphilis. There were 150 cases
over the course of the year that did not receive treatment, as they did not develop any
symptoms despite having tested positive after a Wassermann. Finally, 152 cases were
transferred to Etchinghill after being admitted and starting treatments at other hospitals.99
The use of arsenic and mercury, both potentially highly toxic compounds, could
create a number of unwanted side effects that in turn could cause illness or even death.
According to a 1917 hospital report, three patients died while undergoing anti-syphilitic
treatment at Etchinghill in the previous ten-month period. One death was blamed on
erysipelas, a bacterial skin infection but the hospital claimed this was not caused by any
treatment. The second death was attributed to gumma of the brain, a non-cancerous
growth resulting from tertiary stage syphilis. A man died from atrophy of the liver after
developing jaundice following an arsenic treatment. In this case, the hospital determined
that while under treatment at another hospital the patient had received more 606
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injections than deemed safe by Etchinghill standards. Four other patients had developed
dermatitis while undergoing treatments, two were mild cases, whereas the other two were
more severe, but successfully treated.100 Twenty cases had to be treated for jaundice, but
the hospital medical staff maintained that only eight cases occurred while being treated
with arsenic.
In a study of the toxic effects of arsenobenzol treatments, 39, 377 case cards from
the United Kingdom were studied shortly after the war. This study found that there had
been 370 cases of dermatitis-related illness with eighteen deaths and 221 instances of
jaundice with twenty-four deaths among soldiers treated for VDS.101 The circumstances
surrounding the deaths of eleven Canadians attributed to arsenic poisoning are discussed
in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis. But in this instance, medical staff at
Etchinghill maintained that these three cases of jaundice had been caused by the disease
and actually cleared up after receiving arsenic injections. In nine instances, men became
afflicted with the condition a few weeks or even a few months after having been treated
with arsenic. In these cases the medical staff blamed the development of the condition on
the etiological factor of having VDS plus treatment and not the treatment itself. While not
common, there were several instances where patients suffered from vasodilation, when
blood pressure drops after blood vessels widen, and had to be given subcutaneous
injections of adrenaline. During subsequent treatments these cases were closely watched
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and given adrenaline just prior to arsenic treatments to prevent a drop in blood pressure.
102

Drugs were the primary method used in treating syphilis but they could also be
used in conjunction with surgical procedures. In some cases, indulations on the penis
were excised. Cystoscopy and urethroscopy were performed at the hospital as were more
minor surgeries including opening of bubos, meatotomy and circumcisions.
Uncircumcised patients were advised that circumcision was the best method to guard
against recurrent chancres. Etchinghill circumcised 187 men and another 56 were initially
given primary dorsal slits and later fully circumcised.103
Due to limited bed space syphilis patients had to be treated as outpatients for the
majority of their treatment. As the hospital continued to expand, the medical staff at
Etchinghill experimented with new, simplified methods that could allow men to be
treated by their battalion MOs and reduce the number of cases that needed to be sent to
the hospital. “I am anxious,” Paul told the ADMS at Folkstone, “to investigate the
efficiency of a new 606 substitute called ‘Disodo-Luargol,’ which I understand is being
used to some extent at London Hospital and is a comparatively cheap preparation which
would be immense advantage if this preparation were suitable for our work here.”104 He
also told the ADMS that his lab had been working on developing on a new, simplified
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method for administrating 606 compounds subcutaneously and intra-muscularly that
would allow battalion MOs to administer the injections. This development would have
saved time and transportation costs as outpatients would not have to return to Etchinghill
to finish their treatments but it does not appear the medical staff was able to develop such
a technique by the end of the war.105 Instead patients undergoing anti-syphilitic continued
to be treated as outpatients at Etchinghill throughout the war.
The majority of both gonorrhea and syphilis patients at Etchinghill were treated
using the guidelines established by the War Office. While the medical services of the
CEF fell under command the British, Etchinghill did have some autonomy for
experimentation. Even so patients were treated at Etchinghill much the same way that
their British counterparts would have been. Although there were sometimes minor
deviations in methods they were still based on established practices used by the RAMC.
There were no major changes or discoveries at Etchinghill despite the best efforts of a
range of medical staffers. Regardless, these sites were seen as important testing grounds
that could build on the several discoveries that had occurred in the field just before the
war. That the Canadian doctors at the hospital utilized their laboratory to experiment with
new drugs and treatments was important, even if it did not produce any profound changes
to the system set out by the War Office. As we will see in the last chapter, CAMC doctors
took a special interest in developing research surrounding gonorrhea as they felt
Canadians had made many important contributions to its study in the past. They also
wanted to improve the efficiency of the system the British had implemented. Due to the
constant demands of bed space, medical staff searched for ways to reduce treatment times
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or simplify procedures that would improve the mobility of treatments. These methods
were not always feasible given the limitations of wartime conditions, but the medical
staff’s continued efforts highlight the active role of the hospital within the VD
management system. Their role was significant, even if their work did not produce any
major breakthroughs during the war.

Problems With Security and Space
Administrative and logistical constraints negatively impacted the experiences of
patients at the hospital. Both Paul and MacKinnon had to grapple with problems of basic
accommodation, as they had to increase capacity, improve living conditions and maintain
security at the hospital. Even when operating at full capacity, Etchinghill could not
accommodate the number of cases requiring treatment and proposed expansions were
delayed by poor construction and inadequate infrastructure. Without these expansions,
some men suffering from VD had to be turned away and treated in brigade lines. Men
who were admitted to the hospital sometimes experienced poor living conditions. Some
men actively tried to escape these conditions and Etchinghill struggled to maintain order
at the hospital.
The hospital reached capacity shortly after it opened its doors and had difficulty
providing basic accommodations for patients and staff. The 200 beds that were available
when the hospital opened were filled immediately. By 25 October 1916 Captain Bagnall,
a MO at the venereal ward at Shorncliffe Hospital, reported that he had sent Etchinghill
their equipment for preparing and administrating salvarsan several weeks earlier since
they were to send all of their syphilitic patients there for treatment. However, due to
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limited space Etchinghill had returned these patients to Shorncliffe. Bagnall was furious
as this meant, “in addition to the ever present overcrowding in the Venereal Division, we
have the problem of dealing with the ever increasing number of active syphilis cases
without the equipment necessary for giving salvarsan treatment.”106 He had to request
their supplies be returned to deal with the backlog of syphilis cases since it was unclear
when Etchinghill would be able to take more patients. Less than three months after the
hospital opened, Paul argued they needed to expand to accommodate 1200 people
consisting of 900 patients, 100 guards and 200 hospital staff. Accommodating these
numbers would require four to six weeks of work to construct several new huts, convert
the stables and other out buildings into barracks and a dining hall as well as expanding
the existing sewage system at an estimated cost of 2000 pounds.107
Plans were put in place to start with an increase to 750 people including staff by
the beginning of December 1916.108 Urgent requests for wooden floors, stoves and
hospital equipment were made to the quartermaster. 109 Without these supplies, the
hospital could not accept any more patients on top of the 508 already receiving treatment.
The initial increase to 500 beds had temporarily relieved the VD situation in the
Shorncliffe area, which made it possible to treat cases that were being treated in brigade
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hospitals. But once they started taking cases from outside areas the hospital was
overwhelmed. Without an increase to 600 beds, it again became necessary to treat VD in
brigade hospitals.110 Under these conditions, it was difficult to ensure proper and uniform
treatment for VD cases. Even by 1918, MacKinnon was still receiving reports from
patients who complained about irrigation methods for gonorrhea patients at the Brigade
Hospital, Seaford. They claimed there was no NCO in charge and the men were given the
solution and had to perform the irrigation on themselves. The nozzles inserted into the
urethra were not disinfected in between uses, which could cause the spread of chancres,
VDG and VDS.111
Starting in December 1916, bed space soon became a secondary concern as a
problem with the sewage system was making it difficult for the hospital to provide basic
services to the patients already under their care. The ADMS reported their request to
increase sewage capacity for 600 patients and 150 staff had been denied which caused
significant delays in proposed expansions. 112 As well, shortly after the hospital increased
its capacity to 500 beds, a meter was placed on the hospital’s water supply limiting it to
10,000 gallons a day.113 The hospital needed 20,000 gallons of water per day so this
reduction caused water shortages across all departments including laundry, the cookhouse
110
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and also resulted in plugged latrines. Medical staff also did not have enough water to
distill for 606 treatments, perform Wassermann tests or clean lab equipment.114 Although
the water supply had been increased to 15,000 gallons a day in early July 1917, the
sewage and water supply problem had halted the much-needed expansion of the
hospital.115 By October 1917 the sewage treatment upgrade had not been completed and
as a result the hospital was not able meet its goal of increasing capacity to 1000 beds until
early 1918.116 This shortage of space was problematic as the number of men contracting
VD remained steady and Etchinghill needed to continue to expand to meet demand for
bed space. Without an increase in capacity, cases had to be turned away and treated by
inexperienced MOs.117
Concerns over bed space were further complicated when several of the new huts
at Etchinghill were deemed uninhabitable. Both MacKinnon and Amyot had visited the
new huts in September 1917 and expressed concerns that they would be useless owing to
their faulty design.118 The Armstrong huts were constructed to increase capacity but they
did not pass inspection. After his inspection in December 1917, Colonel Bridges argued
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the huts had not been waterproofed and were not properly insulated against cold weather.
The stoves that had been installed in the huts provided little heat and Bridges found the
patients “huddled around the stove in the most uncomfortable attitude” and the pipes had
frozen in the absolution room.119 Instead of increasing capacity, the poor construction of
these huts resulted in overcrowding as patients had to be moved inside until the situation
could be fixed.
Conditions inside the hospital were not much better. An inspection of the hospital
in the fall of 1917 raised concerns about overall cleanliness. MacKinnon noted that
maintaining a hygienic environment was difficult due to the absence of nursing sisters, as
“the presence of trained female nurses in a ward is always conducive to greater
cleanliness than in those hospitals where they are not employed.”120 CAMC policy
prohibited nursing sisters from working at VD hospitals and instead non-commissioned
men were trained as orderlies to take their place.121 Orderlies did not always provide the
same level of care.122 This problem was compounded by the fact Etchinghill only had two
fully trained orderlies. The other orderlies on staff had not had been properly trained as
they had been rotated through several different duties. To make up for the staffing
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shortage patients were put to work under the direction of the orderlies. 123 MacKinnon
asked the CAMC send more trained orderlies to the hospital to help improve conditions
and the request was granted. While it is not clear how many trained orderlies were
ultimately sent to the hospital, another report made six months later noted that, “although
the work in the operating room is at a disadvantage, owing to the absence of nursing
sisters, the preparation of the instruments, dressings, etc. appears to be carefully done.”124
The lack of nurses negatively affected not only basic cleanliness but also patient care.
One report in December 1917 noted that the absence of nurses in the sick wards was
notable as “the sick ward contains a number of patients who are miserably ill, and would
derive much benefit from proper nursing.”125 It was noted that when some of the local
women began to visit the hospital “as a consequence, the hospital lost most of its prison
atmosphere.”126 While the role of their husbands has been well documented both Mrs.
MacKinnon and Mrs. Skerry became an important and active part of hospital life. The
two were credited with organizing social gatherings for the staff that greatly improved
morale at Etchinghill.127
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Even though most patients undergoing treatment were not ‘moral deviants’ who
needed to be detained, maintaining security at the hospital was a constant concern. At the
end of February 1917, the Officer Commanding Shorncliffe, the DAA and the
Quartermaster General inspected the hospital. Their main concern was that a Combatant
Officer had not been detailed for duty as a permanent guard. In order to meet this
recommendation, Paul argued the hospital needed to be re-classified at a convalescent
hospital for disciplinary purposes. In the meantime, a large number of NCO’s and other
ranks were employed as hospital security. This proposed solution drew objections from
the inspectors that were partially quelled when Paul informed them they were a
permanent guard. Paul expressed concerns about his current rank as he felt that this had
contributed to instability at the hospital. He stated “I am of the opinion that if it were
pointed out to Divisional Headquarters, that the fact of my rank being below that of a
Field Officer, has made it very difficult to maintain good discipline and has deprived me
of the full powers of an Officer Commanding, that the Officer Commanding this Division
would be only too willing to do all in his power to see that your repeated
recommendations for my promotions were acted upon.”128 Paul’s concerns over his rank
reflect problems that had long plagued military medical staff, before they were given rank
and their own chain of command, they had difficulty enforcing medical regulations and
prioritizing medical needs on the battlefield. 129 His concerns also likely stemmed from
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an earlier incident with the Canadian Military Police (CMP) over jurisdiction and the
treatment of his patients shortly after the hospital opened.
In October of 1916, there were 386 patients undergoing treatment and sixteen of
these men had to be placed in detention while at the hospital.130 These sixteen men
became involved in an altercation with several NCOs from the CMP who had entered the
hospital grounds while allegedly drunk and without permission from hospital staff. This
confrontation was not the first instance of trouble with the local CMP; the hospital staff
had lodged an earlier complaint that the CMP did not respect the hospital’s authority. On
this particular occasion Private Middleton, a patient at Etchinghill, started a verbal
altercation when he criticized a CMP for only having one pistol and not being over in
France. The officer apparently retorted, “I was carrying one of these when I was bowled
over in France and I am not doing my bit in a gonorrhea hospital.” According to
Middleton, the “remark led to strong language between the patients and police. I
answered that perhaps I had been in uniform in France as long as he had.”131 Although
Middleton was currently in detention in a VD ward, he took offense to the officer’s
remark that he had not, or was not, doing his duty. Angry words gave way to a physical
altercation. The officers drew their pistols and a brick was lobbed at one of the officers.
The main focus of the inquiry was whether the CMP had jurisdiction to enter the hospital
without the consent of its staff but the incident reveals some of the contempt that was
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directed at soldiers with VD and was the first major instance of security concerns at the
hospital.
Hospital security was still an issue when MacKinnon took over command. He
stated the detention ward comprised of twenty cells with a daily average of fifteen VD
patients who are “usually of a particularly bad type.”132 Mackinnon argued the security
detail was understaffed, as they required at least twenty-five guards for police and escort
duties. On 12 September 1917, six prisoners escaped by removing the iron bars on the
bathroom window and two guards were charged for allowing the escape.133 Just six days
later three more prisoners escaped after digging a hole in the wall and scaling the
fence. 134 Although all three were captured over the next two weeks, MacKinnon
complained, “owing to the inefficiency of a guard furnished from non-combatant ranks,
and the more or less insecurity of these detention wards, prisoners are frequently
escaping. It is therefore absolutely necessary that an efficient Guard be supplied for this
duty.”135 On the same day the last man from the last escape attempt was captured,
twenty-four other ranks from the 1st CORD were sent to Etchinghill for combatant guard
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duty.136 It would appear that the addition of these twenty-four men finally solved the
security issues at the hospital, as there were no further escape attempts recorded in the
hospital’s war dairy.

Public Health and Prevention
Although he was not a trained VD specialist prior to his appointment, MacKinnon
took a keen interest in tracking the spread of VD while at Etchinghill. He felt it was
crucial to understand how the disease was spread in order to create effective policies to
prevent it. It was a very important issue, he argued, as VD created a serious economic
problem for the CEF. Every man admitted, he reasoned, affected the movements of two
other men; the one who had to replace him on the draft and the one who had to be
brought on reserve in Canada to maintain a levy of men eligible for service. When men
on short leave from France contracted VD, his unit also had to replace him with a soldier
from their reserve battalion. This meant, according to MacKinnon, that the 4689 cases
treated at Etchinghill since January 1917 had affected the movements of approximately
9378 other men.137
Starting in 1917, MacKinnon undertook an epidemiological study in order to chart
the transmission of the disease.138 He implemented social case sheets that kept track of
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basic information about the men and their female companions such as occupation or
where they were from.139 Based on the information collected, MacKinnon determined
that VD was a problem all over England, Ireland and Scotland. The majority of infections
happened when men were on short leave in London, Brighton, Folkstone and Hythe. A
study of 2880 case sheets showed that alcohol played an important etiological factor in
the VD problem as approximately half of the men who became infected and a quarter of
the women who were deemed the source of the infection were intoxicated at the time of
fornication – but of course this was based on the statement of the soldiers.140
Over 80 per cent of the men became infected after ‘falling victim’ to professional
prostitutes, who were the main source of infection according to MacKinnon’s analysis.
But while the professional prostitute brazenly solicited men on the street the so-called
amateurs – women employed as munitions workers, factory girls, servants, barmaids,
shop girls, dressmakers or typists – also posed a threat to soldiers’ health. MacKinnon
reasoned that “Many of these, all those classified as amateurs, demand payment, such as
suppers, a drink of beer or whisky, and do not refuse money if offered. These women
both professional and amateur are suffering from Gonorrhea and many of them have
active syphilis lesions as well.”141 His statements reflect the predominant belief that
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‘immoral’ women were responsible for the spread of the disease. But his proposed
solution to the problem – medically regulated prostitution – deviated from official policy.
Based on his findings, MacKinnon argued men on short leave from France
required special attention. He had spoken to one man who was prepared to testify in court
that a prostitute approached him on the street and told the man she would give him a
“dose of the clap” so that he did not have to return to the front.142 “Others have had
similar experiences,” MacKinnon claimed, “Evidently this disease is trafficked for the
above mentioned purpose.”143 While the implementation of preventive measures among
troops had proven successful, MacKinnon argued VD had remained a problem because
there had been no effort to enforce or provide preventative treatment to prostitutes. Nor
did he feel there had been a concerted effort to reduce solicitation on the street. After
significant pressure from the Dominions, DORA Regulation 40D was later put place in
March 1918 to reduce prostitution but its implementation was controversial limiting its
use.144 Even when it was made illegal for women suffering from VD to transmit the
infection to a member of His Majesty’s Army, prosecution was difficult given that
women frequently gave men aliases and fake addresses or some soldiers were simply
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reluctant to provide any information. 145 If officials located a woman, she could be
arrested and held for treatment. Based on his report, MacKinnon argued all prostitutes
should be examined for free on a regular basis and issued a health card to prove they
were free from infection. Soldiers were warned not to have relations with any woman
who could not produce a health card. Men who still became infected could then be dealt
with more severely as MacKinnon figured this was an indication it was self-inflicted to
avoid duty. “If such a measure was adopted,” he reasoned, “it would soon become widely
known among prostitutes and street walkers who pay special attention to the Canadian
Soldier who usually has plenty of money, and in their own interests would be anxious to
present evidence that they were free from ‘V.D.’”146
MacKinnon was suggesting a form of legalized prostitution similar to the way the
French medically regulated their brothels. Although medically regulated prostitution had
proven successful in the American Civil War and soldiers were more likely to contract
VD in England than France, it was a measure military and civil authorities were not
willing to introduce given the moral objections.147MacKinnon’s suggestion that Canada
pursue a course of medically regulated prostitution was met with the same concerns from
his superiors. Colonel J.W. Bridges replied “The recommendations are so far reaching
and involves so many questions of a moral and political nature that it would appear to go
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beyond the powers of the Canadian authorities to do more than agitating this line.”148
Other

senior

CEF

officials

shared

similar

reservations

about

MacKinnon’s

recommendations. One agreed that such a policy would “no doubt have a beneficial
effect” but since it effectively meant licensing prostitution such a radical departure would
not be approved by Canadian or British authorities.149 MacKinnon lamented that, “In my
opinion very little, if any improvement can be made until the people and Government of
Great Britain realize the seriousness of the situation as it presently exists, and not only
adopt but enforce laws that would deal more effectively with the evil of prostitution
which is so rampant throughout the entire country.”150 Unable to affect any change
regarding prevention at the policy level, MacKinnon would instead have to focus his
efforts on dealing with the disease once it reached his hospital.
Conclusion
With preventative measures only partially effective, medical staff at Etchinghill
continued to treat thousands of cases of VD until the hospital was shuttered on 10 June
1919. The hospital became an important site for combating the VD problem. Although it
would eventually become the largest VD hospital in the CEF, patients and staff at
Etchinghill encountered a number of difficulties in its three-year history. After reaching
capacity in its first few days, staff at Etchinghill struggled to provide patients with basic
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accommodation. Proposed expansions were repeatedly delayed because of problems with
housing, plumbing and security. Even more challenging were the negative attitudes
towards VD that impacted patient care and experiences. In its early days, the hospital had
little in the way of services for the men under their care. This situation changed under the
direction of the hospital’s staff, notably its first OC Major Henry Paul and Captain
Skerry, who successfully argued entertainment, comforts and physical activity were
essential to the treatment process. Paul was also instrumental in developing a laboratory
at Etchinghill that played an active role in researching new techniques for the detection
and treatment of VD even if it did not lead to any major developments. When Colonel
W.T.M MacKinnon took over command he took an active role in improving VD
management within the CEF. He focused on improving education about VD diagnosis
and treatments among battalion MOs in an effort to make the system more efficient.
Getting suspected cases to the hospital as soon as possible and maintaining outpatient
treatment schedules required the cooperation of battalion MOs. The use of case study
sheets to interview patients provided MacKinnon with a wealth of information on how
and where VD was contracted. Based on his work, he favoured a policy of medicallyregulated prostitution in an effort to curb the spread of disease especially as a selfinflicted wound that could be used to get out of duty. Although this type of policy had
proven successful in past conflicts and in France, MacKinnon was unable to affect any
change at the policy level. Nonetheless, he continued to promote cooperation and
communication between Etchinghill and battalion MOs as an important part of combating
VD.
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Chapter 4
A Night With Venus, Death from 606: The Dangers of VDS Treatments in the
Canadian Expeditionary Force
As military officials looked for ways to solve the morality problems associated
with venereal disease, they also had to develop a medical response to deal with the new
cases that were cropping up every week. Medical historian Allan Brandt argues that with
the development of new tests and treatments, venereal disease became a scientific
problem with a scientific solution instead of just a moral issue. This chapter considers the
main factors that shaped the delivery of VD therapy in the CEF. The development of
salvarsan just before the war revolutionized the treatment of syphilis and doctors went in
to the war believing it produced better results in a shorter period of time than previous
treatments. But there were concerns that while salvarsan was considered the most
effective treatment available, there could be side effects associated with its use, especially
when efforts were made to speed-up treatment by increasing dosage amounts or
frequency. Salvarsan, an arsenic-based compound, had already been linked to a number
of health problems including organ damage and even death from arsenic poisoning before
the war. Similar results were observed in the CEF, which created tensions between the
dual medical and military roles of Canadian doctors.
CAMC doctors were tasked with ‘curing’ venereal disease but they were also
responsible for getting men back to their units as fast as possible. Even though the
number of overall deaths associated with anti-syphilitic treatment may be small in
relation to the number of men who underwent treatment, the examination of these
incidents reveals how the VD management system functioned and sometimes failed. The
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military wanted to minimize the length of treatments, conserve medical resources and
reduce costs and these issues became determining factors within the care system
overseas.
By the end of the war, 18,612 Canadian soldiers had contracted syphilis and
salvarsan was widely used to treat these cases.1 Salvarsan reduced the amount of time
that men had to spend away from their units but they were often subjected to treatment
regimens that pushed the limits of the drug’s toxicity and they had little say over the
matter. This situation was problematic as records show that there were multiple problems
with the management of VDS patients throughout the war. The death of eleven Canadians
early in 1918 prompted an investigation into the administration of salvarsan, its
substitutes and the overall management of syphilis in the CEF. While the British
conducted an investigation into the practices that had been established by the War Office,
the CAMC ordered their own inquiry. Hospitals like Etchinghill followed the British
system but they were still run by the CAMC. The RAMC created the treatment schedule
for VDS and promoted the use of British-made kharsivan, later thought to be a
contributing factor in the fatalities, but the CAMC were ultimately responsible for
administering care. An examination of Canadian records show that although there was
mounting evidence of multiple administrative problems and salvarsan was the most likely
cause of these deaths, both British and Canadian officials were reluctant to stop using it
and revert to other methods that would have increased costs and treatment times.
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The Use of Salvarsan in VDS Treatments
Despite the potential problems associated with salvarsan, it was the most effective
drug on the market and was widely available until the outbreak of war. Since salvarsan
had been developed in a German lab, Germany retained tight control over its
development and distribution. When the Allied countries declared war on Germany, it
immediately placed an embargo on all exports including German pharmaceuticals
available through neutral countries. By 1915, Canada was facing supply problems and
massive cost increases because the embargo covered “preparations of special service in
medicine and surgery on the ground that they might reach the countries at war with
Germany and Austria and assist in maintaining the effectiveness of the military forces
battling against the armies of those two states,” which included salvarsan.2 To contend
with supply shortages drug companies in Allied countries started manufacturing salvarsan
substitutes. While all salvarsan was often colloquially referred to as ‘606’, their trade
names were galyl (French), diarsenol (Canadian) or kharsivan (British) depending on
which company had manufactured them. Additionally, there were the formaldehyde
sulphoxylate derivatives of 606, neo-salvarsan and neo-kharsivan, also called
novarsenobillon or 914, which were thought to be less potent.3 The process of taking the
crystalline powder, which was highly toxic except in its purest form, and turning it into
an injectable solution was a difficult process. Any mistakes could render the solution
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ineffective or create unwanted side effects.4 Patients being treated with salvarsan needed
to be closely monitored to ensure they were responding well to treatments.
Drug therapy typically lasted about two months with the patient undergoing
intravenous injections every three to five days. In private practice, doctors often had
difficulty getting patients to continue with this lengthy and costly treatment, especially
when symptoms began to disappear – as typical in cases of syphilis – and they thought
themselves cured.5 In the military, doctors had more control over their patients who could
be forced to submit to treatments but they were also concerned with reducing costs and
keeping treatment times to a minimum. Early in the war, the army hospitalized men for
the duration of their illness, as they preferred to isolate them while they were thought to
be contagious. But as the number of cases grew and hospital space became an issue they
could no longer hold VDS cases for the full course of drug therapy. After receiving their
initial diagnosis, syphilis patients were processed and given their first few injections
within a month. They could then be returned to their units where regimental medical
officers could continue to attend to men that were no longer considered infectious.6 To
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reduce treatment times and get better results, the drugs had to be pushed to their limits.7
This approach would have the combined effect of reducing costs while limiting the
amount of time a soldier with VDS was kept out of the trenches.
In May 1916, the routine course of treatment for new cases of syphilis was seven
injections of salvarsan totaling 2.8 grams along with eight injections of mercury over the
course of fifty days (see figure 1.1). On the fifty-second day, men received a
Wassermann test. If the blood tests came back negative, treatments were suspended until
another serological exam was completed three months later. However, if this test came
back positive, the soldier would receive several injections of potassium iodine from the
54th to 68th days followed by three more injections of both salvarsan and mercury
between the 68th and 83rd days. If there were still traces of spirochetes found in the
bloodstream then they were given potassium iodine for two weeks. Then a course of
salvarsan and mercury was repeated. Medical officials continued to develop and
implement procedures to deal with venereal problems as the war progressed.8 While the
drop in treatment times and overall VD rates may suggest that VD management became
more effective over the course of the war, a closer examination of Canadian records
shows the CAMC continued to experience complications treating syphilis throughout the
war.
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Day of Treatment
1st
4th
8th
15th
22nd
29th
36th
43rd
50th
52nd
54th to 68th
69th
76th
83rd

Intravenously
Intramuscularly
606
Mercury
0.3 gr
1gr
0.3 gr
--0.3 gr
1gr
--1gr
0.4 gr
1gr
0.5 gr
1gr
--1gr
0.5 gr
1gr
0.5 gr
1gr
Blood test, if positive or doubtful, continue as outlined below
Potassium Iodine
0.3 gr
1gr
0.4 gr
1gr
0.5 gr
1gr

Figure 1.1 – William Grant Macpherson, Medical Services Disease of the War, Volume
II, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923), 139-140.
Early Diagnosis
Salvarsan was thought to be most effective if it was used during the initial stages
of the disease, so early diagnosis was key. After Lieutenant Colonel W.T.M. MacKinnon
took over command of Etchinghill in 1917, he reported that many suspected cases were
being misdiagnosed, delaying the early treatments that were crucial to recovery. When
Private G.S. Lewis was admitted to Etchinghill on 28 September 1917 he stated that he
had first noticed genital sores on 15 September 1917 and reported this to his MO on three
separate occasions. “He was held in Segregation Camp for ten days,” according to
MacKinnon, “and received no treatment with the exception of the application of lard.
Might I point out that this delay in sending patients to this hospital for immediate
treatment, only tends to allow the disease to generalize and when this occurs, prolongs his
treatment.” By the time he was sent to Etchinghill, the disease had progressed to the
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second stage of infection. Lewis had a large, hardened sore on his foreskin as well as
mucus patches in his mouth and throat. MacKinnon complained, “Medical officers are
evidently unaware that the earlier treatment is begun in primary syphilis, that secondary
symptoms are prevented, and cures are more easily and quickly obtained.”9 Lewis went
on to spend thirty-two days at Etchinghill, receiving seven injections of 0.4 grams of
novarsenobillon before his Wassermann came back negative and he was discharged on 6
November 1917.10
Just over two weeks later, MacKinnon encountered two more cases that were not
sent to Etchinghill until after the disease had generalized. Sapper Thomas Boyter was
symptomatic for two weeks before being admitted to Etchinghill on 13 October 1917
while Driver William Smith had been exhibiting symptoms for eight days before being
admitted the same day. At the time of his arrival at Etchinghill, Boyter’s condition had
progressed to a case of generalized syphilis as he had erosions on his penis as well as a
very large indulation. Smith arrived in a similar state with an inflamed penis covered in
erosions and indulations. MacKinnon was adamant that the importance of seeing these
cases early needed to be made clear to MOs as
In cases in which early treatment is begun on the appearance of
the primary sore, our experience in this hospital is, that a
negative Wassermann is obtained at the end of the initial course
of 606, but in cases where delay occurs, such as the above, there
9
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is no guarantee that a negative Wassermann can be obtained,
even at the end of the double course of 606 treatment, and
delays in treatment, not only make it difficult to obtain what
they believed could be definitive cure, but deprive the public of
the man’s services for a much longer time.11
Boyter spent almost three weeks at Etchinghill and received three 0.45 gram injections of
neo-salvarsan and three mercury injections. On 1 November 1917 he was discharged as
an outpatient during which time he received three more injections of mercury, two more
injections of novarsenobillon with a final 0.75 gram injection on 22 November 1917. It
total, Boyter received thirteen injections over the course of forty-two days, which
exceeded the recommended course of treatment. For these men, by the time they were
sent to Etchinghill, their conditions had generalized and they had to be treated with
double doses of salvarsan. Doctors believed this tactic was necessary to ‘cure’ cases that
arrived at the hospital after the disease had generalized but doing so greatly increased
their exposure to a highly toxic drug.12

Problems with 606
Even with the use of salvarsan, the medical community believed its perceived
curative powers diminished drastically when treatment was delayed by even a few days.
They argued early treatment could reduce the number and frequency of injections and
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thereby one’s exposure to the potentially dangerous side effects of these drugs. The
toxicity of salvarsan was a concern for MOs throughout the war. Its use was linked to
outbreaks of dermatitis and jaundice. In his official history of the Medical Corps after the
war, RAMC medical historian William Macpherson attempted to approximate the
percentage of cases that suffered from the toxic sides effects of salvarsan while under
treatment. An investigation of 39,377 treatment cards revealed 370 cases of dermatitis
(0.9 per cent) and 107 cases of jaundice (0.32 per cent) with fifty deaths, eighteen of
which were definitively caused by dermatitis and another eight due to jaundice as could
be determined by the information available in the case records. In late 1917 and early
1918, several Imperial and Dominion venereal disease hospitals experienced outbreaks of
jaundice that led to at least twenty-nine fatalities.13 Canada reported at least eleven
fatalities connected with anti-syphilitic treatments. These deaths prompted an
examination of VDS management within the Canadian ranks.
One of the first reported Canadian deaths was Corporal George Dysart. Dysart
was just eighteen years old when he enlisted on 1 October 1915. He was admitted to the
hospital in Brighton on 11 October 1917 for a circumcision and hemorrhoids, although it
is possible these were misdiagnosed given that just ten days later Dysart was diagnosed
with syphilis. He received two doses of kharsivan and two doses of mercury at Brighton
before being transferred to Cherry Hinton on 2 November 1917 for further treatment.
Upon arrival, his urine was tested for traces of albumen, a test that was to be performed
prior to any injections to ensure one’s kidneys were healthy enough to withstand
treatment. When the tests came back negative, he received seven injections of mercury
13
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and five more injections of kharsivan. A Wassermann test performed on 6 December
1917 came back a weak positive, so he did not receive any more injections but remained
hospitalized until his Wassermann test came back negative on 23 December 1917. Just
over a week later, on 31 December, Dysart complained that he had been vomiting and
was experiencing generalized pain throughout his abdomen. He appeared markedly
jaundiced and was constipated when he was admitted to Eastbourne the following day.
By 2 January, he was still “drowsy, taking little fluid and voiding little urine.” He had a
high white blood cell count and his urine exam showed albumen and traces of bile. He
was given a hot enema to help with the constipation. By 10 p.m. that evening, Dysart
became restless and noisy, crying out several times before quieting down a few hours
later. In the middle of the night, Dysart became delirious and was given some morphine
to calm him down. He fell into a coma and died at 3:50 p.m. on 4 January. Dysart was the
first of three Canadians to pass away in January 1918 after receiving anti-syphilitic
treatment at Cherry Hinton in the fall of 1917.14
These fatalities prompted Colonel Robert Rudolf, the CAMC Consultant in
Medicine, and Lieutenant Colonel John Amyot, the CAMC Consultant in Sanitation, to
travel to the Seaford area to investigate the first three fatal cases connected to salvarsaninduced jaundice. All three men had come from different units but had been treated with
kharsivan at Cherry Hinton between October and December 1917. They all reported as
having abdominal pain, their tests showed higher white blood cell counts, there were
trace amounts of bile in their urine samples, they had little or no fever and became
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delirious then comatose before dying. Rudolf did not feel this was a case of malignant
jaundice given that these types of epidemics generally occurred in warm weather and
these had occurred in the middle of winter. Guinea pigs were injected with blood from
the affected organs for the deceased but the cultures failed to show any evidence of
bacteria or any other microorganisms, which seemingly made these incidents isolated.
Based on these observations, Rudolf concluded, “Taking everything into consideration,
Lt. Colonel Amyot and myself consider that these cases were most probably due to
arsenic poisoning. In the two instances the men had shortly before had a full course of
606. We will report again after the full pathological findings.”15
On 26 January 1918, Amyot received a report from the Canadian General
laboratory about a recent autopsy done on Dysart. The particulars of this case fit with five
cases that were reported by Professor Stuart McDonald in the British Medical Journal a
week prior. After conducting the post-mortem exams, McDonald found that all five cases
had died from acute yellow atrophy while undergoing salvarsan treatments for syphilis in
a two-month period. In these cases, there was a sudden onset of jaundice and in the next
two to eight days, their symptoms became more dramatic and included wild excitement,
severe jaundice, bile-stained urine, and vomiting blood before falling into a coma and
dying one to four days later. Post-mortem exams revealed diminution of the liver and
inflamed kidneys while bacteriological examinations showed organisms, possibly of the
coli typhoid group, in the heart and lungs. Based on his findings he concluded, “That the
most reasonable view to take would appear to be that the essential cause of acute yellow
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atrophy is some poison, possibly of microbic nature, produced in the alimentary tract and
acting on a liver previously damaged, or whose function at least has been disturbed.”
Although the combined use of arsenic and mercury was the most obvious culprit,
McDonald noted,
It is remarkable that though similar cases amounting to
thousands have been treated by the same methods, such as a
complication as we have recently experienced has not been
observed until now. This would seem to point to some other
factor having been introduced. There is no evidence that the
salvarsan had been materially altered, at least in the last three
years, and the syphilitic toxin and mercury factors may be taken
as a constant.16
The Canadian lab encountered three out of five cases, including Dysart’s, which seemed
to fall into the same category as McDonald’s. The Canadian lab attempted to use the
Marsh test, a contemporary test for arsenic poisoning, but Dysart’s tissue sample was not
large enough. The other cases came back negative, but the lab was not sure if the Marsh
test could detect arsenic that had been given intravenously and not ingested orally. The
lab noted, “In our control [group] it seems to us that we had to add more 606 substitute
before we got a mirror that would be at all likely to be present in a piece of liver of
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moderate size. To really get ahead on the chemical detection of arsenic we would
probably need a lot of books and chemical apparatus.”17
Amyot’s initial response to the problem was to issue an order on 26 January 1918
limiting dosages for salvarsan and instead use inunctions of mercury.18 The staff at
Etchinghill expressed their concern, as multiple applications of mercurial ointment would
require at least fifty trained “rubbers” which would complicate and slow the treatment
process.19 Captain George Scott at Etchinghill complained that reverting to older forms of
treatment was not feasible given the limitations on military resources. Inunction treatment
would require an increase in medical staff while also delaying a man’s return to his unit.
He argued, “The most scientific treatment of syphilis known at the present day leaves
very much to be desired. We, however, at this hospital have had very encouraging results,
both as regards the obtaining of negative Wassermanns, few severe reactions from
arsenical compounds, and a death rate that is, so far as we know, infinitesimal.”20 Amyot
assured the staff at Etchinghill the changes were only temporary to address the current
emergency.21 He did warn them, however, that they would likely have to accept changes
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to the system that would prolong treatment times. “As things stand now,” he reminded
them, “many cases remain in Hospital not more than 20 days as indoor patients. Many of
these had not received more than 3 doses of salvarsan combined with the mercurial
treatment and had their open sores healed.”22 Despite concerns no long-term changes
were made. The order was cancelled thirteen days later and hospitals were told to return
to their former procedures with the caveat that “special vigilance is to be observed in the
selection of cases for full treatment, having regard to debilitating anterior history and
present lowering condition. Special care also will be taken in the sterilization of all
material and apparatus tools.”23 This precaution was short-lived as by 14 February 1918
Amyot reported “Without being final the conclusion ‘pro-tem’, is justified that these
three men died of chemically ordinated degeneration – not of spirochetic [sic]
jaundice…in general they have narrowed it down to one ‘local’ – so that it is considered
justifiable to return to the old establishment of treatment system as ‘ante’”24
Shortly after reverting back to the old treatments, another Canadian died from
complications potentially related to anti-syphilitic treatment. Private John Cathie was a
thirty-two year-old married plumber who enlisted on 29 June 1915. Prior to being treated
for syphilis, he spent several weeks in March 1917 at the hospital at Eastbourne for
nephritis. After developing sores on his penis, Cathie was sent to Cherry Hinton for anti22
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syphilitic treatment on 26 October 1917. Over the course of the next fifty-three days, he
received eights injections of mercury and 2.8 grams of kharsivan over seven injections
and was released on 18 December 1917. It was not until early February that Cathie was
admitted to Ravenscroft with severe jaundice, which his attending physicians attributed to
his exposure to salvarsan. Cathie complained of nausea and vomiting and over the next
two weeks, got progressively worse as he was drowsy, irritable and became emaciated
before passing away on 24 February 1918.25
On 8 March 1918, Colonels Murray, MacLaren, Finely, and Rudolf, as well as
Lieutenant-Colonels Adami and Stewart met with Captain Joseph Gibbs, a physician
from British Columbia who served with the CAMC in England including at Etchinghill,
to discuss the use of salvarsan.26 Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence Whitaker Harrison, a
renowned expert in venereal disease who had been put in charge of VD research at the
War Office, provided the committee with a detailed account of the cases. Prior to the
fatalities, there had been a few cases of catarrhal jaundice in patients that had received
salvarsan, which cleared up after a few days. Several other cases were in the secondary
stages of VDS and had yet to receive any salvarsan injections. In July 1917, hospitals in
Cambridge, Dublin and Newcastle had reported several cases of fatalities from jaundice
related to salvarsan. Soon after, several Canadian hospitals also reported that they had ten
cases of jaundice resulting in eight deaths. Harrison stated,
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Of these Canadian cases there have been up to date, ten: 5 of the
10 (with 4 deaths) had received their treatment at Cambridge;
another 5, also with 4 deaths, had been treated, 3 of them at
Hastings, 2 at Etchinghill, and subsequently at Seaford. The
later doses of the last group, i.e. five cases treated in Canadian
Hospitals, were given either in Seaford or Hastings. No cases
have occurred in those whose only treatment has been at
Etchinghill.27
Harrison concluded that the drug itself was not to blame for the fatalities based on several
pieces of evidence. He noted that there was no consistency in the drug that was used as
several modifications and substitutes had been used in the various treatments. In Dublin,
only one hospital had reported fatalities even though another hospital in Dublin had
received the same batch of kharsivan. He stated that there were no fatalities reported from
larger centres in Manchester, Lichfield, Hillsea, Devonport, Bulford, Connaught,
Rochester Row or the 39th General Hospital in France who treated a much larger number
of venereal patients so it appeared that there had to be another factor in the deaths than
the drug itself.28
In his investigation, Harrison found that all of the cases in Dublin had come from
the married men’s barracks, each small room packed with three or four beds. Eight of the
cases in Dublin came from three rooms with blood samples from nine of the fatalities
showing the presence of malignant malarial parasites, which were believed have been a
27
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contributing factor in these cases. Harrison reported similar conditions in Cambridge as
the treatment huts were arranged in four lines, A through D. There were two treatment
rooms, but the solutions were made up at the same spot. All 27 cases from Cambridge
came from lines A and B, with no cases reported from lines C and D. He could find no
sign of the malarial organism that had been reported in Dublin, Cambridge and
Newcastle. However, autopsies from these hospitals revealed two other important
features. Harrison said the livers showed an absence of arsenic while mesenteric glands
were congested and swollen. These two pieces of evidence suggested an infection rather
than metallic poisoning. Based on these findings, Harrison concluded that the most likely
scenario was that the salvarsan solution had been contaminated by bacteria from
unsterilized water that had been kept in a Winchester jar and replenished several times.
He argued, “Just as for years a well at a farm may be contaminated with sewage and yet
nothing happen [sic] until suddenly an epidemic of typhoid occurs, so it may chance that
for a long period no pathogenic organism invades such unsterilized solution of salvarsan,
but if the same Winchester quart bottle is not sterilized, but filled up and sent back to the
same treatment centre, then suddenly the contained solution may become and may remain
infected with pathogenic organisms.”29 The conclusion that the committee reached was
that the most reasonable explanation was that 606 alone was not responsible for the
fatalities, but they were the result of another factor which was most likely caused by an
infection from contaminated water used to prepare the solution.30 Liver damage caused
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by syphilis had lowered its ability to cope with certain microbes entering the blood
stream. These combinations of factors, and not the remedies themselves, were cited as the
main factors in outbreaks of acute jaundice.31
The meeting produced several outcomes affecting the treatment of syphilis
patients in Canadian hospitals. Firstly, Harrison did not see the need to stop salvarsan
injections in any hospital that had not reported a fatal case of jaundice. Secondly,
although men and MOs might be reluctant to continue salvarsan treatments after a string
of fatalities, Harrison was adamant treatments should continue on the basis that if
“treatment by 606 be discontinued and replaced by mercurial and other non-arsenic
treatments, the cost to the country in money, in time of treatment, and in men fit for
active service, will be so great that it cannot be considered. 606 in one or other
modification is the only rapid method of treating early cases of syphilis.”32 Wartime
necessity overshadowed concerns over safety. In the view of the army, the deaths of
eleven soldiers were seen as a regrettable but ultimately minor problem compared to the
perceived benefits of the system.
Lastly, Harrison noted that there had been no issues following intramuscular
injections of 914. Based on Harrison’s report, the committee made several
recommendations to the DMS. Firstly, the venereal centres at Etchinghill and Witley
would continue to administer 606, as there had been no fatal cases at either hospital.
Secondly, intravenous injections of 606 were to be suspended at Hastings and Seaford
31

LAC RG9-III-B-2, Vol.3617, The Management of Patients Under Treatment for
Syphilis, 16 March 1918.
32

LAC RG9-III-B-2, Vol. 3618, Report on Conference Upon the Treatment of Syphilis
by 606, March 1918.

185

and replaced with intramuscular injections until the cause of the fatalities could be
determined. Thirdly, the bacteriologists at Hastings and Seaford were to examine the
procedures for the preparation and administration of 606 with a focus on the sterility of
the fluids used. Lastly, as an additional precaution, the administration of 606 was
modified: the period of treatment was extended and would use smaller doses.
Captain Gibbs recommended all the cases at Seaford, about twenty-six, that were
awaiting treatment or had not yet finished treatment, should be sent to Etchinghill or
Witley until they had finished their courses of salvarsan. Any Seaford cases that had yet
to receive a diagnosis would have their samples immediately sent to Eastbourne before
these cases became generalized. Gibbs reasoned this would “will clear up the present
situation re: the untoward effects of 606 recently experienced, as these cases would
receive their full treatment before discharge from Hospital, and no trouble has been
experienced in cases fully treated at Etchinghill or Witley Special Hospital.”33 Like
Harrison, Gibbs also recommended intramuscular injections of 914, or arsenobenzol, in
the connective tissues of the gluteus maximus and the gluteus medius. He argued, “Even
when in a simple solution the injection of 914 is not followed by nearly the same amount
of pain as that which results from the local injection of 606…[and] no cases of acute
changes have followed the use of this modification of 606, while…the negative
Wassermann reaction at the end of the course are 12 percent better.”34 It is not clear why
it produced slightly better results, but it was also the drug preferred by doctors at the front
33
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as it could be dissolved in less water. Even when used intravenously, doctors at the front
argued it created fewer problems than other drugs. 35 When injected into the vein,
salvarsan could cause skin irritations and incredible pain at the site of injection. After
receiving several injections, Private L.J. Seavey refused any further medical treatments
for his VDS. He reported, “The treatment was also upsetting my stomach and I couldn’t
hold my breakfast down in the morning. Once after the injection it was just like a knife in
my back and I had to sit down on a bench in the hospital for two hours, and then they had
to carry me to the ambulance. On two occasions the treatment caused an abscess on the
hip where they injected it.” 36 It was reported that massaging the muscle after the
removing the needle helped disperse the substance and abolish the immediate pain.37
These recommendations were implemented in the modified course of treatment
that was issued in March of 1918 (see Figure 1.2). Treatment times were extended from
fifty days to fifty-seven days, patients would seven injections of mercury instead of eight
and the overall amount of salvarsan was reduced slightly from 2.8 grams to 2.6 grams.
The new schedule also outlined two courses of treatment for the use of 914, or neosalvarsan, a compound that was about two-thirds the content of 606 and could be injected
intramuscularly.38
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Day
of Intravenously
Treatment
606
or 914
1st
8th
15th
22nd
29th
36th
43rd
50th
57th
59th
61st to 75th
82nd
92nd

Intramuscularly
or 914

Intramuscularly
and
Mercurial
cream
0.3 gr
0.45 gr
0.45 gr
1 gr
0.3 gr
0.45 gr
0.45 gr
1 gr
0.3 gr
0.45 gr
0.6 gr
1 gr
---------1 gr
0.4 gr
0.6 gr
0.6 gr
1 gr
0.4 gr
0.6 gr
0.6 gr
1 gr
------------0.4 gr
0.6 gr
0.6 gr
1 gr
0.5 gr
0.75 gr
0.6 gr
---Blood test, if positive or doubtful, continue as outlined below
Potassium Iodine
0.3 gr
0.45 gr
0.6 gr
---0.4 gr
0.36gr
0.6 gr
----

Figure 2.2 – William Grant Macpherson, Medical Services Disease of the War, Volume
II, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1923), 140.
In an effort to deal with the concerns over the continued use of arsenic in the
treatment of syphilis, the CAMC produced a circular outlining the management of
syphilis patients. It addressed the “exaggerated rumors” of the dangers of anti-syphilis
treatment. It acknowledged that there had been several fatalities but it clearly stated there
was no evidence to support the claim that increased toxicity of treatments was to blame.
While both syphilis and arsenic treatments might cause some liver damage, doctors
argued the actual problems started when certain types of microorganisms entered the
blood stream. The preparation of salvarsan for injection was a complicated process: if not
prepared properly, it could result in illness or death. Salvarsan required pure, distilled
water but it was not always possible to obtain under wartime conditions.39 The War
Office ordered an investigation of salvarsan to examine the sterility of the water in an
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effort to determine whether the side effects were incidental or a directly due to a tainted
solution. One hypothesis was that a perfectly healthy liver was able to destroy these
microorganisms but if the liver was affected by syphilis then these microorganisms,
which entered the body during an injection or were absorbed by the intestine, could lead
to the rapid destruction of the liver in some cases. 40
For Canadian officials the potential risks associated with salvarsan were not
enough to justify a complete overhaul of the VD management system. The general belief
was “the present system of treatment of syphilis has successfully saved a most important
amount of wastage in manpower, not only in affected patients but in medical personnel to
look after them, and a reversion to older methods of treatment would result in such an
increase in man-power wastage as can not be afforded, even if there were stronger
grounds for such a step that there are at present.” Instead, more precautions were
introduced to minimize the chances of patients developing acute jaundice. Before starting
treatment, patients were to be “thoroughly examined as if for life insurance” in order to
identify any pre-existing conditions, such as arterio-sclerosis, myocarditis and pulmonary
or renal diseases that might affect dosage and intervals between treatments. Over the
course of treatment, and before any injections patients were to be carefully watched.
Urine samples were to be examined before and after every injection to check for renal
problems. MOs were to watch for jaundice, loss of weight or appetite, chronic headache,
sleeplessness, irritably of the stomach and bowels, skin disturbances and cyanosis as well
as any reactions that may occur during the treatment itself. If any of these symptoms were
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present during an examination, MOs were to suspend treatment for several months after
the symptoms disappeared.41

Investigation into VDS Management
Even though the CAMC was ultimately under the direction of British policy, they
had some autonomy in their special hospitals.42 The Canadians conducted their own
investigation of the deaths and Captain Austin Irvine was sent to take over the VDS clinic
in the area and inspect their procedures. Irvine compiled a list of recommendations for
the treatment of venereal disease, specifically syphilis. Before the war, Irvine was a
surgeon from Sherbrooke who enlisted in the CEF on 31 August 1916. While in France,
he was stationed with the 12th Canadian Field Ambulance and also served as the MO of
the 87th Battalion. During his time with the 87th, Irvine was awarded the Military Cross.
When he returned to England, he did rotations at Brighton, Eastbourne and Shorncliffe. It
is not clear why Irvine was chosen to examine the administration of venereal disease at
several clinics, but he provided a number of recommendations to the DADMS.
One of his first recommendations was that the number of patients seen per day at
the clinic should not exceed thirty, as that was “the maximum number that can be dealt
with intelligently.”43 He also listed a number of precautionary measures to ensure the
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patient was in good health prior to any treatments: well rested with a light meal and a
saline purgative the night before. Patients were to report to the Sick Parade the following
day to check for any reactions and have their urine examined for albumen before any
more injections. He could not provide a definitive answer on how long treatment would
take other than to state patients were to receive two salvarsan injections a week and one
mercury a week but that they could not be given on the same day. “Every effort,” Irvine
concluded, “will be made to give the treatment in as scientific & intelligent a manner as
possible, but at the same time with a minimum interference with the duties of a soldier.”44
Irvine’s inspection of Canadian VD clinics continued even though the DADMS,
Major Burke had decided that Irvine’s recommendations had not yet warranted any action
from higher up the chain of command. Burke reasoned that the “recommendation, and the
reasons for not forwarding them to the D.M.S. is apparent. Every recommendation can be
dealt with and acted upon by this Office, as they only concern the Battalion Medical
Officers.”45 To help improve the system, Irvine provided a more detailed breakdown of
the type of treatment that should be used depending on the stage of syphilis. According to
Irvine, his proposed treatment schedule rested on Erlich’s original belief that salvarsan
could cure syphilis in one dose. While this theory was proven wrong, Irvine argued that
since the spirochetes were most susceptible in the early stages, it was best to treat a
patient in the primary stages with as many large doses of salvarsan as the patient could
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withstand as was the practice of large, private hospitals. Treatments were tailored to the
patient depending on the stage and severity of the disease. Salvarsan was to be used in
conjunction with mercury and pushed to the limit of toleration with mercury becoming
the drug of choice in later stages and in instances of prolonged treatment. This treatment
schedule was difficult to maintain given that patients often had to receive treatments at
different hospitals but Irvine countered that while more patients would require
hospitalization, it would use less salvarsan and overall treatment times would be shorter.
Irvine concluded, “I do not think an injustice would be done to any patient, who had had
an initial and recurrent course as advised here, if he were classed as recovered if free
from clinical symptoms. It is a better course of treatment than 75 per cent of luetics
receive in civil life, and recurrences should be very few.”46
As Irvine continued his investigation he began to uncover a number of problems
concerning the administration of syphilis. As part of procedure, a syphilis case sheet was
to be created for each man that entered the system for VDS treatment to keep track of a
soldier’s treatment schedule once he left the hospital to be treated as an outpatient. Irvine
found that many patients were treated but never supplied with a case sheet. He stated, “In
certain instances instead of the case sheet patient [sic] had a small slip of paper on which
were marked the injections of 606 and mercury given, and to be given in that particular
course, but giving no information as to previous courses.”47 When the case sheets were
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available, the course of many arsenic and mercury injections had not been properly
entered with the most recent injection often the only one that had been recorded. Even
more troubling was his discovery that “in several cases whole courses are omitted. This is
naturally very misleading and if it were not for the fact that we have carefully looked into
the past history of all cases grave results would have followed.” Without proper
information as to the patients’ history, it was possible that men would miss treatments or
receive more injections and higher doses than outlined in the recommended course of
treatment. In one case, he encountered a man who claimed he could name the dates and
hospitals where he had received twenty-five injections. Another nine men told Irvine they
had received fifteen or more injections, well over the recommended seven injections.
Irvine believed many of the problems were due to the clinics trying to complete
too many VDS treatments in one day. The rushed manner at the clinic meant injections
had not been properly recorded and other important information was also missing from
the case sheets. The column marked ‘Symptoms and Progress’ was rarely filled out,
which was problematic as these were potentially important factors in guiding treatments
and tracking a patient’s response to treatment. He also found many reports were missing
urinal analysis or had been incorrectly reported as normal. Irvine noted, “One condition
that is hard to understand regarding the examination of urine and which is hard to believe
is that every urinary examination made on every case sheet so far that we have seen here
has been marked normal.”48 After testing several patients’ urine, Irvine found several
samples contained traces of albumen, an indication that treatment should be suspended.
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He found that his request for urine samples generated a great deal of curiosity among
staff and patients as it had apparently not been a regular part of the hospital’s routine.
After his observations at Seaford, Irvine concluded there were multiple problems
in VDS management from “the want of preparation of patients, slackness in noting
symptoms and re-actions and recording them, failure to examine urine before and after
treatment, inaccuracies of Syphilis Case Sheets, and general hurry up method of
treatment are that if one wishes to avoid accident in the future that every effort be made
to overcome these deficiencies in administration and technique. These deficiencies might
easily be regarded as possibly the unknown quantity already sought for in certain
unfortunate cases.”49 In Irvine’s opinion, the problems he had encountered in the system
should not be present after almost four years of war. He suggested to his superiors that
they hire a syphiliologist, one who had practical experience with treating syphilis and
managing a large-scale hospital clinic. Employing a person with extensive experience
was, in his opinion, the best way to improve the technique and administration and would
eliminate the factors that may have contributed to the fatalities at Seaford. In a follow-up
letter to Major-General G.L. Foster, Irvine clarified his recommendation and stated, “I
trust that when you read the latter part of the report that you will not think that I am
trying to create a post and suggesting myself to fill it. I have no desire to fill that post, but
think that it should be created and that someone thoroughly qualified should fill it. I do
feel though, that anyone endeavoring to do the VDS work in this area should do that and
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that alone, otherwise the work cannot be done and as you would wish. I would put myself
on record to that effect, please.”50
Irvine continued to examine the VDS procedures at Seaford and continued to
forward specific cases and examples of errors to his superiors at their request. When he
spoke to patients and compared their experiences to what had been recorded on their case
sheets, he found multiple discrepancies in three major areas. The first area of concern was
the number of patients who declared the urine examinations recorded on their charts were
incorrect, with Etchinghill being labeled by Irvine as the worst offender. Private Hittula
was placed on the syphilis register when he arrived at Etchinghill on 10 April 1916.
According to his chart, he received five injections of salvarsan and five injections of
mercury with the last injection on 10 May 1916. With each injection, there was a column
indicating that he had had a urine test, which had come back clean each time. When
Irvine took over Hittula’s treatment, urine tests showed no albumen but it did show traces
of bile. Irvine immediately stopped salvarsan injections and continued with only mercury.
Private Hittula told Irvine that he had only had his urine examined when he first arrived
at Etchinghill despite the fact that his case sheet showed he had received one after every
treatment. 51
The second area of concern for Irvine was the multiple instances where
examinations had not been recorded before or after treatments. He found that prior to 16
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April 1918, Etchinghill, Witley, Hastings, Cherry Hinton and Ravenscroft were all
offenders. In the case of Private Kennedy, Irvine received two different case sheets. The
original sheet, which came from his orderly room, shows that he was admitted on 31
October 1917 for VDS at Witley and received three doses of salvarsan and two doses of
mercury before being discharged as an outpatient on 16 November 1917. Over the next
three weeks, Kennedy received four doses of both salvarsan and mercury before his
treatment was stopped on 20 December 1917. Five months later he was given two blood
tests and both came back negative for spirochetes. Kennedy was classed as recovered on
1 June 1918. However, the copy Irvine received from the hospital only charted his
treatment until he was discharged as an outpatient on 16 November 1917 and showed that
he had received four urine tests that had all come back normal. But the orderly copy
showed Kennedy had never received any urine tests. His hospital records also indicated
that he had received three doses of mercury instead of the two that had been recorded on
his orderly case sheet.52
Conducting examinations of patients’ urine was important to understand how they
were reacting to treatment. Private Hunter was given a urine examination after his
transfer to Cherry Hinton on 3 December 1917, shortly after he was admitted to Brighton
with syphilis on 28 November 1917. Over the next several weeks, Hunter received seven
injections of salvarsan, totaling 4.7 grams, and eight injections of mercury. Even with a
double dose of salvarsan, his Wassermann test on 21 January 1918 came back as a strong
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positive followed by another Wassermann on 7 February that still came back as a weak
positive. A positive Wassermann meant another round of treatments for Hunter and over
the next few weeks he received three more injections of both salvarsan and mercury.
Even though his Wassermann on 28 February showed another strong positive, he was
discharged from the hospital on 1 March. Although he received ten injections of
salvarsan in total, according to his syphilis sheet, he did not have his urine examined at
any point after the initial examination. When he was readmitted on 14 May 1918, Irvine
put him on a course of solely mercury after his urine showed traces of albumen,
indicating a potential kidney problem. The slight trace of albumen that was detected in
his urine sample saved Hunter from a more intense treatment. Hunter’s kidney function
should have returned to normal between the last treatment and the test. This meant he had
severe nephritis or had developed a chronic kidney condition after his last treatment.
Regardless of the cause, any further treatments should have been immediately suspended.
On 21 May 1918, Hunter was admitted to Eastbourne as severely ill with jaundice from
salvarsan. Hunter was hospitalized for ninety-three days before being transferred to
Hastings with jaundice. Although his condition had improved enough to be struck off the
seriously ill list, Hunter spent another twenty-eight days in the hospital before being
discharged on 17 August 1918.53
The final area of concern Irvine found was there were several cases where the
number of arsenic injections recorded was incorrect. In his preliminary examination of
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the patients in Seaford, he found seven cases where patients claimed they had received
more injections than had been recorded on their case sheets. Private Currie was admitted
to Cherry Hinton on 30 November 1917 and a Wassermann test on 3 December 1917
showed that he had syphilis. He received twelve injections of salvarsan and seven doses
of mercury over the duration of his hospitalization until he was discharged on 4 February
1918. After talking to Currie, Irvine discovered that missing from his case sheet was the
six doses he had received prior to his admission. Currie had previously been admitted to
Hastings on 21 June 1917 before being transferred to Cherry Hinton on 17 July 1917.
After his Wassermann came back negative, he was discharged from Cherry Hinton on 16
August 1917 with a follow-up blood test scheduled for 16 November 1917. When the
results came back positive for syphilis, he was re-admitted to Cherry Hinton. However,
the first course of treatment was not recorded in his syphilis case sheet and was
subsequently not uncovered until Irvine discovered the omission when he took over the
case on 30 April 1918.54 This meant that Currie had received eighteen doses of salvarsan,
more than twice the recommended amount of injections.

Outcomes of the Investigation
Despite numerous examples of mismanagement, MacKinnon dismissed many of
the concerns raised by Irvine on the basis that much of the evidence had been furnished
by former patients. MacKinnon argued that since the patients were ‘interested parties’ in
the matter, any statements they made could not be considered reliable without further
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evidence to support their claims. MacKinnon also felt that the War Office had already
dealt with Irvine’s concern that examinations were not being recorded properly. New
instructions were distributed on 19 April 1918 so any complaints made before had
already been addressed. Lastly, he stated that unless Irvine could state what evidence he
had to prove NCO’s and orderlies had given salvarsan injections he should not be
submitting those types of complaints. MacKinnon’s overall impressions of Irvine’s report
was that it “would appear that the officer [sic] VDS clinic is anxious that the VD cases
reaching him should have been treated in accordance with instruction but is relying on the
statements of patients in aiming his criticism and not submitting information which will
enable these complaints, based on fact, to be properly investigated. It is suggested, please,
that the consultant who next proceeds to Etchinghill might have access to this
correspondence and quietly investigate on the spot the discrepancies in treatment and
documentation which may possibly exist.”55
The only charge MacKinnon followed up on was Irvine’s claim that orderlies and
NCOs had been administering salvarsan injections to patients and requested more
information on this matter. In response, Irvine furnished a list of fifteen names of NCOs
and other ranks that stated that they had received salvarsan and mercury injections by
NCOs and orderlies while under treatment at Etchinghill.56 This recommendation seems
to be the one area of concern that was dealt with as a memo was issued to VDS clinics to
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investigate these charges and institute suitable instructions to eliminate these practices.57
Both Etchinghill and Shorncliffe responded that all treatments had always been
performed under the direction and supervision of qualified MOs and the matter was
apparently dropped.58
Although he was dismissive of Irvine’s claims of any mismanagement, in the fall
of 1918 MacKinnon discovered there were still multiple problems in the administration
of syphilis treatments. Despite the number of orders, memos and circulars that had been
dedicated to deal with the VD problem, MacKinnon’s report, written while Canada was
trying to demobilize its forces, shows that they continued to experience serious problems
in the management of syphilis. These problems were exacerbated by the use of salvarsan,
the ‘cure’ that had been linked to a number of deaths in Canadian and British armies,
which prompted the formation of a British-led committee to investigate its use.
The Salvarsan Committee, headed by Francis Coutts, contacted Adami after
hearing that there had been several fatalities potentially related to salvarsan amongst
Canadian troops. This committee was initially formed in the early stages of the war by
the Medical Research Council (MRC) to oversee the standardization, efficacy and safety
of manufactured drugs after many German drugs, salvarsan included, became
unavailable. It was reformed in 1917 when the potential problems associated with the use
of salvarsan continued to be a topic of debate. While the MRC, “wanted to prove that
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British Kharsivan was as effective and as well tolerated as German Salvarsan, the data
[was] insufficient to support confident claim – yet the MRC was still stating publicly that
British arsphenamine was as good as German arsphenamine.”59 The committee wanted
information on any instances of jaundice where the patient had been treated for syphilis
and whether they had received salvarsan or neo-salvarsan injections. Within the
committee it had “been suggested that possibly severe jaundice following 606 might be
associated with an epidemic of jaundice generally and that 606 might act as an existing
cause leading to a greater incidence of the disease in those undergoing such treatment and
possibly the development of a severer type of jaundice.”60 After review the committee
determined, “the relation between arsenbenzol treatment and jaundice cannot be defined
exactly, but its close similarity to liver disturbance consequent on trinitrotoluene and
toluylenediamine poisoning points to the organic complex of arsenobenzol as being to
some extent responsible.”61 Since there had been similar outbreaks in Germany without
any changes to the compound or technique, MacDonald’s suggestion of a secondary
microbial infection could not be ruled out. Yet according to the official medical history,
“the committee could not escape the conviction that there is a connection between
intensity of treatment and the incidence of jaundice”62 The committee was unable to
reach a definitive conclusion on the relationship between salvarsan and jaundice even as
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reports sent to them by Canadian medical staff supported the theory that salvarsan, or
more specifically the British-made substitute kharsivan, was a key factor in the outbreak
of jaundice in soldiers undergoing treatment for syphilis.
In 1919, Adami responded to the committee’s inquiry into the fatalities associated with
salvarsan. Adami reported that a number of cases in primary treatment showed bile in the
urine within 24 hours of receiving a salvarsan treatment while a number of these cases
also developed clinical jaundice over the course of treatment. In the spring of 1918,
fifteen cases of acute yellow atrophy developed with eleven fatalities. Subsequent
investigations into these deaths showed no evidence of spirochetes, arsenic or mercury
although Adami admitted that in the case of the last two “our facilities were not
exhaustive.”63 All of these cases had become seriously ill seven to ten weeks after
finishing their treatments but Adami could not definitively state that 606 was a
contributing factor. He did feel that, as these men had received both mercury and arsenic,
the arsenic may have been the basic cause and was ‘helped’ by the mercury. Adami
stated, “We had not the courage or temerity which to treat these men in acute conditions
existing with ‘606’, and yet we had in mind the possibility that the condition might be a
secondary manifestation of syphilis.”64 Kharsivan had been used for the full course in ten
of the cases while one treatment had started with kharsivan but switched to another form
of salvarsan. Despite these fatalities, they continued with this course of treatment without
incident until the spring of 1919 when there were eight more fatalities from cases that had
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been initially treated in France but there was no record of the type of salvarsan they had
received. Adami felt, based on the clinical and post-mortem findings, that these deaths
were the result of arsenic poisoning. But given that they had no control group, someone
with untreated syphilis, to compare with, their findings were incomplete. He concluded,
‘Salvarsan’ is not a very stable substance. Treatment has been of
necessity under war conditions in hands not always cognizant of
the delicacy of this drug and of the extent of the patients’
resistance that is called on in this form of treatment, also
conditions under which the treatment is carried on and the aftercare of the patients were not always what could be desired. All of
these things must be taken into consideration in explaining these
cases, which for the time being we are inclined to think are
attributable to ‘606’ or its substitutes.65
As the British-led Salvarsan Committee investigated the fatalities associated with
salvarsan, Canada continued its own inquiry into its use. Captain Scott reported that he
had 42 cases of jaundice develop at Etchinghill at varying periods over the course of their
salvarsan treatment.
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While Adami has concluded salvarsan was the culprit, other

Canadian doctors were reluctant to blame the drug itself. Lieutenant-Colonel Shelly had
several cases of salvarsan poisoning at No. 16 Canadian General hospital while he was in
charge and was preparing a report. His report was waiting on Captain Bailey to test the
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liver function in these cases, which had been held up after the chemicals he needed had
not arrived. Once the lab was up and running, Shelly hoped that all the cases of salvarsan
poisoning could be sent to him. He wanted to publish a full report by September 1919.67
Bramshott had also reported a number of jaundice cases following salvarsan treatment
and Shelly wanted to examine these cases. He stated, “quite a lot has been done upon the
chemical side of these cases, but while there have been theories there has been little
practical work done upon possible bacteriological causation of the condition, i.e. upon
bacteria of low virulence taking hold in the system damaged by arsenic.”68 In the midst of
demobilization, it is unlikely Shelly was able to test his theory. With little consensus
among the medical community regarding the dangers of salvarsan, it remained the main
treatment for syphilis until penicillin was discovered as an effective cure in 1943.

Conclusion
An examination of the problems with 606 reveals the place of the CAMC within
the RAMC. Facilities such as Etchinghill, like all Canadian medical services, operated
under the guidelines created by the War Office. But as established in the previous
chapter, CAMC personnel in England had more leeway to develop their own techniques
and could more readily influence the VD management system than their counterparts in
France. While this organization allowed the CAMC to modify existing systems to suit
their needs they were still not entirely independent. Nor were they more readily equipped
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to deal with problems in the delivery of this system to its soldiers than the British. The
British had promoted the treatment schedule and the salvarsan substitute that were
contributing factors in the untimely deaths of a number of soldiers. Even so the CAMC
was ultimately responsible for carrying out the orders that were given to them by
developing their own practices and procedures around the framework created by the
British.
The system that they developed had multiple problems. After four years of war,
Canada still did not have consistent procedures in place to effectively deal with the VD
problem. Procedures were not followed or enforced, medical staff was not properly
trained and clinics had more cases then they were designed to handle. Problems with
VDS management were compounded by the use of a highly toxic drug as the primary
cure. Although once hailed as the ‘magic bullet’ to cure syphilis, the repeated use of
salvarsan could create a number of problems. The files of the Canadian ADMS show that
salvarsan was linked to organ damage, serious illness and even death. Despite the known
risks, salvarsan reduced manpower wastage and medical cost and continued to be the
primary cure in the anti-syphilitic treatment of soldiers.
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Chapter 5
Returning Home after a Night with Venus: Policies and Procedures for the
Homecoming of Soldiers with VD

Venereal disease created two distinct problems for Canadian officials while the
British had one main focus. The most immediate and pressing concern for both was the
drain on manpower and resources. In addition to this matter, Canadian officials were
worried returning soldiers would create a public health crisis by carrying VD back to
Canada. With an overall VD rate of about 5 per cent in their army, and the fact that
British soldiers frequently returned home to their families and communities throughout
the war, British officials did not generally share this same fear.1 Canadian officials, both
at home and overseas, had been caught off-guard by the high rates of VD among soldiers
and struggled to implement effective procedures throughout the war. Officials in Ottawa
complained that Canada had experienced a sharp increase in VD since the beginning of
the war, which they attributed to the return of troops from overseas.2 This increase
generated fears over public health and led to a re-evaluation of the procedures for
returning men with VD “as many in senior ranks and at home feared the prospect of a
plague of diseased soldiers descending on the helpless women of Canada.”3 This chapter
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investigates how the tensions between officials at home and overseas shaped the
construction of policies dealing with the homecoming of diseased soldiers.
Men who had a history of VD on their medical case sheet were to be physically
inspected and tested before leaving England. This policy was designed to limit the spread
of VD in Canada from returning soldiers while also serving as a deterrent. Anyone who
tested positive would not be allowed to sail to Canada until they were considered cured.
Soldiers were frequently warned that contracting VD could delay their return for several
weeks or even months so it was best to avoid sexual encounters.4 The Wassermann
(VDS) and Schwartz (VDG) tests were used to determine which cases required further
treatment. These tests produced inconsistent results, so the CAMC took a special interest
in the development of more reliable testing. The CAMC saw an opportunity to utilize
wartime conditions to expand VD research although pathologists ultimately made little
progress during the war. Despite their known limitations, these tests remained the
cornerstone of CEF regulations for returning soldiers.
Over the course of the war, procedures were under constant scrutiny and routinely
altered to root out men who had VD before they were returned to Canada. The
development of these policies was a contentious issue between officials in Canada, who
advocated for stricter policies, and overseas officials who argued existing procedures,
while not foolproof, were largely effective. Long-term health concerns and public
opinion underscored the policies favoured by those at home. Overseas officials had to
balance these demands with the realities and limitations of operating in wartime
conditions. They argued that focusing only on the overseas contingent was shortsighted

4

Cassel, The Secret Plague, 132.
207

since it ignored the VD problem at home. Contemporary estimates stated at least 25 per
cent, but as many as 80 per cent, of young men in pre-war Canada had gonorrhea while 5
to 15 per cent of Canadians likely suffered from syphilis, compared to a total VD rate of
15.8 per cent among the Canadian forces.5 Given the problems at home, military officials
argued enforcing stricter controls only overseas would have little impact on the rates of
infection among the civilian population.
Mass demobilization following the end of hostilities in 1918 intensified these
debates. Canadian officials wanted the military overseas to retain responsibility for these
cases, while rapid demobilization made this approach impossible. Discussions about
demobilization had begun in 1916 to ensure that once the war was over, soldiers were
returned to Canada as quickly and comfortably as possible. The original estimate was that
it would take approximately eighteen months to return all Canadians serving overseas
back to Canada. Instead of the original estimate of eighteen months, two-thirds of
Canadian soldiers were back home in five months.6 To accommodate the new challenges
posed by demobilization, changes were repeatedly made to existing procedures.
Maintaining strict screening and testing overseas in the face of dwindling military and
medical resources made holding and treating cases overseas increasingly difficult.
Procedures that were put in place to protect public health and opinion at home had to
frequently be altered to address the exigencies of war and demobilization.
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Testing
The policies and procedures put in place to manage the return of soldiers with VD
relied on the same contemporary testing methods that were used at the front and in
England during treatment. Soldiers who showed a history of VD on their medical
histories had to submit to an additional medical exam to determine if they could be
returned to Canada. Syphilitic cases underwent a Wassermann test, which had recently
been standardized and put forward by the Committee on Bacteriological Standards of
National Research Committee for the War Office. If the test came back negative, a
soldier could continue on to Canada. Any soldier whose test came back positive but had
no open lesions was also likely to be sent home. Those with positive tests and/or open
lesions were to be held in England for further treatments until their lesions had healed
and then they were sent home.7 The Schwartz test was used to detect cases of gonorrhea
that were in the infective stage but did not display any outward symptoms. While
officials relied on these procedures to ensure disease control among returning soldiers,
the limitations of these tests were well known. Canadian medical officers stationed in
England utilized military laboratories and the population of infected soldiers at their
disposal in an attempt to create more reliable testing methods. Their work was well
supported by both overseas and Canadian officials. It became an important component of
the demobilization process and officials believed it would further VD research and
medical advancements in civilian life. 8

This experience represents a process of
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knowledge exchange between home front and battlefield that has not been documented
by historians.
In addition to managing the treatment of VD cases in England and France,
overseas authorities also needed to manage their eventual return to Canada. This task
involved drafting procedures that would ensure every man sent back to Canada was
medically inspected before proceeding home. On 10 October 1917, Foster released a
memo outlining the procedures. Examination records for gonorrhea patients needed to
include the clinical findings of the anterior urethra, posterior urethra, prostate gland,
seminal vesicles, spermatic cord and epididymis. In addition to physical exams, blood
samples were taken from men who had a history of VD. Special laboratories would be
constructed at disembarkation points in Liverpool and Buxton to processes samples.
Chronic cases of gonorrhea would be returned to Canada regardless of whether the results
of their bacteriological tests came back positive or negative. Only acute cases were to be
held in England for further treatment. For VDS cases, the Wassermann was used to detect
the presence of syphilitic spirochetes. Any soldier with a positive Wassermann was held
in England for further treatment. These procedures were designed to minimize the
number of symptomatic soldiers who were returned to Canada although officials
understood these measures were not foolproof.9
Even with the medical developments that had taken place in the earlier part of the
century there were still limitations to their use. Neither positive or negative tests results
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could be considered definitive. Foster issued a warning stating “it must of course, be
appreciated that negative Wassermanns or negative gonococcus results are recorded as
for the time of examination. By the time the patient’s journey home is ended he may
again be positive in either case.”10 Pre-existing conditions could flare up or the disease
could be contracted somewhere between the final medical inspection and a soldier’s
arrival in Canada. It was also possible that even if a man was suffering from VDS, his
Wassermann test could come back negative. This possibility was problematic given that
the Wassermann test was used to determine cases that required further treatment. A false
negative could mean “men suffering from VDS, and having shown a negative
Wassermann, have gone away feeling gloriously happy that their Blood Test showed they
were cured; such things are a sad commentary on the human weakness of allowing one
letter to make the word – one symptom to condemn a man to a life of misery one branch
of science to constitute the basis of medicine.”11 Potentially unaware of their positive
status, these men may forgo further medical intervention and unknowingly pass the
disease on to their spouses, sexual partners and future offspring.
Of equal concern was the potential for false positives. Test results that seemingly
confirmed the presence of syphilitic spirochetes were not always reliable given that there
were a number of diseases besides syphilis that could yield the same results. Positive
Wassermanns had been reported in cases of non-specific chancre, yaws, gonorrhea,
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alopecia areata, leprosy, lupus, malaria, erythematosus, enteric fever, tumors, herpes,
aortic disease, relapsing fever, pneumonia, Scarlet fever, trypanosomiasis, puerperal
eclampsia, persons under narcosis and from the serum of dead bodies. As early as April
1917, Captain Joseph Gibbs expressed concern over the confidence placed on these
results. He worried men “may easily become a victim to too great a faith in such a means
of diagnosis, and his life ever after become a veritable nightmare.”12 The reliance on the
outcome of an unreliable test could mean that men underwent unnecessary treatments.
This risk was problematic as anti-syphilitic treatments were highly toxic. Given the
number of cases that had been misdiagnosed due to faulty testing, Gibbs argued “with
evidence such as this, coupled with the general impression that a Positive Wassermann is
a definite assurance that Syphilis is present, it would seem that a warning should be
sounded, especially to those Medical Officers in charge of VD departments.”13 MOs
could not rely on the results of the Wassermann test alone to confirm a diagnosis. They
needed verify their results through observation and additional exams before “submitting
such a man to a life of worry.”14 Although the medical community was acutely aware of
the problems, the Wassermann test remained an important determinant in managing the
return of men to Canada.
The accuracy rate for gonorrhea testing was equally inconsistent. A committee
headed by Lieutenant-Colonel John Adami had been formed in 1917 to standardize the
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tests for gonorrhea. The main purpose was to find a method that would produce
consistent and accurate results. “A wrong positive diagnosis,” the committee argued,
“may be the means of inflicting grave injury upon the individual; a wrong negative
diagnosis is liable to injure the family of the individual and the community to an even
graver extent.”15 Clinical examinations were still the best method of diagnosis, but the
goal was to find a test that could supplement these findings especially in cases where
symptoms were not observable or conclusive. The committee reviewed several methods
including Gram’s stain, the cultivation of gonococcus and various methods for producing
a focal gonococcal reaction. While the committee believed these methods could yield
consistent results they were invasive, required extensive preparations from the patient or
needed a specialist beyond a pathologist, none of which were conducive to the constraints
of wartime medicine. 16 In contrast, a complement fixation test, used to detect the
presence of the antigen created by a gonorrhea infection, required only a blood sample
and a pathologist. While the Schwartz method was most commonly used there were
several different variations of the test. The results of the test also depended on the type of
antigen being used. Canadian MOs had reported difficulties finding a suitable antigen and
technique that produced consistent results. It was reported that at Etchinghill, “Captain
Jackson has become so disgusted with the antigen and has given up on the fixation test
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entirely.”17 With several different antigens available and no consensus among the medical
community on which produced the most accurate results, complement fixation tests for
gonorrhea proved to be as equally unreliable as the Wassermann. The report stated the
test could also only be used in certain cases. It was not effective in acute cases where
there were not enough antigens, in cases where the disease was localized to one area of
the body, if a man had received a vaccine for gonorrhea and it also produced non-specific
results if other diseases were present. The committee concluded “as for the Wassermann
reaction, and for the same reasons, the committee cannot recommend any one standard
method of complement fixation…They recommend that in tests made for official returns
the method of complement fixation employed be clearly stated.” 18 The lack of a
standardized method was problematic given the importance that was placed on the
outcomes of these tests. The CEF needed a reliable method of diagnosis to prevent a
possible public health crisis back home. With military funded labs at their disposal,
several doctors within the CEF continued to experiment with new techniques, based on
the popular Schwartz, Kolmer and Owen methods.
After discussing the matter, Colonels Finely and Rudolph recommended that
Colonel Adami head a combined enquiry into the development of a complement fixation
test for VDG.19 The senior staff of the CAMC, themselves civilian practitioners before
the war, saw an opportunity to use military medicine to build on previous developments

17

LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3617, Letter from Captain Edward Fidlar to Colonel Adami, 1
July 1918.
18

Medical Research Committee, Reports of the Special Committee, 13.

19

LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3617, Memorandum from AMDS to AMD, 22 June 1918.

214

pioneered in Canadian medicine. A letter was sent to several CEF pathologists,
physicians and doctors to see if they were interested in joining the enquiry. They were
told,
The complement fixation test for gonococcal infection is
peculiarly Canadian. Lt-Colonel Meakins was the first English
speaking worker to employ it, H. Schwartz, a Canadian graduate,
introduced the polyvent antigen in use to-day and Major Owen
published the clearest description of the technique. Now it is
being recommended by the Medical Research Committee for
general employment in British Venereal clinical laboratories, and
there is sure to be considerable work upon it.20
The plan was that each laboratory would tackle a specific problem such as the existence
of different strains, best mediums for growing vaccines, or the effects of prostate
massage. They realized that the war provided them with the unique opportunity to “obtain
a sufficiency of cases upon which to make a definite statement.”21 The VD problem
created a chance for “Canada to continue in the forefront” of VDG research.22
The response to Adami’s request was mixed. Captain Farquharson at No. 15
General Hospital responded that he would be “very glad” to be part of the investigation
as he stated he had been having problems with the current antigen and had heard the one
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supplied by Parks Davis was equally unsatisfactory.23 The response from the laboratory
at No. 11 Canadian General was less enthusiastic. Having previously carried out
serological work with Captain Taylor at No. 1 Canadian General, Captain Fidlar
confessed, “I have no faith in the G.C. fixation tests although I have continued them as
before because of the requests which come in.”24 His concerns came from the problems
he had encountered with the antigen supply. Fiddler stated, “The anti-complementary
value is such that if one were to take half the amount for each test that the country would
be impoverished. On the other hand some capsules will have an anti-complementary
value only slightly more than twice the time [?] on the later.”25 To be successful Fidlar
argued they would need to isolate and grow their own strain from their soldiers but could
only accomplish this with the addition of more trained men. However, if they were able
to find a more suitable antigen then he would be happy to assist with the investigation.26
Captain Jackson echoed the concerns raised by Farquharson and Fidlar over the antigen
supply. He told Adami he had not performed any reactions in over a month because of
problems with his supply. Jackson said he had “tried to overcome this difficulty for
myself by making my own antigen from several strains of gonococci, but situated as I am
without a supply of gas or electricity I am dependent upon a paraffin oil incubator and

23

LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3617, Letter from Captain Farquharson to Colonel Adami, 30
June 1918 and LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3617, Letter from Captain Farquharson to Colonel
Adami, 26 July 1918.
24

LAC, RG9-III-B-2 Vol. 3617, Letter from Captain Fidlar to Colonel Adami, 1 July
1918.
25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

216

have therefore met with no success.”27 He agreed that in addition to finding a suitable
antigen they would also need to reach a consensus on a method. Jackson said that he had
developed his own technique based on Owen’s method. While it had produced
satisfactory results, it was somewhat tedious. Although he had some reservations about
methodology and his current workload, Jackson told Adami that he could count on the
support of his MOs and would “take up this problem with pleasure.”28 Meanwhile,
Captain Hertherington at Eastbourne told Adami that he first encountered the test while at
Folkstone and was “extremely interested in its possibilities. When I came to Eastbourne I
attempted to procure antigen with the intention of performing the test on cases in this
hospital but was unable to procure the necessary antigen.”29 He informed Adami that he
would like to be a part of the enquiry.
The unanimity over the dissatisfaction with the antigen prompted Adami to reach
out to Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison who worked out of Rochester Row, the military
teaching hospital.30 Adami informed the Captains that in response Harrison had promised
him “if your pathologists can come along here, Captain Thomson would show a better
antigen than P.D. & Co’s and a better method than Kolmer’s for doing the G.C.
complement fixation test. Briefly the antigen is a solution of G.C. and the methods
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provides for overnight fixation at ice-chest temperature.” 31 Adami had to secure
arrangements with Foster to have these men proceed to Rochester Row to work with
Colonel Harrison. He told Foster that it would be more beneficial if they were able to
take control of the matter instead of having to rely on Rochester Row. Once they were
able to prepare their own antigen, one laboratory could take over production and
distribution. With his prior experience, Captain Jackson was considered to be most well
suited for this role but given his current workload would require an assistant.32 Foster and
Amyot made arrangements to have Captain Archibald William Hunter, a thirty-sevenyear-old physician and surgeon who worked in Vancouver before the war, transferred
from Moore Barracks along with a supply of gas.33
The desire to develop a reliable complement fixation test increased dramatically
with the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918. Facing mass demobilization, the
CEF needed an effective method for testing VDG. In early December, Adami wrote to
Jackson to inquire about his progress.34 The news was not what Adami had hoped to hear.
Jackson responded, “I regret that we have not accomplished more in regards to
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complement fixations. However we have not been idle.” 35 He reported Hunter had
cultivated about twenty-four different strains. Hunter wrote to Adami to inform him that
his work had been slowed by the lack of trained technicians in the lab, which made it
difficult to create a supply. However, he reported he was confident that with additional
time, help and equipment, he would be able to make any quantity Adami wanted.36
Meanwhile, Jackson informed Adami that he had created six antigens to test. He said that
if Adami wanted he could easily make up a polyvalent antigen from about twenty strains
but felt it was better to test them at his lab before sending them out.37 By January,
Jackson wrote Adami to tell him Hunter had prepared eight antigens consisting of one
strain that were ready for testing and was eager to know if they should wait to include
more strains or move ahead with their current supply.38 Adami responded that although
more would be better, eight strains were a good start given the renewed urgency of the
matter.39
Etchinghill was eager to share their supply with the other laboratories.
MacKinnon reported their antigen had “been getting excellent results [both] undiluted
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and used as a vaccine.”40 The delivery of the antigen, however, had been slowed by the
lack of boxes and ampoules needed to ship it. In response, Adami told MacKinnon, “It is
pretty hard to get anything out of the ordinary these days. I should have thought that
ampoules would have been on the market and easily obtainable, that a big firm like
Burroughs and Wellcome would let us have some for investigation purposes.”41 Shortly
after drafting these letters, Etchinghill received word from Adami that their supply of
ampoules had finally come in.
Staff at Etchinghill hoped this would enable them to conduct more trials of their
antigen. Mackinnon proposed the creation of a station at Kinmel Park to root out any men
who may have been suffering from latent gonorrhea. He suggested that he could send
Captain Hunter with his new antigen to conduct blood tests on soldiers about to be
shipped back to Canada. MacKinnon argued this process would involve testing every
man whose medical case sheet showed a history of VDG, which provided them with a
unique opportunity not found in civilian practice. At Kinmel Park, Hunter would be able
to test the antigen in conjunction with the extensive medical histories of each soldier.
This information would allow to them confirm the reliability of their new complement
fixation test. If the use of the antigen proved to be successful, MacKinnon argued they
could continue to perform serological tests months and even years after men were
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discharged to see if they were still suffering from VDG. A reliable method of testing
would enable them to ensure an accurate diagnosis. Such a test would also help deter
malingers looking to get a pension from symptoms related to VDG.42
As early as 15 May 1917, there were already discussions about the criteria for
awarding a pension to a man with a history of VD. In most cases a pension would not be
awarded for any disability that resulted from a man’s negligence, which was any case that
had been contracted while they were in the military. However, there were concerns some
cases occurred prior to enlistment but were aggravated by one’s service. In a letter to
Adami, Major Todd of the Board of Pensions Commission asked “it is suggested that
pensions should be awarded in such cases for the extent to which the progress of the
disease might be judged to have been accelerated by factors consequent upon military or
naval service…Is there any means by which even moderate accuracy in estimating the
extent to which progress of the disease has been accelerated by service be obtained?”43
Apparently, the pension board was having difficulty classifying these types of cases. The
position of the pension board was, “On the one hand the necessity for compensating for
all disabilities due to service is imperative; on the other hand is an obligation not to give
pension for disabilities resulting from a man’s own fault or negligence.” 44 Adami
responded that the majority of these men should not receive a full pension, but were
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likely entitled to a portion, at least in some cases of VDS. He based his views on Colin
Russell’s experiment on syphilitic rabbits. During the experiment, Russell flashed a
bright mirror into the rabbits’ eyes over the course of several days eventually inducing
Argyll-Robertson pupils, a sign of neurosyphilis. The conclusion was the rabbits would
have never had this reaction had their optic nerves not been strained and exhausted by the
mirror. The same principle, Adami argued, could be applied to soldiers who became
symptomatic during service. Adami discussed a hypothetical case in which a man that
had contracted syphilis prior to enlistment, but believed that he had been cured, might
become symptomatic after the stress of service. If a man’s symptom manifested after a
prolonged period in the trenches or long marches, he believed “it is unjust and immoral to
deny that man a pension, on the ground that this is the outcome of venereal disease. It is
the outcome, but also the strain has been a definite contributory cause; but for that strain,
it might have been years before the symptoms manifested themselves if indeed they ever
showed themselves.”45 To ensure men were not lying about having VD in order to get a
pension, they would need accurate serological tests to determine which cases were
genuine. MacKinnon believed the testing he was proposing would enable them to
develop an accurate test.
Adami reported MacKinnon’s plan to his superiors but they did not agree with his
recommendation for conducting tests at Kinmel Park.46 It was decided that the proposal
was not feasible given the delay it would cause with troop transport back to Canada
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especially since the Wassermann test that had been ordered for soldiers with a history of
VDS had already been canceled.47 The scheme would have also created clerical issues,
as more soldiers would be required to travel with even more documentation. Instead,
Adami recommended using the existing staff and equipment at Kinmel Park to collect
information and a small sample of blood from these men, who could then be quickly
dismissed and continue on to Canada. These samples, and any other data collected, could
be used to conduct examinations including additional tests that would be passed along to
the office of the ADMS and, as a courtesy, any information obtained about cases of latent
gonorrhea, could be sent to Ottawa every week.48 Adami argued that if they implemented
this system overseas then when the matter of venereal disease was brought up in
Parliamentary proceedings it would resonate positively with the Canadian people if they
knew the CAMC had “done its utmost and gone further than any other medical service in
diagnosing the disease and determining its frequency among our troops.”49 A plan was
also put in place to send an officer to Canada who was familiar with the preparation and
use of the antigen.50 They hoped authorities in Canada, having considerable power over
the yet-to-be discharged soldier with a history of VD, would be willing to work with staff
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from Etchinghill to carrying out testing.51 Once in Canada, the officer could ‘”keep in
touch with the experts at Etchinghill, so that combined results can be collaborated and
credited to those who have done this pioneer work on the preparation of this antigen.”52
The Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment (DSCR) expressed interest in
working with the Etchinghill laboratory. Fotheringham wrote, “Your letter affords an
interesting side-light on the value of work done by the Military Medical Authorities with
respect to V.D. and it is expected that these results will be made available to the proposed
Dominion Department of Health with much advantage.”53 Soon after, Captain Hunter
was dispatched to Canada to continue his research at a lab at the University of Toronto
and assume duties there as a civilian.54
MacKinnon later reported that they had successfully tested the antigen on cases in
their gonorrhea ward. Ninety-three percent of cases tested positive, which confirmed
earlier clinical examinations.55 While the accuracy of MacKinnon’s report is difficult to
verify, it provides interesting insight into the use of these newer medical technologies
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within the military. Even with their dubious track records, these tests played an important
role in the management of VD since they were one of the few methods available that
authorities believed could help alleviate long-term problems. Concerns over a potential
health crisis shaped the procedures surrounding the disposal of men with VD. This also
provided an opportunity for the civilian-trained CAMC doctors to conduct extensive VD
research. The staff at Etchinghill was able to take advantage of the unique circumstances
provided by wartime medicine to develop what they believed to be an accurate testing
method.

Procedures During the War
Even if these tests had been able to identify men who were still considered
contagious, there were still a number of problems with the disposal of VD cases. Policies
for dealing with these cases developed from the competing demands of Canadian officials
and the resources of those overseas. Rarely did these interests ever centre on the actual
health of the men themselves. At home officials were anxious to avoid negative press
over the high rates of VD among Canadian servicemen. They believed keeping cases
overseas was the best method for preserving the legacy of the war and public health.
Domestic authorities pressed for strict guidelines to manage the return of any soldier who
may have contracted VD including rigorous inspections, paperwork and testing. Any case
that slipped through the system was considered grounds for a complete overhaul of the
existing procedures. Officials overseas argued little could be done to improve current
practices. They believed the few infective cases that may be sent to Canada were
regrettable, but ultimately unavoidable, given the problems with testing, overseas
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resources and the nature of the disease itself. With VD already a problem at home,
overseas administrators also argued the stringent rules favoured by Canadian bureaucrats
were shortsighted as they did little to address the real issue.
The debate over VD management policies began in the fall of 1917 when Major
Herbert Molson, DAAG for the Canadian Contingent, inspected the procedures for
invaliding men with VD back to Canada. He furnished a report in October 1917 that
outlined several weak points he found in the system along with several recommendations
for improvements. Under the current system men were examined two days prior to
entraining to Liverpool and received no further examinations prior to embarkation.
Molson argued this practice was problematic as during these two days men were not
confined to their barracks but allowed to go into town. After getting a clean bill of health,
men could potentially contract VD while waiting for their sailing. Molson had also heard
stories that men who had developed VD were getting substitutes from a non-sailing party
to pass their inspections but he could not offer any definitive proof to substantiate these
rumors. However, he argued that his findings – that there were major problem with the
current system – were supported by the latest statistics. Molson complained in a recent
sailing of 1150 men, the ship had left England with five cases of VD and arrived in
Canada with seven.56 He argued that “it seemed a needless expense to the Government
that the five cases mentioned above should have been kept at Buxton ready for sailing
and then should have been sent to the Hospital at Cambridge for further treatment before
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discharge from the Service.”57 These cases were considered the financial responsibility of
the overseas contingent even if the Canadian government was technically still footing the
bill. Regardless, in Molson’s opinion such incidents were indicative of major problems
with medical processing that had to be dealt with immediately.
To solve these issues Molson offered several recommendations for improving the
current system. He suggested that after passing the examination, men should be given a
white card with their name, number and signature indicating that they were free from
infection. These cards would be presented at the point of embarkation. The personnel
responsible for loading the ships would ensure that the number of cards corresponded to
the number on the nominal roll. Under this system any man who could not provide a
white card had to be examined again before they were allowed to sail. Molson argued
men who had been tested for VD should be confined to their barracks for the two days
they stayed in Buxton to ensure the results of their earlier medical inspections were
accurate. He also recommended that an early treatment centre be established at Buxton to
inspect every man returning to camp regardless of his previous medical history. Any
soldier who did not pass this inspection should be held for treatment and further testing.
To catch latent cases of VD, men should undergo another inspection for VD once the
steamer landed in Canada. Men who were free of infection were given a blue card that
indicated they were fit to continue home or return to duty. VD cases that developed
during the voyage would be issued red cards, segregated and “placed under escort
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disposition by the SMO.”58 Once these measures were implemented Molson believed, “it
would be possible to keep track of every man and to eliminate entirely the danger of any
man carrying back to his home the infection.”59 Although comprehensive policies were
already in place, those concerned with public health in Canada championed the creation
even stricter regulations. Meanwhile, personnel overseas were skeptical that these new
plans would be feasible or more effective.
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Hanson, Commanding Officer of the Discharge Depot,
was highly critical of Molson’s report. He argued instituting these changes was neither
realistic nor necessary. Molson’s suggestion that men should be confined to the barracks
after inspection, Hanson argued, was both impossible and unwarranted since only a small
percentage of men scheduled to sail actually had a history of VD. Since the statistics
showed only ninety-two of the almost 12,000 men who had been sent back to Canada
were held for VD, Hanson felt it was unfair to treat all of the men like prisoners. Hanson
also believed the possibility of men getting someone else to pass their inspection was
very slight. His view was supported by the fact there was no evidence to support this
claim, so it would make little sense to draft procedures to address a non-existent issue.
Furthermore, Hanson considered a ship of 1150 docking in Canada with only seven cases
of VD a good outcome. In what is likely a veiled reference to homosexuality Hanson
stated, “Take 1150 civilians, either from a shop or from an Ecclesiastical College and I
think you would find a higher percentage and in the case of the last sailing where men
were only here two days, they might be perfectly clean when they leave here, and they
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are, but we cannot prevent disease breaking out on the boat. I will be safe in stating that
there has never been a party of 1150 men come from Canada as clean as we send them
back.”60 Hanson’s remark reveals the frustration overseas officials felt about the apparent
double standard in VD controls championed by authorities in Canada. Given the high
rates of VD among servicemen coming from Canada, overseas personnel felt their
procedures were unfairly scrutinized.
Dismissive of the problems Molson had outlined, Hanson was equally critical of
his suggestions for improvement. The use of a colour card system, he argued, was of little
benefit given the amount of cards and documentation that was currently in place.61
Soldiers returning to Canada already had to answer 386 questions and provide their
signature eighteen times on thirteen different forms compared to the three forms required
by the both the British and Australian armies. 62 It was also unnecessary since a
Government of Canada (GOC) order was issued on 5 February 1917 that said no soldiers
could leave the United Kingdom unless they possessed the proper certification. Returned
men needed to have a medical certificate, issued no later than three days before the
scheduled sailing, that was signed by an MO from the CAMC and said the soldier in
question was free from all infectious, skin and venereal diseases. The order also included
a provision that “no venereal disease, whether in the acute or chronic stage, is permitted

60

LAC, RG9-III-B-1 Vol. 3596, Letter: from Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Hanson to Argyll
House, Soldiers Who Have VD Returning to Canada, 22 October 1917.
61

Ibid.

62

Morton, A Peculiar Kind of Politics, p.179.

229

to return to Canada.” 63 With these measures already in place, Hanson believed the
addition of coloured cards was redundant.
Hanson had similar reservations about Molson’s suggestion for early treatment
facilities in Buxton. The cost of establishing a centre there would be enormous and
ultimately have little impact. Hanson said that he personally warned the men every
morning that if they contracted VD after their arrival at the discharge depot, they would
have their proceedings canceled and may find themselves delayed for three or four
months. A better way to catch the few cases that developed after men arrived at the
discharge depot was to have MOs on the boat hold inspections. Once in Canada, these
cases could then be isolated and placed in detention quarters. “In conclusion,” Hanson
wrote, “I would state that we are very particular on this subject here and I think our
record will show that we do not send venereal disease to Canada, but over there when the
shoe is on the other foot, they let them come over here.”64 Hanson’s statement was
supported by an epidemiological study undertaken by Captain Gordon Bates in 1917 at
the Base Hospital in Toronto. The study showed VD rates were far lower amongst
returned soldiers than in a similar subsection of males in the civilian population. Bates
argued that this was because soldiers received education, inspection, quarantine and

63

LAC, RG9-III-B-1 Vol. 3596, Letter from Surgeon General DMS to Argyll House,
Prevention of the Return of Soldiers to Canada, Suffering from Venereal Disease, 6
February 1917.
64

LAC, RG9-III-B-1 Vol. 3596, Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Hanson to Argyll
House, Soldiers Who Have VD Returning to Canada, 22 October 1917. G

230

treatment. 65 Even though rates were lower among returned soldiers in living Canadian
urban centres, they remained the focal point for concerns over rising rates of VD.
The military command structure ensured men would submit to medical exams and
treatments but there was little that could be done to compel private citizens to undergo
VD testing or treatments. This situation was problematic as the high rates of VD were not
limited to Canadian soldiers overseas. Civilians, as well as troops stationed in Canada,
suffered from high rates of infection. Those serving overseas were quick to point out that
25 per cent of soldiers who were diagnosed with VD had contracted the disease while
still in Canada and were not properly inspected before being sent overseas.66 MajorGeneral G.C. Jones, the DGMS of the Canadian contingent in 1917, argued stringent
measures for returning soldiers were inconsequential if public health authorities ignored
the rest of the population. While all three groups were involved in the spread and
transmission of the disease, “the only one of these three that there seems a general
consensus to attack is the third, probably because it is thought here is a group of men
whose history is recorded and who are helpless to resist interference.”67 Jones believed
that until Canada developed a cohesive public policy to address all three categories it
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made little sense to only target cases that developed overseas. Especially since of the
three groups, soldiers had likely received the best care. The majority of overseas cases
had been thoroughly treated and while a few may sometimes still be infective, Jones
argued there was little more that could be done in those instances. All cases should be
returned to Canada for treatment, “then there will be a question of policy as to whether it
is better to treat these men at a Base Hospital and ignore the social storm stirred up, or in
each military division or district.”68 Holding these cases overseas did little to improve
public health but it did impact public opinion. Jones stressed that Canadians needed to
“get over the delight of being shocked by the problem.”69 The Canadian authorities, he
continued, needed to go “a little deeper into the subject in their own borders. It would
seem premature and not very sound to commence the campaign from this end.”70
Not all overseas officials wanted to return cases to Canada. Colonel W.T.M.
MacKinnon, OC at Etchinghill, felt patients would recover more quickly if kept in special
hospitals in England. His vocal opposition followed a report that indicated there were
forty VD cases at his hospital that were permanently disabled and should be sent back to
Canada. After examining the cases in question, he found that twenty-nine had since been
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discharged while the medical officers in charge of the remaining eleven cases reported
they would be released to their units within the next few weeks. In response to the report,
MacKinnon also examined the 170 cases that had been hospitalized for longer than three
months. He selected forty-two of these cases for examination by a Board of Specialists
“with a view of finally determining whether it is in the best interests of the Service to
have these men returned to Canada for further treatment.”71 “I am of the opinion,” he
wrote, “that it will not be in the best interests of the Service to return more than 20 of
them to Canada.”72 He argued that while the average stay of chronic cases was around
ninety-days, many had been hospitalized for 150 to 250 days but were eventually
discharged to duty. These rest periods, he argued, were crucial to recovery. The delays
caused by transporting these cases to Canada would likely exacerbate the disease and
slow recovery. Given these concerns, MacKinnon asserted it was “ utterly impossible to
lay down a hard and fast rule regarding the disposal of protracted cases. The disposal of
these cases should be left to the discretion of the Commanding Officer and Specialists at
this hospital.”73 He vowed that patients were receiving the best care available while also
returning them to service as soon as possible to conserve manpower in the Canadian
Corps. While some cases would not benefit from staying in England, he argued a
significant portion of long-term cases could eventually be returned to duty. Whether or
not MacKinnon’s assessment was correct, his views are interesting as he one of the few
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people involved that considered the cases from a medical standpoint. Unconcerned about
overseas resources or public health in Canada, MacKinnon believed holding chronic
cases would produce better curative rates.
Others in the medical community also supported keeping cases overseas to
maintain discipline. Colonel Simpson, serving as ADMS of 3rd Division in France,
concluded it was “in the best interest of the Canadian Corps, in fact all of the Canadians
overseas and at home by refusing to return such men without previously having assured
ourselves that they are cured, or every effort has been made to effect a cure.”74 His view
was predicated on the belief that this type of order was an effective deterrent as men,
wanting to return home as soon as possible, would exhibit more caution in sexual matters.
The refusal to return Canadian soldiers with VD until they received treatment had been
frequently used as a disciplinary tool to discourage sexual intercourse. Simpson asserted
that this rule should be strictly enforced among soldiers stationed in both France and
England, so that “nothing could be left open to criticism.”75
Coordination problems in the overseas contingent played a role in creating some
of the problems that existed. Difficulties in recording-keeping and communication
between authorities in France and those stationed in England created problems with
regards to VD returns from the continent. The Department of Militia and Defense in
Ottawa complained that medical case sheets from France, which were used to ensure
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every soldier with a history of VD was checked before embarkation, were not reliable.76
Under the established protocol, men who showed a history of VD in their personnel files
were supposed to submit to a Wassermann or complement fixation test to confirm they
were disease-free. If this information was missing, it meant that men could potentially be
sent back to Canada without being flagged for extra inspections and testing before being
allowed to sail. Fotheringham stated “In view of the number of cases reported as
‘positives’ on routine examination in hospitals in Canada, it would appear that the subject
marginally referred to [the records from France] is entitled to early and careful
consideration and will have a direct bearing on the scope of the measures adopted in
Canada in dealing with soldiers before they are discharged from the service.”77 Without
an accurate medical report, men with a history of VD might not receive extra testing
before being sent back to Canada. Men who did not have open lesions but were still
infective could be returned home unaware of their status.
To address this potential issue, in May 1918 overseas officials recommended that
testing facilities be improved. The basic procedures stayed the same. All men underwent
a medical inspection prior to boarding. Any soldier who showed a history of VD on their
medical case sheets received a clinical examination including any necessary
bacteriological or serological testing to ensure they were no longer symptomatic before
being returned to Canada. To improve the quality and speed of testing, laboratories had
been established at Buxton and Liverpool. Amyot had personally instructed the chief
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personnel there about the method, objective and recording of the examinations. Amyot
was confident the estimated 7 per cent of soldiers who had VD in their history had been
treated as thoroughly as possible, much more than they would have been in civilian life.
Even after the most rigorous therapy, it was still possible that syphilis or gonorrhea could
manifest later in life. Amyot contended a “complete cure of VD cases in present state of
practice and knowledge, and facility is not accomplished…To treat these cases to finality
would require facilities such do not yet exist in England.”78 Unable to ‘cure’ all VD
cases, the overseas contingent would instead do their best to simplify the disembarking
and discharge process in Canada. Under the new overseas guidelines, men would be
notified of the results of their tests and if they required further treatment once they
returned home. Previously, VD cases had been returned to Canada without any
information about their medical status. However, this new policy did not permit military
or government authorities to interfere with their movements after they arrived back in
Canada. 79 Once they were discharged from the military, these men could no longer be
compelled to undergo any treatment. If authorities wanted to control the spread of VD
from servicemen, they had to ensure men were examined and underwent treatments
before they were officially released from the military.
This modified plan was designed to return VD cases without overwhelming
medical facilities in Canada. Original estimates concluded that 7 per cent of men returned
to Canada would have a history of VD and only a small percentage of them would require
any further treatment. Canadian officials had agreed, in principle, to takeover these cases.
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Although there was a preliminary agreement in place, there was no consensus between
Canadian and overseas officials with regards to the actual details of the plan. Overseas
authorities wanted to send all chronic cases back to Canada, which would include any
case that had been undergoing treatment for longer than six months or any man who
would not be returned to duty within six months because of ongoing VD treatments. The
plan was to return a maximum of fifty chronic cases per month up to a maximum of 1200
per year if it was necessary. They were confident that Canada would be able to handle the
return of all of these chronic cases. The current hospital system in Canada, they argued,
could easily absorb fifty cases per month without putting a strain on its existing
resources. The laboratories at Liverpool and Buxton would help facilitate the return of
these cases by conducting the examinations, collecting clinical data and generating
reports “in order that Canada may fully appreciate the amount of treatment they have
received; their present condition; and the indications for further treatment.”80 From the
perspective of overseas officials, they had taken great care to ensure that soldiers with
VD posed a minimal risk to the general public. It was decided, however, that they would
not reveal the details of this plan to Canadian authorities until after Major-General Foster
returned from France and there were enough invalids, including non-venereal patients, to
fill two hospital ships. 81
After returning from France in June of 1918, still months away from the end of
hostilities, Foster began drafting new plans for returning soldiers, which included the
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eventual demobilization of VD patients. His first suggestion was all Canadian special
hospitals, including the venereal ones, and early treatment centres should remain open
until the end of demobilization. Contrary to current policy, Foster argued that once the
war was over they would not be able to seriously consider a system of universal testing
for overseas transports. This type of widespread testing would not be practical once
overseas authorities were faced with returning tens of thousands of men home in a
shortened period of time. This view was compounded by the belief that the clinical and
laboratory tests for syphilis (Wassermann) and gonorrhea (Schwartz) were not very
reliable. Since treatments were generally only successful in the acute, early stages of
these diseases, it made little sense to root out the chronic cases and detain them overseas.
Foster argued that the most they could do in England was to prevent the transfer of men
with primary or secondary stage syphilis, or acute gonorrhea, through physical
inspections prior to boarding. These cases could be held for treatment. Any chronic cases
were to be returned to Canada.82 However, this plan was criticized later that month when
twenty-three chronic cases were sent to Canada, seemingly without approval from
Ottawa, which renewed the debate over how to handle chronic cases.83 Canadian officials
did not agree that chronic cases should be invalided back to Canada and argued that they
should remain in England until they were cured.84
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Over the course of the war, there had been considerable discussion between
domestic and overseas officials over the return of soldiers with VD. This debate
intensified during demobilization when it became impossible to appease Canada’s request
for tight restrictions on returns. Authorities in Canada wanted all chronic cases held
overseas until they could be considered cured while CAMC officials overseas quickly
discovered that this system was not feasible especially when tasked with the
demobilization of overseas operations. Concerns over public health would no longer be
the main factor shaping VD policies that had kept most cases in England.

Demobilization
Procedures for returning soldiers with a history of VD became even more
complicated after the Armistice was signed and the tens of thousands of Canadians
serving overseas could be sent home. The original plan was that men would be returned
by their units with any remaining soldiers being sent back according to the “first in, first
out” principle. This system had to be altered when the actual rate of return surpassed
earlier estimates.85 According to the original demobilization plan, men with a history of
VD on their medical case sheets were examined and held for treatment if needed. This
testing, even with its limitations, had become standard protocol for returning men during
the war, but maintaining this system was no longer feasible once the war was over. Just a
week after the Armistice, Foster informed Ottawa that “On account of the conditions
arisen here in reference to despatch [sic] of low category men, and the availability of
Transport to Canada, it has been found necessary to suspend the special post-V.D.
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Examination of those soldiers showing V.D. entry on their Medical History Sheets.”86The
logistics of a mass demobilization had created tensions as thousands of Canadian soldiers
waited for their sailings. During this time Canadian soldiers were accused of excessive
drinking and other raucous behaviour that was attributed to a combination of
overcrowding and lack of discipline.87 These types of incidents helped speed up the
process. As more transports were made available, the rate of demobilization increased
dramatically and the average soldier actually spent less than a month in England waiting
for their sailing.88
This accelerated timeline significantly altered the earlier protocol for processing
soldiers with VD. Foster assured Ottawa these changes would still ensure the safe return
of these cases. Inspections would still be conducted to catch acute cases of gonorrhea or
men with open sores. These cases were still held for treatment but men with a history of
VD would no longer undergo additional testing. Their medical case sheets were sent to
the Disembarkation Medical Officer in Canada who would assess these cases. 89
Authorities in England were confident these cases could be easily processed with
minimal risk to Canada thanks to the thorough and accurate medical case sheets for each
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soldier. 90 They argued all men who had contracted VDS during the war had received
their full courses of treatment prior to going to France. However, Lieutenant-Colonel
Seymour Bulloch argued that many patients did not complete outpatient treatment but
were sent to France “when v.d. conditions were at their worst.”91 To rectify the situation,
he suggested that orders should be issued and read on parade that men who exposed
themselves needed to have their blood tested even if they had been in the hospital.
Bulloch believed that men would readily respond once they told it was for the “future of
Canada.”92 Foster replied that this action was not necessary as “practically no men during
the last 2 years have gone to France who have not been given their full course of
treatment.” 93 The special hospital in Witley guaranteed that no man suffering from
syphilis and undergoing arsenic treatment would be included in drafts for dispatch to
Canada until their treatments were completed.94 All of these men had also been informed
that they might require further treatment six months or even a year after their initial
treatments and were made aware of the facilities that were available for follow-up care.95

90

LAC, RG9-III-B-1, Vol. 3618,Major-General Foster, Special Examination of Soldiers
Returning to Canada with V.D. Entry of Medical History Case Sheets, 18 November
1918.
91

LAC, RG9-III-B-2, Vol. 3617, Letter from Lieutenant Colonel Seymour Bulloch to
Argyll House, 22 January 1919.
92

Ibid.

93

LAC, RG9-III-B-1, Vol. 3617, Letter from Major-General Foster to Argyll House, 29
January 1919.
94

LAC, RG9-III-B-1, Vol. 3618, Major-General Foster, Return to Canada of Soldiers
Suffering From Syphilis, 25 June 1919.
95

LAC, RG9-III-B-1, Vol. 3617, Letter: from Major-General Foster to Argyll House, 29
January 1919.
241

Officials overseas argued they were doing everything possible to ensure the health of the
soldiers and guard against public health risks back home.
To accommodate the influx of VD cases, Canadian authorities had to develop
procedures for processing and treating these cases, if needed, once they arrived back in
Canada. On 20 January of 1919 Privy Council Order (PCO) 47 was issued by Governor
General Victor Cavendish to coordinate the return of soldiers with VD. PCO 47 stated, “it
is considered imperative that the public should be safeguarded as far as is possible from
the danger of infection from men being discharged from the Canadian Expeditionary
Force who have had venereal disease.”96 The order was issued to the OC in every
Military District and stated that all men and officers who had contracted VD while
enlisted were to undergo an examination by the Officer in Charge of Venereal Disease in
each district prior to being discharged from the army. Cases of chronic VDG, or men who
had only received one course of treatment but had no open lesions would be discharged.97
These cases were told it was in their best interest, as well as their communities, to receive
further treatment if the disease reappeared. Treatments would be made available free of
charge by the DSCR.98 The reports of their diagnoses were marked ‘confidential’ and
forwarded to the Medical Officer of Health in the soldier’s home province along with the
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man’s name and address. The same criterion was applied to men who were later
hospitalized in Canada with VDS. 99 In order to adapt to the challenges of a mass
demobilization, officials in Canada had to assume more responsibility over VD cases.
To ensure men were properly processed once they arrived in Canada, authorities
there relied on the accuracy of records and information provided by their overseas
counterparts. They requested that soldiers travel with all of their medical information and
documentation whereas overseas officials included pertinent information on the nominal
rolls. Since the armistice, the nominal rolls had been forwarded to Ottawa, most often
before the troops sailed, instead of accompanying the actual ship. The sheer number of
men made it exceedingly difficult to coordinate the collection of individual
documentation except for when men were boarded at the initial camp where the
inspection took place. It was possible, however, that men may be sent to other camps
prior to their actual departure. This reality made the possibility of collecting every man’s
documents, and sending them with the particular ship that they were sailing on, nearly
impossible. In some cases, however, it was reported that nominal roles did not always
reach the venereal disease officers at the point of embarkation or for the arrival of troop
ships at the points of dispersal, which went against PCO 47. Foster felt that although the
nominal roles may arrive late to Ottawa, they would have the necessary information
including addresses for any men who had VD. Troops received a final medical inspection
just before their final embarkation and anyone with an acute case or fresh lesions would
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still be held in England for further treatment. With all of these safeguards already in
place, it was not necessary to create more paperwork. Foster contended,
So many documents are being demanded by Canada, and
documents have to be handled by so many Departments before
embarkation that to advise another inspection of documents for
this purpose just previous to embarkation, would retard the
embarkation of troops some considerable time, and it is not
thought that the results of such delay would justify this step
being taken. The Medical Service in England is working at the
present time at full capacity, and this would entail quite
additional extra work on the medical and clerical staffs if put
into operation.100
The pressures of demobilization continually countermanded the requests of Canadian
authorities, which still wanted overseas personnel to assume the bulk of responsibilities
despite the fact the war was over and overseas resources were decreasing.
As Canadian personnel returned home, overseas medical operations were
significantly reduced. The shuttering of medical services made it logistically difficult and
impractical to keep VD cases in England. In June of 1919, there were still 6,102
Canadian patients hospitalized in England and about 2,000 of these cases were for VD.101
A report from 23 June 1919 stated that Moore Barracks was slated to close first on 10
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July and still had 664 patients. Epsom and Bramshott were scheduled to close at the end
of July or early August and had 522 and forty-seven VD patients respectively. Witley had
the highest number of patients at 889 and was given the probable closure date of August
1919.102 It was still policy to retain and treat cases in the acute or infective stages but
accommodating these cases was becoming increasingly difficult. There was still
considerable debate between Canadian authorities in Ottawa and London about the best
way to deal with the remaining Canadian VD cases. Fotheringham reported officials in
England wished to dispatch a group of 300 venereals starting on 3 July 1919. However,
General Frank Mewburn in Canada urged them to reconsider as Ottawa wanted VD cases
to remain in England until cured. But Fotheringham’s request was prompted by reports
that 1,000 VD patients who had been transferred there from the continent and had been
responsible for recent riots in Epsom. The result was British officials wanted to transfer
the majority of the men back to Canada regardless of whether they had finished their
treatments. 103 On 24 June 1919, the Overseas Military Forces of Canada (OMFC)
reported, “owing to the present feeling on the part of the inhabitants at Epsom towards
Canadian Personnel, it is been decided to evacuate Epsom Hospital entirely…[and it] will
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be completed about July 1st next.”104 Plans were made to move the patients to Moore
Barracks in Shorncliffe, which marked a reversal from the previous plan to transfer
patients to Epsom from Moore Barracks since it was supposed to be the first of the
remaining hospitals to close.105 Ottawa felt this move was a better alternative to sending
these patients back to Canada.106
Canadian authorities argued an influx of patients would create a number of
logistical and financial problems in Canada. Current facilities could not manage the
return of almost 2000 men, many of who still needed treatment, over the course of just
two months. Men needed to be segregated in Camp Borden or Long Branch, which would
exacerbate existing staffing shortages. Accommodating more cases required an expansion
of existing facilities and men would also need to be transported to Toronto, both of which
would be costly. The change in location would also make it increasingly difficult for
these men to conceal their conditions from their friends and families. Mewburn believed
many men would have preferred to stay overseas until their treatments were complete. He
wrote,
It has been strongly felt that the majority of the men concerned
would prefer to be cured overseas, rather than be brought here to
face a period of segregation in Canada, with the practical
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certainty of their conditions becoming known to their relatives.
So as far as facilities and staff overseas are concerned, it is
understood that these exist. The largest V.D. Camp now is at
Witley, where it is understood that there is abundant room for
expansion. I am aware of the fact that there are many Medical
Officers ready to remain Overseas so that there will be no
difficulty about the staff.107
However, Major Paul, who had inspected Camp Borden in July 1918, had already
recommended that the next of kin of these soldiers should not be notified of their arrival
since they could not immediately return home. This practice, he argued, would ease the
minds of patients whose families may not have been aware of their conditions. It would
also benefit the medical staff from having to deal with an influx of questions from
anxious friends and relatives.108
If VD patients were eager to stay in England to keep their condition under wraps,
Canadian authorities were equally motivated to keep them overseas for the same reason.
The logistics of caring for these men in Canada were not Mewburn’s only concern; public
opinion was another important factor. “We have had to take a very great deal of pains,”
Mewburn wrote, “to satisfy public opinion and prevent scandal with regard to the
incidence of VD among the Canadian troops, and all our best effort, it is thought, would
be neutralised by the knowledge which would spread all over the country if two or three
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ships, and four or five hospital trains, loaded with cases of this type, had been returned
from overseas and transported in a contagious condition half way across the
continent.”109 Overseas authorities did not agree. They largely supported the British view
that they should evacuate all remaining patients. Continuing to keep patients in the
United Kingdom until they were treated would significantly delay the demobilization of
the remainder of the Canadian Corps. They saw no reason to hold these patients until
September and thought they could have the majority of the remaining 2900 men out by
August.110 The only purpose the delay seemed to serve was the desire of Canadian
authorities to limit criticism “The objections from Canada,” a memo from the OMFC
argued, “have not been stated officially, rightly or wrongly, they are assumed to be ones
which are based on the grounds of public sentiment and arise out of social conditions. In
this connection it is noted that of 10,777 cases dealt with by this service in which the
source of the disease was ascertained that 1366 originated in Canada prior to
embarkation.”111 Although there was already a VD problem at home, authorities in
Canada hoped keeping men overseas would allow them to avoid discussing rates of VD
among its soldiers or citizens.
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While some men may have been anxious to get home as soon as possible, MOs
overseas were concerned that many men who still required treatment for VD were not in
the same rush. Some officials felt it was not just the fear of being exposed but also their
desire to remain in the hospital that slowed their recoveries. As long as these men were
still hospitalized overseas, they could not be discharged from the army. Staff at Witley
began to suspect that a number of patients in their care were reluctant to return home and
resume their normal duties. Lieutenant Colonel E.L. Stone, OC at Witley, reported to the
ADMS they “have reason to suspect that in some instances there is not hearty cooperation on the part of the patient in hastening recovery, and that some patients prefer
the treatment and care of the hospital to discharge from the Army and returning to
work.”112 He asked if there was still a provision in place for invaliding men back to
Canada who had been in the hospital for more than four months as they had twelve
patients in their care they wanted to discharge. The OMFC replied that the twelve cases
in question should be transferred immediately to No. 5 Canadian General Hospital in
Liverpool in anticipation of sailing on 12 May back to Canada.113
Demobilization put increased pressure on a system that was already under
constant scrutiny. The process of returning tens of thousands of Canadian soldiers made it
near impossible to conduct universal testing, especially when the actual rate of
demobilization exceeded initial estimates. Despite these new challenges, Canadian
officials still wanted to treat cases overseas to avoid a public health crisis and minimize
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public criticism. However, holding these cases was became exceedingly difficult to do as
overseas medical services were shuttered. The stringent procedures that were in place for
much of the war, had to be abandoned when the war ended and Canada was tasked with
demobilizing its overseas contingent at a rapid pace.

Conclusion
In spite of the policies and procedures that were put in place, Canadian officials in
Ottawa continually argued throughout the war that Canadian overseas officials were not
doing enough to mitigate the risk of returning soldiers who were still infected. Domestic
officials frequently demanded that procedures be altered to address their concerns. These
requests could include holding more cases in England, increasing the number of preembarkation inspections and forms, or even confining men to barracks for the time in
between their final inspection and sailing to limit their exposure during these few days.
Overseas officials, already burdened with maintaining a healthy army and winning a war,
were unwilling to add more steps to existing procedures. Especially given that statistics
compiled by the CAMC showed almost 25 per cent of Canadian soldiers had contracted
VD while still Canada. With officials there doing little to prevent these cases from having
been sent overseas in the first place, enforcing even stricter standards overseas made little
sense until Canadian officials were willing to face the VD problem at home.
Even with the developments in the diagnosis and treatment of VD - with the
advances for complement fixation tests - there was no way to guarantee all men would be
returned home ‘cured.’ Doctors were still aware of the limitations of these tests for
accurately diagnosing VD and the ability to effectively treat all of these cases. The
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CAMC utilized military resources and laboratories to address the problems with
contemporary testing especially with regards to developing a suitable antigen in an effort
to improve VDG testing. The war provided CAMC personnel with a unique opportunity
to expand on prior VD research that had been done in Canada. While their work
ultimately did not improve the quality of testing that was used to screen returning
soldiers, their work highlights the connections between civilian and military medicine
that are created under wartime conditions.
The process of demobilization intensified the debates between overseas and
Canadian officials concerning the procedures surrounding the return of men with VD.
Already aware that testing could be inconclusive and with VD already a concern at home,
overseas officials proposed relaxing procedures in order to expedite the return of soldiers,
even those with a history of VD. Instead of holding every man with a history of VD,
which had been part of procedure since 1916, men were inspected and anyone with fresh
lesions was held in England. The demands of demobilization did not allow for any
extensive testing, instead the nominal rolls forwarded to Ottawa would note any man who
had a history of infection so that authorities there could implement procedures to dispose
of these cases. Canadian officials were reluctant to take on more cases, even chronic
ones, but the dismantling of overseas medical operations made it increasingly difficult to
keep patients in England. The views and capabilities of overseas officials frequently
conflicted with the demands of Canadian officials concerning the so-called VD problem
among soldiers. Early in the war, concerns over public health and public opinion were
important issues that influenced the development of policies and procedures for returning
venereal cases to Canada. Over the course of the war, however, the realties of war and
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demobilization increasingly became more significant factors in determining the creation
of policies that regulated the return of infected soldiers.
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Conclusion
On 23 September 1914, Lester Learmouth, a twenty-six-year-old paper maker
from East Angus, Quebec, enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.1 Sometime in
May of 1915 while serving with the 14th Battalion in France, the unmarried Learmouth
contracted VD. Once the first symptoms appeared, he was sent to No. 22 General
Hospital on 23 December 1915 with a diagnosis of syphilis and was given a hospital
stoppage. He spent two weeks at No. 22 General followed by a brief stay at No. 1
Convalescent Camp before being admitted to the special VD hospital ward at No. 9
Stationary in Le Harve as ‘Not Yet Diagnosed.’ Doctors were likely unsure if it was VDS
or VDG since both diagnoses appear in his medical records. Learmouth spent almost two
months at No. 9 Stationary before being discharged to No. 11 Convalescent Hospital. On
10 March 1916 he rejoined his unit in France – two and a half months after leaving the
line.
A few months later, while on short leave in England, Learmouth checked in to
Shorncliffe Hospital with VDG. He claimed he had contracted the infection on 16 June
1916 when he checked into Shorncliffe on 24 June. However, given the short period of
incubation these symptoms were likely caused by his previous infection. On 2 July,
Learmouth was sent to Cherry Hinton with VDG and was discharged twenty-two days
later. He spent time with several units in England before being sent back to France in
May of 1917 – nearly a year later. He remained in France until 16 March 1919 during
which time he managed to stay out of the hospital although he did not stay out of trouble.
1
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He received No. 2 Field Punishment twice: once for drunkenness while on active service
and later for not complying with orders from an NCO. During this time Learmouth was
also sentenced to “make good” for the value of potatoes he had stolen from a Belgian
farmer. On 21 March 1919, Learmouth was given a Wassermann test at Witley that came
back a strong positive. Despite this, his file said “he would be dealt with on arrival in
accordance with P.C.O. 47” and Learmouth proceeded to Canada on 10 April 1919.2
Once back in Canada, Learmouth tested positive for syphilis but was discharged
on 21 April 1919. The following June, he received word that he was not eligible for a
pension on the grounds that he could return to his former trade as a paper maker.
Learmouth resumed work in his former trade in East Angus. He married in 1920 and had
a son who was born in 1921. There were no reports of any illness or problems until five
years later when Learmouth was admitted to St. Anne’s Hospital in Bellevue on 6 May
1924 with general paresis, a severe neurological disorder causing insanity that occurs in
tertiary stage syphilis. The admitting physician reported,
Man has no complaints but states in a jocular manner that he
has syphilis and supposes that he will have treatment for this
while in hospital…There is a noticeable slurring of the speech.
The emotional mood is one of exaltation and elation. He is
quite satisfied with his lot and is satisfied at being confined to
his ward. The ethical sense shows degeneration and he talks of
chancre and anti-luetic treatment before the Nurse with entire
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freedom and without any feelings of shame or apology. He is
very unstable emotionally, laughs with little if any
provocation: is highly pleased with himself, everybody and
everything. A degree of confusion exists and he not
infrequently hunts through the fellow patients’ lockers without
seeming to appreciate the error. This case appears without
question of doubt to be General Paresis.3
It is clear that by the time Learmouth was admitted to St. Anne’s he was already suffering
from tertiary stage syphilis. As is characteristic of general paresis, he exhibited loss of
inhibitions and suffered from delusions and problems with his speech. Over the next few
months, his condition continued to deteriorate to the point where he had lost both muscle
and brain function and was bedridden. Evidently, the treatments he had received overseas
did not cure his disease. Given his mental state when he was finally hospitalized, it is also
unlikely that he had not sought further medical intervention after being discharged, even
though it was available through the DCSR.
Learmouth remained at St. Anne’s until he died on 2 June 1925, by which time he
had become completely dependent on his caregivers. Shortly after his death, his wife
applied for a pension but received word in August 1925 that her husband’s death was not
related to his military service. Her application was rejected although she did receive $75
from the DSCR for his funereal expenses. On 30 August, Mrs. Learmouth wrote to the
Pensioner Commissioners inquiring as to why her application had been rejected since she
was
3
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Sure some of his trouble was due to the war for he was
overseas nearly five years, also was buried twice or three times
and was in the hospital. I think any person that serve [sic] five
years overseas was enough to make any person out of their
head. I can’t understand why there isn’t a pension. There are
cases around here that are getting pensions that are entitled
much as what I am. It seems very strange that there is nothing
for his son, as I am not able to work, and who is to look after
him I think there is something strange about it. I always
thought that was what the Government was for looking after
the Soldiers dependents [sic].4
The symptoms exhibited by Learmouth when he was admitted to St. Anne’s were similar
to symptoms those associated with shell shock, which she clearly believed her husband
had. It does not appear that Mrs. Learmouth knew the sordid details of her husband’s
service overseas. It is equally possible that her own ill health, which prevented her from
working, could be attributed to syphilis that she had contracted from her husband. The
Board reviewed her letter and file but once again rejected the application. They did not
specify why it was denied, only stating that she and her son were not entitled to a
pension. Considering his five-years of service, this response clearly frustrated Mrs.
Learmouth. “I do not think it is hardly fair,” she told the pension board in a letter dated
May 1926, “to let things like this go on. I could name over more than a dozen people that
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are drawing a pension in this town that has a husband to work for them also son, that
were never in the firing lines. I can’t understand why this is.” 5 An internal letter
addressing Mrs. Learmouth’s request stated that after careful consideration the
dependents were still not entitled to a pension but “it is suggested that the above
information be treated as confidential in so far as it related to the nature of the condition
causing the disability which resulted in death.”6 Instead B.J. Kee, Secretary for the BPC,
informed Sherbrooke MP C.B. Howard, who had petitioned the board on the family’s
behalf, that “if you are in Ottawa sometime in the future I will be glad to discuss with you
personally and fully the marginally noted man’s case. His death was the result of an
infection which was contracted during service, but which is considered as misconduct
under the Pension Act and is not pensionable. The above information is confidential, and
I know you will not communicate such to his dependents, relations or friends.”7
The story of Lester Learmouth is an interesting example of what was probably a
typical case of VD. He was sent to the rear after receiving several different diagnoses
before finally undergoing treatment at No. 9 Stationary Hospital after contracting syphilis
in France. During his time in hospital he was subject to the army’s punitive measures for
VD and received a hospital stoppage. Upon his arrival at No. 11 Convalescent Hospital,
however, his hospital stoppage was reversed, likely because he was employed as a
stretcher-bearer or performed other manual labour while there. Although his infection
should have prevented him from taking leave for twelve months, this policy was
5
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evidently not widely enforced. Just three months after rejoining his unit he contracted, or
had a reoccurrence, of VD while on short leave in England. Despite the fact that cases
like his were to return to France to undergo treatment, he remained in England.
Learmouth would spend the next ten months in the hospital system before returning to the
front. When it was time for him to return home he was given a Wassermann, which came
back positive for syphilis. Earlier in the war this test result would have delayed his return
home, but since it was March 1919, he was immediately returned to Canada according to
the stipulations of Privy Council Order 47, which had been put in place to meet the
demands of demobilization. Cases like Lester Learmouth no doubt substantiated the fears
of Canadian officials that soldiers would return home and infect women in Canada. Mrs.
Learmouth likely suffered from VDS, which she had contracted from her husband.
Although since she was kept in the dark about her husband’s ‘war related’ illness, the
preferred legacy of the war remained intact.
Venereal disease created a number of difficulties for the Canadian Army Medical
Corps. The high rates of infection early on in the conflict were made worse by the fact
that the British Army went into the war without a comprehensive policy towards VD. In
an effort to reduce infection rates and appease concerns over morality, the military
experimented with punitive measures such as court martial, hospital stoppages and
legislation aimed at prostitutes and local women. When this approach failed to address
the problem, both the BEF and CEF also utilized a medical approach and established
early treatment centres and prophylaxis kits. Even with this shift in policy, the problem
required the development of separate medical services to treat VD cases. Along with
contemporary stigmas and limitations of testing and drugs, the CAMC had to work within
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the confines of the RAMC. An examination of their records show that, while the VD
management system in the CEF followed the guidelines and orders set out by the War
Office, the CAMC displayed some autonomy. They utilized their special hospitals and
laboratories to experiment with new techniques and drugs in an effort to improve the
efficiency of the system. In England, at least, they operated with little interference from
the British. Hospitals like Etchinghill were actively involved in improving the VD
management system by way of better conditions, educating medical officers and utilizing
their labs to further VD research.
This independence did not extend to VD management in France where, despite
the development of a system that returned men to their units sooner, the RAMC forced
the CAMC to fall in line with the British system of sending cases to the rear. The
procedures that had been implemented in France were not able to meet the new
challenges created by the mobility of the battlefield in late 1918. Earlier that same year,
conditions in England were also subjected to an inquiry. The deaths of eleven Canadians
from 606 treatments shows that there were still multiple problems with the VD
management in England after almost four years of war. Hospitals often operated while
overcapacity and understaffed, which led to difficulties with treatment procedures, staff
training and record keeping. These issues were exacerbated by the fact that contemporary
‘cures’ involved the use of mercury and arsenic, two highly toxic compounds. Part of the
VD management system overseas was already under close scrutiny from officials back in
Canada. They were very worried that the returning soldiers to Canada with a history of
VD would cause a public health crisis. This concern, of course, ignored the fact that 25
per cent of the cases had been contracted while men were still in Canada. But even with
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equally high rates among civilian populations, there were concerns that high rates among
soldiers would tarnish the legacy of the war. To control the situation, Canadian officials
demanded strict screening practices prior to embarkation. This system required the
extensive use of the Wassermann and Schwartz tests even though it was well known that
the results were not always conclusive. Canadian pathologists worked to improve testing
methods right up until the end of the war but ultimately these rigorous procedures had to
be abandoned. The demands of demobilization simply did not allow for widespread
testing. Canada had to assume responsibility for the inspection and care of these men
even if they were unwilling to do so. Exploring the CAMC through the lens of VD allows
for a long overdue examination of the medical war of the CEF.
An emphasis on morality shaped the punitive policies and procedures that
characterized VD management in the beginning of the war. As VD rates continued to
increase, these disciplinary tactics were supplemented by a medical approach that used
chemical therapy and preventative measures. VD treatments followed pre-war methods,
utilizing advances in testing and drugs that occurred in the first decade of the twentieth
century. These methods had to be modified to meet the military environment. Military
physicians had more control over men’s bodies than civilian practitioners, so they could
require their patients submit to lengthy, and sometimes painful, treatments. However,
these treatments had to be altered to meet wartime demands. Treatment schedules were
materially shortened and the drugs that were used had to be pushed to their limits to get
soldiers out of the hospital and back to their units as quickly as possible. To address the
VD problem, the British Army created comprehensive procedures and policies.
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Physicians with the CAMC generally followed the framework established by the
RAMC. At the same time, many Canadian officials believed these approaches should also
address long-term concerns like public health and opinion. The British were typically not
as concerned about these factors and their policies reflected this general feeling. The
Canadians instead developed practices to suit their needs, which could create tensions
with the British that varied depending on the theatre of operations. To improve
techniques and practices they utilized the unique opportunities for development and
research created by the war. War gave the young, civilian doctors that made up the bulk
of CAMC personnel money and resources that they could use to further VD research and
development beyond the battlefield. In contrast, the permanent physicians of the RAMC
were military-trained and worked within an existing and well-established military
structure. Examining the Canadian approach to VD shows the unique circumstances that
shaped the development of the CAMC.
This work is a starting point from which we can begin to connect the wartime
experiences of Canadian soldiers like Lester Learmouth to their lives in the interwar
period. As Marina Larrson briefly explores in her book, VD created problems for the
families of these veterans as did cases of shell-shock, tuberculosis, amputation and every
other disease or trauma treated by the CAMC. To fully understand both the short and
long term impacts of war on soldier health we need to better understand the services that
cared from them. Trying to situate this work with the larger historiography draws
attention to the fact that we are missing a comprehensive examination of the Canadian
Army Medical Corps for the First World War. Most recently historians Cynthia Toman
and Mark Humphries have looked at the medical services overseas during the war
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through two different lenses. Toman wrote an excellent history of Canadian nurses while
Humphries expertly examines the treatment of shell shock in the CEF. These works
provide important starting points, insights and examples of how to frame individual
experiences within the larger military organization, but they would benefit from being
part of a larger discourse on the history of the CAMC. The medical history of the
Canadian Expeditionary Force in the First World War deserves to be written.
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